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1 
Introduction 
“If we expect evaluations to be able to confirm ‘what works’ in an area of high complexity 
such as innovation policy, then we are surely expecting too much.”1 
This research aims to contribute to the increasing demand for evidence-based policy making by 
analysing the spread and impact of policy support measures aimed at achieving a socially 
optimal level of R&D and innovation. Moreover, I analyse how public funds affect the 
behaviour of supported firms, but also individual researchers. I emphasise the word ‘contribute’ 
here as I do not pretend to provide an all-encompassing view of what works and what does not, 
but merely add a brick in the growing wall of evidence of how R&D support affects 
beneficiaries and ultimately society. 
The motivation for public intervention in private R&D stems from the link between research 
and development, innovation and economic growth (Mansfield, 1972). Underinvestment in 
R&D – as a component of innovation systems – hinders growth, which paves the way for 
growth-seeking governments to support firms’ efforts in R&D in order to achieve a ‘socially 
optimal’ R&D activity that will produce the innovations needed for advancing the overall 
societal wealth. In other words, when innovation suffers, society suffers. 
Underinvestment in R&D is typically based on two main market failure arguments (Arrow, 
1962). First, because knowledge is a non-rival and non-exclusive good, firms cannot fully 
appropriate the returns on their R&D investments; this stems from knowledge having high fixed 
costs of production and low marginal costs of utilisation. Second, uncertainty is a defining 
characteristic of innovative activity. When firms engage in R&D, they cannot fully predict the 
output by the inputs they employ. If economic actors are risk averse, they will discriminate 
against risky projects (Arrow & Lind, 1970). 
More recently though, RDI policy has been observed from a slightly different perspective that 
complements the focus on the individual firm with a more systemic rationale for intervention 
(Laranja, Uyarra, & Flanagan, 2008; Dodgson et al., 2011; Edquist, 2011).2 The ‘systemists’, 
                                                 
1 Flanagan and Uyarra (2016, p. 184). 
2 The term ‘systemic’ here should be read with a dose of circumspection; it does not imply a systematic approach to 
categorising rationales for policy intervention, but merely defines problems within a framework of innovation 
systems, rather than the linear, neo-classical approach to innovation. 
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if I may, argue that having a market fail implies departure from an ideal innovation system, 
which would be near-impossible to define (Edquist, 2011, p. 1726). They prefer regarding 
innovation as a system – or, to be precise, a multitude of systems – which R&D, financing and 
institutions are parts of.3 For them, policy intervention is required by systemic problems rather 
than market failures. Systemic problems are direct results of the evolutionary nature of 
innovation systems, where path dependency can accommodate trajectories that lead to 
devolution rather than evolution. For example, in the late ‘70s JVC’s VHS became the standard 
consumer analogue video recording system despite the existence of technically superior 
alternatives, such as the Betamax. In evolutionary theory, a system needs to produce more 
offspring than can survive in order to ensure that competition leads the fittest to pass on their 
genes. Similarly, an innovation system needs to support alternative paths that might lead to 
better results. Bluntly put, institutions have the role of ensuring enough variation in R&D as to 
create the premises for evolution – or survival of the fittest innovator. With the risk of spoiling 
the narrative with specificity, I note here that ‘cherry-picking’ the most promising research is 
not a role of institutions, but of the system itself. In this framework, policy should not be 
subsidising top R&D performers, but rather ensure that a wide variety of firms and / or projects 
compete with each other. 
The ‘choice’ of rationale for policy intervention – at least in scholarly environments – has so 
far had less to do with the economic context and more with the prevailing school of thought in 
economic theory at a given point in time. The persistence of market failure arguments for policy 
intervention is tied to the prevalence of neo-classical welfare economics (Laranja et al., 2008, 
p. 824). As evolutionary economic theories appeared, the linear approach to innovation has 
been gradually complemented by the systemic view (Magro & Wilson, 2013). 
My thesis tries to bridge the gap between the market failure and systemic strands of theory, in 
response to recent calls from scientists and policy makers alike for a more integrated view of 
research, development and innovation (Laranja, Uyarra, & Flanagan, 2008; Dodgson et al., 
2011; Edquist, 2011). I understood these calls from three perspectives: a) the need to analyse 
R&D support both vertically – that is, at the intersection between supra-national, national and 
                                                 
3 I refer to R&D and institutions as ‘parts’ of the system, rather than ‘components’. A more exact wording – in 
systemic jargon – would be ‘activities’ of the system of innovation (SI). 
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sub-national policy (Martin, 2016)4 – and horizontally – i.e. the variation between different 
policy implementations, such as direct and indirect measures; b) a need to focus on possible 
interactions that happen not only at policy level, but also between users of policies; c) and 
finally, the necessity for a ‘high-resolution’ analysis of knowledge creation through research 
by focusing not only on firms, but also zooming-in on the behaviour of individual researchers 
as part of a knowledge-creation system. This ABC that I develop throughout my thesis 
acknowledges the fact that research and innovation systems are dynamic and evolve through 
time and across borders and actors, but also that creation through R&D has multiple loci and 
sources (Lundvall, 2007; Dodgson et al., 2011). Failure to address issues on any of these 
dimensions may result in what can be defined as ‘system failure’. For example, unsolved 
systemic problems in academic research will result in a reduced pool of scientific knowledge 
that entrepreneurs can draw upon to create innovations for society through R&D activity. 
Similarly, failure to address problems at the entrepreneurship level will results in less 
innovation and, consequently, a reduced public appetite to fund science at the bottom of this 
food chain. 
The political answers to the issues with R&D and innovation described so far come in various 
shapes and colours. In Belgium alone, there are more than 20 different support measures for 
R&D. For example, there are six R&D-related tax exemptions granted by the federal 
government, and they apply – in theory – uniformly across the national territory. On the other 
hand, regional authorities have devolved powers which allow them to set separate subsidy 
schemes. While this may allow communities to tackle local issues through R&D support, it 
results in over 15 subsidy schemes spread over the three regions – Brussels, Flanders and 
Wallonia. The birth of such ‘multi-headed monster’ policies came from common-held views 
that policy makers were under-utilising the portfolio of instruments that were available to them 
(Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011), and the subsequent systemic shift from national to multi-
level intervention (Martin, 2016, p. 166). Recent audits of the Belgian R&D support landscape 
have found it to resemble a maze which firms find difficult to navigate, resulting in many 
eligible firms not using support they are entitled to (Soete, 2012; Dumont, 2013).5 
                                                 
4 The supra-national level – although an important part of a systemic approach to the analysis of R&D and innovation 
policy – is out of scope of this thesis. I do, however, admit this shortcoming and strongly advocate future research 
should integrate, to the extent possible, this extra policy dimension. 
5 The ‘Soete Reports’ analyse R&D support in Flanders, the largest of the three administrative regions in Belgium. 
Even in this relatively small – on an international scale – 6.4 million-inhabitant region, there is a high degree of 
fragmentation in the R&D support landscape. Considering that the Walloon and Brussels-Capital regions follow 
 
4 
Chapter I 
Building on this observation, in the first chapter I analyse to what extent there is a lack of 
information about support measures for R&D and what are the behavioural processes that firms 
rely on to overcome this deficit. My research complements the literature on peer effects on 
firms’ decision-making (Gort & Konakayama, 1982; Kennedy, 2002; Lu, 2002; Debruyne & 
Reibstein, 2005; Leary & Roberts, 2014) by studying the adoption of R&D support. The 
theoretical basis for this analysis is that peer effects may play a role if the R&D support 
landscape is complex, and firms rely on their peers’ decisions as an input in their own adoption 
decisions. 
Specifically, using a complex empirical identification strategy, I show that firms’ decisions to 
use R&D tax credits are influenced by the choices of their peers, defined at the intersection of 
geographical and economic proximity. The setting has similarities with regional systems of 
innovation literature where tacit knowledge – in my case information about cost-reducing R&D 
tax credits – is geographically bound as it is spread through interpersonal contacts between 
employees and managers of different firms (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). This social 
dimension is a key issue in studying adoption decisions, that is, its comprehensive assessment 
necessitates rising above the level of the individual firm to include social feedback effects (Hall, 
2004). 
The fact that information travels in peer groups that follow industry and distance-based default 
lines suggests possible policy interventions for reducing inefficiencies in the take-up of R&D 
support. Adoption by eligible firms could be expedited by communicating the measure to 
sufficiently fine-grained sectors, and in a geographically-distributed way. As opposed to broad 
policy communications, ‘narrowcasting’ would help to reach many localized firm clusters, or 
peer groups, allowing for rapid peer-to-peer influence once initial adoption has taken place. 
Chapters II and III 
The build-up of the number of firms receiving R&D support – whether affected by their peers 
or other factors – has been constant over time, and in 2011 there were almost 2,000 Belgian 
companies receiving either payroll tax exemptions or subsidies (or both) for R&D. The 
government’s budgetary effort surpassed 500 million Euros for these financing lines alone. This 
                                                 
similar patterns, the overall national policy is intricate and requires skilled managers to make proper use of public 
support and lower firms’ R&D cost. 
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non-negligible amount has led me to examine those companies that manage to navigate their 
way through the multitude of support schemes. More precisely, in the second and third chapters, 
I analyse the effects of R&D payroll tax credits and subsidies on firms' R&D behaviour, both 
from an integral perspective, but also by focusing on the split between (basic and applied) 
research and development. Moreover, I shed light on the interaction between two policy 
measures, in a bid to help policy makers construct a more coherent support environment. 
There is a chronic lack of empirical evidence of the interaction between direct and indirect – 
and, more generally between different levels of – support for R&D, which has been signalled 
multiple times in recent years (Flanagan et al., 2011; Aranguren et al., 2014). A study for the 
European Commission concludes: “the limited empirical evidence indicates that interactions 
between different policy measures probably exist” (Straathof et al., 2015). Furthermore, the 
interaction between (inter-)national and regional policy is even more opaque, in the context of 
distribution of authority from national level ‘downstream’ – to regional level – but also 
‘upstream’ – to international structures (Flanagan et al., 2011; Lanahan & Feldman, 2015; 
Martin, 2016). Federal systems of governance provide an ideal context to study interactions 
between policies at different levels of administration (Lanahan & Feldman, 2015, p. 1387). 
Although incomparable in size to the US, Belgium does offer fertile ground for study by having 
numerous R&D policies spread across federal and regional governmental agencies. My analysis 
provides evidence that federal fiscal exemptions and regional subsidies do seem to interact in 
ways that increase firms’ response to receiving them – but that also depend on how responses 
are defined. 
Although empirical evidence is not yet abundant, the theoretical consensus seems to be that 
different policies will interact with one another, sometimes in unpredictable ways. Martin 
(2016, p. 167) provides a useful analogy with healthcare, where drugs used to treat different 
ailments may interact in complex manners. Even though each drug may be the best treatment 
for its target illness, other drugs may counteract its effect and vice-versa; as physicians need to 
take all these interactions into account, policy makers should also design R&D instruments 
without neglecting how they may affect each other. 
The interaction of public policies has rarely been defined or analysed. With a few exceptions, 
such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) state programmes in the US that were 
introduced with the specific aim to reinforce federal SBIR funding of innovative SMEs 
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(Lanahan & Feldman, 2015), the reasons and ways in which different policies may interact or 
not are rather cloudy.6 
First, the simultaneous use of tax credits and subsidies might simply create a volume effect. 
That is, users of the policy mix may take advantage of the fact that the amount of support 
received is increased by combining two measures. For example, the average subsidy received 
by Belgian firms in my sample in 2011 was 259 thousand Euros, while the average amount of 
tax credits was 198 thousand Euros. On the other hand, the average value of support for those 
combining the two was a whopping 788 thousand Euros. Although skewed, this number seems 
to point to the possibility that combining support measures in a mix provides larger amounts 
for funding R&D, which may induce a more-than-proportional response from companies. This 
scale effect is especially plausible if both support measures would have the same scope. 
Second, just as different medical treatments are prescribed for different health problems, R&D 
policies might be used to tackle different issues with innovation activity. For example, as 
regional subsidies in Belgium come in a large variety of forms, one may assume that some 
support measures tackle specific problems, such as lack of access to finance for SMEs, 
lacklustre innovation results in some industries, high unemployment of qualified researchers in 
some regions and so on. Wage-based fiscal exemptions, although also coming in a (smaller) 
variety of deductions, apply more evenly to firms across geographical regions. In this case, their 
main objective is to provide incentives for companies to increase private investment in research 
and development. Recently, Busom et al. (2014) analysed how Spanish firms’ different 
characteristics are correlated with the use of either direct or indirect support. They find that 
subsidies and tax credits do not address the same barriers to innovation, and as such they cannot 
be substituted with one another. Subsidies seem to be more sought after than tax credits by 
firms that find it hard to access external financing for their R&D, while tax credits are more 
utilised by firms with less appropriability concerns. However, the latter result may be 
instrument-specific, as Spanish tax credits are deductions on firms’ corporate tax liability, and 
thus apply to profit-making enterprises. Companies in poorer financial health will find it 
difficult to finance their R&D projects from external sources, but, if their projects have 
innovative potential, they can be granted subsidies. In this case, the amount of tax credits they 
might receive is more uncertain than grants, as it depends on the firms’ ex post tax positions 
                                                 
6 I refer to interaction in a rather loose manner – it generally refers to the effect of using a policy mix rather than a 
single policy. 
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(Busom et al., 2014, p. 577). I argue that the Belgian wage withholding tax exemption that I 
analyse throughout this thesis behaves differently from its Spanish counterpart in the sense that 
companies are almost sure of the amount exempted ex ante, as this is based on the wages of 
their researchers and the administrative burden of applying is low.7 
Third, policies may have varying impact on different types of R&D activities. For example, tax 
credits might increase spending on closer-to-market (development) projects (David et al., 2000; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011), while subsidies could be used for more basic research (Clausen, 2009; 
Dumont, 2015). If this were the case, then the fact that each policy changes the balance between 
research and development could go unseen in a traditional input additionality analysis. 
Finally, another possible reason for interaction effects between subsidies and tax credits could 
be the following: while R&D subsidies are generally targeted towards long-term research 
projects, there may be spillovers with respect to the way tax credits are used by the firm. For 
example, I show in the second chapter that subsidies do not affect by themselves the amount of 
(basic and applied) research performed by firms; but when used alongside tax credits, they 
increase spending on these activities. The reasons for this kind of interaction may be well 
beyond the power of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data, in the sense that R&D 
spending – even split into different activities – can only capture one facet of firms’ behaviour. 
Although highly informative, analyses based on CIS do not reach the detailed behavioural 
aspects captured by the focused survey at the basis of the data used in the third chapter. Results 
such as increasing the speed of R&D activities or scaling-up R&D projects when firms use 
subsidies and tax credits together cannot be shown when only looking at R&D spending. But 
they become evident when behavioural aspects are zoomed-in on in the specific way that the 
Belspo survey on the use of tax exemptions does. This data allows me to delve deeper into the 
changes in R&D behaviour in the third chapter and reveal that those firms that add subsidies to 
tax credits use are able to increase the speed at which they produce research results and increase 
the scale and number of R&D projects. Furthermore, I am also able to show a reorientation of 
the resources freed up by tax exemptions towards research and away from development. 
In order to justify the existence of these effects, one needs to analyse how the subsidy (i.e. R&D 
project) changes the R&D environment such that the firm uses the tax credit differently. I argue 
that it may be a very real possibility that subsidized firms direct the financial resources freed 
                                                 
7 Note that, as I mention in the second chapter, Belgium also provides an R&D investment tax credit similar to the 
Spanish and other national systems, which due to data constraints is out of scope of my research. 
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up by the tax exemption towards the subsidized project(s), and as such provide direction for the 
use of the R&D tax credit. In other words, those financial resources may find a ‘productive 
home’ within the context of the subsidized project. More specifically, the subsidized R&D 
projects may serve as a roadmap, pointing to a more productive way for allocating additional 
R&D resources. For example, the tax credit may create room for additional experimentation in 
the subsidized R&D activities that the firm would not have undertaken otherwise. 
Chapter IV 
In the fourth chapter I change the scope of the analysis and shift focus from companies to 
individual researchers. In doing so, I analyse what individual and institutional factors – funding 
being among them – encourage academics to change their behaviour and venture into new 
scientific fields. 
As most previous studies have focused on scientific productivity and collaborations (Bozeman 
& Gaughan, 2007; Goldfarb, 2008; Defazio, Lockett, & Wright, 2009; Auranen & Nieminen, 
2010; Jacob & Lefgren, 2011; Grimpe, 2012; Hottenrott & Lawson, 2013; Kelchtermans & 
Veugelers, 2011, 2013; Whalley & Hicks, 2014), I set to provide empirical evidence regarding 
what drives exploratory behaviour in science. My results on the impact of funding show that 
academics at the University of Leuven are less inclined to venture into new research fields if 
they have obtained funding from the faculty’s research council. This mechanism favours more 
senior researchers with a better track record and higher rank. I also find that scholars with a 
better track record are more likely to enter new fields, and the positive effect from productivity 
on new field entry is even more pronounced when I correct for (instrumented) funding. 
Moreover, only when correcting for the effect of funding, researchers that have progressed 
through the promotion ladder are more likely to venture into new fields. 
The results suggest that grants lead academics to stay within their existing research areas, rather 
than diversifying their portfolios by entering new fields.  Recent calls from prominent scientists 
show that there is a pressing need to improve the design of funding mechanisms, which has 
underscored that we still do not fully understand the amalgam of incentives given by funding 
(Lane, 2009). My research fits in this context and contributes to the scarce empirical 
productions that explain scientific behaviour other than productivity. I argue that policy design 
is of utmost importance at all stages of innovation systems, including the production of 
academic research. It is thus important that policy makers have robust evidence of how funding 
affects science, and my results show that at least one type of grants lead towards specialisation 
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rather than diversification. This does not in itself imply that policy has failed science. For 
example, it may be the case that this specific line of finance has been directed towards 
specialisation as a response to ‘too much’ experimentation through entering new fields and a 
consequent drop in scientific productivity. My research should be read as an analysis of a 
multitude of drivers of experimentation, as it stops short – thus far – of addressing the policy 
motivations that may stand behind the intervention. 
10 
 
I. Peer effects in the take-up of R&D tax Credits 
Abstract 
This paper starts from the observation that the majority of firms in Belgium that were eligible 
for a newly-introduced R&D tax credit does not use it, or is slow to adopt, despite significant 
potential cost savings. We hypothesize that the R&D support landscape is too complex for 
firms to navigate and that they may cope by relying on their peers’ behaviour to inform their 
own decision. We identify endogenous peer effects in industry and location-based peer groups 
by exploiting the intransitivity in firms’ networks as well the variation in peer group size. The 
results show that firms’ decision to use R&D tax credits are indeed influenced by the choices 
of their peers, primarily in the time window immediately following their introduction. Our 
analysis complements existing literature on peer effects on firms’ decision-making and 
suggests improvements for the communication of new public support for business R&D.  
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1 Introduction 
Social, or ‘peer-to-peer’, interactions have been considered in the literature as a way to transfer 
knowledge (Noorderhaven & Harzing, 2009; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010). In particular, 
economic agents may draw lessons and create expectations from the observation of actions and 
outcomes experienced by others (Manski, 2000). Through this lens, peer effects have been 
studied extensively for explaining social behaviour, such as job-searching (Nanda & Sørensen, 
2010; Cappellari & Tatsiramos, 2011) or the initiation of sexual activity (Card & Giuliano, 
2011). The social connectedness of firm decision-making has been investigated less, arguably 
due to the difficulty in directly observing inter-company interaction, which we address in 
section 2. Nevertheless, this social dimension is a key issue in studying adoption decisions, that 
is, its comprehensive assessment necessitates rising above the level of the individual firm to 
include social feedback effects (Hall, 2004). Despite the empirical challenges in observing peer 
groups, a number of studies have looked into the role of ‘social influence’ in the corporate 
world by considering, in various settings, whether a larger number of adopters of a certain 
decision increases the probability of it spreading further. Evidence of such imitation behaviour 
has been provided in studies of market entry (Gort & Konakayama, 1982; Kennedy, 2002; Lu, 
2002; Debruyne & Reibstein, 2005), investment banking (Haunschild & Miner, 1997) and 
corporate financial policy (Leary & Roberts, 2014). 
Our paper complements the literature on peer effects on firms’ decision-making by studying 
the adoption of R&D support. The theoretical basis for our analysis is that peer effects may 
play a role if the R&D support landscape is complex and firms may rely on their peers’ 
decisions as an input in their own adoption decisions. In Belgium, the setting we study, one 
would at first sight expect rapid and widespread adoption, with little role for peer effects. 
Reasons include the fact that the administrative cost of applying for the tax credit is essentially 
zero and that the tax credit is effectively implemented as a wage subsidy for R&D workers, so 
a firm needn’t report positive profits to benefit from the measure. In other words, not using the 
R&D tax credit while being eligible comes down to leaving money on the table. However, 
audits of the portfolio of R&D support mechanisms have found it to resemble a thicket that 
firms find difficult to navigate, up to the point where many eligible firms do not use support 
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they are entitled to (Soete, 2012).8 Dumont (2013), reporting descriptive evidence on the uptake 
of the fiscal incentives for R&D introduced in Belgium in 2005, concludes that most R&D 
active companies do not use the measure four years after its introduction. Our sample of 
Belgian firms shows that even by 2011, hardly 40% of the firms eligible for the tax credit use 
it. Similar evidence has been reported for other countries. For example, Falk et al. (2009) find 
that companies in Austria lack awareness of the structure of tax incentives and point towards 
insufficient information as a reason for non-adoption. A study by Bozio et al. (2014) reveals 
that in France, after the shift from an incremental to a more generous volume-based tax credit 
scheme in 2008, the share of eligible firms that does not apply still surpasses one in three 
companies.  
The situation in which initially only a relatively small share of eligible firms adopts the tax 
credit in a complex support environment creates the opportunity for peer effects to occur. More 
specifically, if information about support is complex – i.e. the abundance of support schemes 
– and uncertain – in terms of eligibility – firms may resort to heuristics in their decision-
making. One such approach is to imitate decisions of peers who have adopted the measure 
earlier. Prior work has found evidence of peer effects in firm decision-making in diverse areas, 
including financial decisions (Leary & Roberts, 2014), market entry strategy (Debruyne & 
Reibstein, 2005) and compensation of top management (Albuquerque, 2009).  
Using the peer effects rationale, we investigate to what extent firms’ adoption of the R&D tax 
credit can be attributed to decisions of their peers, rather than own firm characteristics or 
unobserved shocks pushing whole groups of companies towards adoption of the tax credit. 
Analysing a sample of 1,981 R&D active companies in Belgium, and relying on an innovative 
– in this setting – IV approach for identifying the endogenous peer effects, we find that a firm’s 
decision to take up R&D tax credits is influenced by the choices of its peers. We start from the 
empirical observation that a majority of possible users of R&D tax credits seem reluctant to 
use them, despite the significant wage cost reduction involved. Attributing low adoption rates 
to lack of information, this paper is the first to demonstrate how peer effects shape firms’ 
response to R&D public support schemes with limited information regarding peer networks. 
                                                 
8 The so-called ‘Soete reports’ considered R&D support in the Flemish region, which is the largest of the three 
regions in Belgium. However, the R&D support landscape in the Walloon and Brussels Capital Region is also 
characterized by a proliferation of support measures. 
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Our findings show that imitation is one of the strategies employed by firms in order to cope 
with the multitude of public support measures they face. 
Our paper makes the following contributions. First, we complement the literature on support 
for innovation by showing how peer effects influence firms’ usage of public support schemes. 
This is important, as an accurate understanding of the dynamics of firm choices is essential for 
reducing inefficiencies, i.e. the belated absorption of public support for R&D. Our results 
suggest that firms develop strategies to cope with the complexity of the R&D support landscape 
by imitating firms who adopt earlier. The finding that imitation occurs in peer groups that 
follow industry and distance-based default lines suggests possible policy interventions for 
reducing inefficiencies in usage of R&D support. More specifically, adoption by eligible firms 
could be expedited by communicating the measure to sufficiently fine-grained sectors and in a 
geographically-distributed way. As opposed to broad policy communications, ‘narrowcasting’ 
would help to reach many localised firm clusters, or peer groups, allowing for rapid peer-to-
peer influence, once initial adoption has taken place. Second, the establishment of peer effects 
as a significant factor driving firms’ selection into support schemes informs the methodological 
literature on selection bias in program evaluation (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).9 Namely, the 
existence of peer effects calls for looking beyond the individual firm to explain selection into 
support programs. More generally, by using recent advances in identification strategy for peer 
effects (Bramoullé et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010), this paper contributes to the broader 
literature on peer effects between firms. More specifically, by relying on a nearest-neighbour 
peer group definition, peer groups vary at the individual firm level. This variation implies the 
presence of excluded peers – i.e. firms that are not part of firm i’s peer group, but who are peers 
of i’s peers. The exogenous characteristics of these excluded peers act as instruments for the 
endogenous peer effect because they are correlated with the adoption decision of firm i’s peers 
by means of social interactions, but they are uncorrelated with shocks affecting firm i and its 
peer group. Given the high degree of clustering in many ‘small world’ firm networks (e.g. 
Fleming & Marx, 2006), this approach of exploiting intransitivity in firms’ networks is more 
generally applicable to identify peer effects in other settings. One example would be the 
                                                 
9 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, p. 14) signal that only recently have social interactions been regarded as an ‘object 
of interest’, rather than nuisance, in studies of program evaluation. Our paper adds evidence to this very recent 
trend and does so in a new setting – that of tax credits for R&D. 
  
14 
analysis of knowledge spillovers in networks of inventive activity, as measured by co-patenting 
between firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition of peer groups, 
which ties into our identification strategy and empirical model, both of which are discussed in 
section 3. Section 4 discusses the results of the analysis of peer effects in R&D tax credit 
adoption and reports the robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Peer group definition 
Any identification of peer effects on decision-making needs to start from the definition of peer 
groups. This constitutes a key challenge since the circles of peers in which information is 
transferred may be informal and therefore hard to trace empirically. While some settings in 
social interaction literature provide an institutional dimension that offers a handle on peer 
groups, e.g. class allocations of students, it is not straightforward which firms jointly constitute 
a peer group. In order to deal with the lack of precise information on peers, we draw on 
literature that has studied firm interactions to identify the defining characteristics of firms’ 
peers. In particular, we consider industry and geographical location to determine a company’s 
network, following the long-standing observation in economic geography literature that 
economic activity tends to be clustered in relatively small geographic areas (e.g. Marshall, 
1920; Krugman, 1991). The intersection of industry and geography therefore provides an 
intuitive perspective on peer groups. Further, Porter (1990) argued that innovation dynamics 
in clusters are stimulated by local competition and peer pressure among firms. These efforts 
and the associated influence of peers needn’t be restricted to innovation in a narrow sense, but 
may well extend to all innovation-enabling activities, such as accessing public R&D support. 
A more general motivation to include the industry dimension in the construction of peer groups 
is homophyly, which is considered an important determinant for social network formation, with 
actors more likely to connect to, or be influenced by, others who resemble themselves in one 
or more dimensions (Boschma & Frenken, 2010). Empirical work has found industry to be a 
defining feature of the context where different types of inter-firm influences take place. For 
example, the revision of a company's previous financial statements has been found to induce 
share price declines not only for the focal firm, but also among non-restating firms in the same 
industry (Gleason et al., 2008). Graham & Harvey (2001) showed that the financing decisions 
of peer firms in the same industry, in particular competitors, influence the focal firm’s own 
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decisions. Measuring firms’ industry membership at 3-digit SIC level, Leary and Roberts 
(2014) show how within-industry peers are a more important determinant of firms’ financial 
policies, such as their leverage ratio, than changes in firm-specific characteristics.  
Besides industry, geographical proximity is also prominent in social interaction literature, since 
short distances favour contacts and facilitate knowledge exchange (e.g. Bell & Song, 2007; 
Nam, Manchanda, & Chintagunta, 2007). Several empirical studies have shown the 
geographically bounded nature of (technological) knowledge spillovers (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Fritsch & Franke, 2004). Further, 
geographical proximity correlates positively with other dimensions of proximity, such as social 
and cognitive proximity (Boschma, 2005), and therefore partially captures other linkages with 
peers, such as social relations between employees or being embedded in the same knowledge 
community. 
Based on these insights from previous work on firm interactions and knowledge spillovers, we 
define peer groups using a nearest-neighbour logic. More specifically, we take as a firm’s peers 
the K closest firms (KNN) within the same 3-digit NACE sector.10 This definition allows for 
intransitivity in the network – i.e. peers of a firm’s peers are not necessarily peers of the firm 
itself. We exploit this feature in order to identify peer effects, as explained in section 3. 
As a first check on the potential role of distance in peer influence, Figure I.1 relates firms’ use 
of R&D tax credits to location in 2007, the earliest year in which any peer effect emanating 
from early adopters (in 2006) was possible, and in the subsequent years we analyse – 2009 and 
2011. It shows the share of tax credit users by municipality, the finest level of detail at which 
we observe firms’ locations.11 It indicates that use of R&D tax credits is not uniformly spread, 
but rather that locations with higher shares of users tend to be clustered. Note that firms may 
be considered randomly allocated to a location with respect to their usage of R&D tax credits. 
In other words, it is unlikely that firms would co-locate for reasons that drive their decision to 
                                                 
10 The peer groups we consider are geographically confined to Belgium, which we deem reasonable since R&D tax 
credits are granted by the Belgian federal authority, and firms within Belgium therefore constitute the relevant 
firm network.  
11 Technically, we observe a firm’s location by an NIS-code, which denotes a statistical unit corresponding to 
municipalities. The median size of a municipality is 40.1 km², with a standard deviation of 37.7 km². The average 
number of firms per municipality is 3.18, with a standard deviation of 4.23. 
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use R&D tax credits. The analysis will control for other R&D-related factors that may explain 
co-location of firms, such as R&D intensity. 
Figure I.1 Tax credit use by municipality in 2007, 2009 and 2011 
 
Finally, we note that it is common for empirical work using social network data to observe 
only a sample of all the nodes in a network. Our work is no exception: the data we use for the 
peer group definition and the estimation is a sample of R&D tax credit users, namely those 
firms for which characteristics from the business R&D survey are available.12 Using a sample 
of the population would imply measurement error if there are firms in the population that are 
not part of the sample but that are in the (true) peer groups of sampled firms. It is important for 
our approach that firms were not selected into the sample based on location, making it a 
reasonable assumption that missing links in peer groups are random.13 However, even in the 
                                                 
12 Note that firms are not selected into the sample based on the dependent variable, as we observe both users and 
non-users of the R&D tax credit. 
13 Since the importance of R&D tends to be strongly related to the type of industry, which is the other dimension in 
our peer group definition, firms in a given industry are likely to be treated similarly with respect to inclusion in 
the business R&D survey, and thus our sample.  
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case of fully random sampling, networks can still be misspecified (Chandrasekhar & Lewis, 
2011). While the definition of peer groups draws on prior evidence and is informed by the 
patterns shown in the descriptive statistics, the lack of direct observation of peer groups and 
the sampling still allow for measurement error and thus a misspecified network structure. Two 
remarks are in order here. First, virtually all studies of peer effects suffer from potential 
measurement error in the definition of peer groups, since it is not typically known what is the 
precise mechanism that underlies the interaction, the type and degree of interaction being 
specific to the empirical context (De Giorgi et al., 2010). In our analysis of the adoption of 
public support for R&D, peer effects may arise due to imitation of other firms’ decisions, 
without the need for close interaction. This alleviates concerns about not observing explicit 
collaborations between firms, and even makes such information unnecessary. More generally, 
empirical work shows a broad range of peer group definitions, ranging from very 
comprehensive, e.g. the effect on consumption by peers of the same race in the same state of 
residence in the U.S. (Charles, Hurst, & Roussanov, 2009) to highly restrictive, e.g. the effect 
on student performance by roommates in the same college dorm (Sacerdote, 2001). Our 
definition is rather comprehensive, which is consistent with the setting under consideration, 
where any influence by peers on the focal firm’s decision to adopt the R&D tax credit merely 
requiring observation of peers’ behaviour, rather than explicit interaction. 
Second, we adopt a conservative approach regarding the specification of peer groups and 
conduct a series of robustness checks in section 4.6 to ascertain that any identified peer 
influence is not conditional on a given measurement of peer groups. First, we apply a network 
randomization test, in which we scramble the peer groups by reshuffling the sampled firms 
across locations and industries, and then re-estimate the model to verify that the results on peer 
effects are not obtained when considering any random peer network. Second, we check the 
sensitivity of results for different choices of peer group size (K). Third, we define peer groups 
at different industry aggregation levels and include additional industry and regional controls in 
the model. 
3 Identification strategy and model 
The identification of peer effects is notoriously challenging, as originally explained by Manski 
(1993). In this section, we explain the two key identification problems and how we exploit 
intransitivity in the firm network, i.e. partially overlapping peer groups, to address them 
(Bramoullé et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010). The first problem, referred to as reflection, 
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essentially means that it is hard to disentangle whether a firm’s decision to use the R&D tax 
credit system causes its peers to do the same, or whether it does so as a consequence of its 
peers’ actions. In other words, the setting of peer effects suffers from a simultaneity problem. 
The second problem in identifying peer effects consists of endogeneity due to endogenous peer 
group formation and unobserved correlated shocks. Both of these factors may cause the 
decisions of an individual firm and its peer group to be correlated, confounding any true peer 
effects. Common unobserved shocks refer to factors that cause both the focal firm and its peer 
group to adopt the R&D tax credit, without any peer influence taking place. In our setting this 
would occur if, for example, the focal firm and its peers rely on the same external accountant, 
alerting all its clients of the introduction of the R&D tax credit system. 
Following De Giorgi, Pellizzari, & Redaelli (2010), we now provide a more detailed discussion 
of the identification challenges and the approach we take to address them. Consider the 
following linear-in-means spatial14 model, omitting time subscripts for simplicity: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑖) + 𝛾𝐸(𝑥|𝐺𝑖) + 𝛿𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖   (1) 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 indicates whether firm 𝑖 has adopted the R&D tax credit,
15 𝑥𝑖 are 
firm characteristics, 𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑖) is the average choice of firms in 𝑖’s peer group, which is denoted 
by 𝐺𝑖. 𝐸(𝑥|𝐺𝑖) are the average characteristics of firm 𝑖’s peers. Practically, a firm’s peers are 
indicated through the use of a spatial weighting matrix 𝑊, which implements the peer group 
definition such that 𝑊𝑦 = 𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑖) and 𝑊𝑥 = 𝐸(𝑥|𝐺𝑖). Parameter 𝛽 captures the endogenous 
effect i.e. ‘true’ peer effect, and 𝛾 the exogenous effect, sometimes also referred to as the 
contextual effect (Manski, 1993). 
We focus first on the reflection problem and assume for now the absence of any endogeneity 
concerns i.e. 𝐸(𝑢𝑖|𝐺𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) = 0. As mentioned before, our identification approach hinges on the 
fact that peer groups are only partially overlapping. To understand this, first consider the case 
                                                 
14 The label ‘spatial’ is due to the fact that the modelled interactions are determined by firms’ locations. 
15 Note that although our dependent variable (adoption of the R&D tax credit) is binary, we stick to the approach 
taken by De Giorgi, Pellizzari, & Redaelli (2010), who study the binary choice of major in higher education. They 
also opt for a linear model, which allows for a clearer exposition of the identification strategy. Some work has 
been done on identifying peer effects in binary choice models, exploiting non-linearity to separate endogenous 
from exogenous effects (Brock & Durlauf, 2007). However, current implementations in statistical software ignore 
the existence of correlated effects – i.e. spatially correlated errors – due to strict multivariate distributional 
assumptions needed to identify the model. We consider that accounting for unobserved peer group characteristics 
that may drive firms’ adoption decision to be paramount to properly identifying the endogenous peer effect, and 
we thus choose to estimate a (spatial) linear probability model. 
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where peer groups overlap perfectly such that, if firm 𝑖 and firm 𝑗 are in the same peer group, 
their peer groups coincide i.e. 𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺𝑗. As Manski (1993) already argued, in this case the 
endogenous effect 𝛽 cannot be identified separately from exogenous effect 𝛾.16 A less 
ambitious approach is therefore to simply estimate a single parameter for the combination of 
endogenous and exogenous effects without separating them.17 However, in our empirical 
framework, the KNN-based peer groups are not fixed across firms, hence 𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑖) varies within 
peer groups. Consider the following simple example to illustrate how this feature achieves 
identification in the face of the reflection problem. Say firms A, B and C are part of the same 
industry, which also contains other firms. Firms A and B are nearest neighbours (with 𝐾 = 3) 
and thus part of the same peer group, based on industry and distance. Firm B and C are also 
nearest neighbours, but, given the geographical distribution of firms in the industry, firms A 
and C are not (see Figure I.2). This layout results in ‘excluded peers’ – i.e. firms who are not 
in the focal firm’s peer group but who are part of the groups of its peers. Firm A is excluded 
from the peer group of firm C, and vice versa, while B’s peer group includes both A and C. 
Figure I.2 Example layout of peer groups 
 
More formally, rewrite equation (1) by taking averages over peer groups, allowing them to 
vary by firm 𝑖: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝐺𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸[𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑗)|𝐺𝑖] + 𝛾𝐸[𝐸(𝑥|𝐺𝑗)|𝐺𝑖] + 𝛿𝐸(𝑥𝑖|𝐺𝑖) (2) 
                                                 
16 Taking the average of equation (1) over group 𝐺𝑖 shows that 𝐸(𝑦|𝐺𝑖) is a linear combination of the other 
regressors: (𝑦|𝐺𝑖) = [𝛼 (1 − 𝛽)⁄ ] + [𝛾 + 𝛿 (1 − 𝛽)⁄ ]𝐸(𝑥|𝐺𝑖). 
17 Typically, the absence of either endogenous peer effects (e.g. Brooks-Gunn et al., 1993) or contextual peer effects 
(e.g. Klier & McMillen, 2008) is assumed. 
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with 𝑗 a member of 𝑖’s peer group, and 𝐺𝑗 never identical to 𝐺𝑖.
18 With respect to the preceding 
example we can write, omitting firms other than 𝐴, 𝐵 or 𝐶:   𝐺𝐴 = {𝐵}, 𝐺𝐵 = {𝐴, 𝐶}, 𝐺𝐶 =
{𝐵}. Equation (1) can then be written for the three firms as follows: 
𝑦𝐴 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐵 + 𝛾𝑥𝐵 + 𝛿𝑥𝐴 + 𝑢𝐴
𝐴 
𝑦𝐵 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 (
𝑦𝐴 + 𝑦𝐶
2
) + 𝛾 (
𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶
2
) + 𝛿𝑥𝐵 + 𝑢𝐵
𝐵 
𝑦𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝐵 + 𝛾𝑥𝐵 + 𝛿𝑥𝐶 + 𝑢𝐶
𝐶  
To see how we achieve identification, consider the reduced form equations: 
𝑦𝐴 =  (𝛼 +
𝛼𝛽(1 + 𝛽)
1 − 𝛽²
)
+ (
𝛽(𝛾 + 𝛿)
1 − 𝛽²
+ 𝛾) 𝑥𝐵 + (
𝛽(𝛾 + 𝛿𝛽)
1 − 𝛽²
) (
𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶
2
) + 𝛿𝑥𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴
𝐴 
𝑦𝐵 =  (
𝛼(1 + 𝛽)
1 − 𝛽²
) + (
𝛾 + 𝛿
1 − 𝛽²
) 𝑥𝐵 + (
𝛾 + 𝛿𝛽
1 − 𝛽²
) (
𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶
2
) + 𝜎𝐵
𝐵 
𝑦𝐶 =  (𝛼 +
𝛼𝛽(1 + 𝛽)
1 − 𝛽²
)
+ (
𝛽(𝛾 + 𝛿)
1 − 𝛽²
+ 𝛾) 𝑥𝐵 + (
𝛽(𝛾 + 𝛿𝛽)
1 − 𝛽²
) (
𝑥𝐴 + 𝑥𝐶
2
) + 𝛿𝑥𝐶 + 𝜎𝐶
𝐶 
where the reduced form error terms 𝜎𝐴
𝐴, 𝜎𝐵
𝐵 and 𝜎𝐶
𝐶  are linear combinations of the structural 
error terms 𝑢𝐴
𝐴, 𝑢𝐵
𝐵 and 𝑢𝐶
𝐶. The four structural parameters are identified from the four reduced 
form parameters.19 Note that our identification approach relies on the assumption that – 
referring to the example – excluded peer firm C does not influence firm A directly. As argued 
in the section on peer group definition, it seems reasonable to assume that distant firms, in 
terms of both geographical distance and type of industry, only exert an indirect influence.  
The second main identification problem concerns endogeneity due to self-selection of firms 
into peer groups or the presence of unobserved group-level shocks. Formally, the error term 
may be written as: 
                                                 
18 As we explain below, our choice of the number of nearest neighbours allows for partially overlapping peer groups. 
19 In this example, the third equation is redundant, which reflects the fact that only observations with distinct groups 
of peers contribute to identification.  
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𝑢𝑖
𝑔 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃
𝑔 + 𝜖𝑖 
with 𝑔 denoting the peer group (𝐴, 𝐵 or 𝐶 in the preceding example), 𝜇𝑖 an individual fixed 
effect, and 𝜃𝑔 a group fixed effect (e.g. the aforementioned ‘common accountant’ effect20) and 
𝜖𝑖 is independently identically distributed random error. 
In our setting, firms’ peer group membership is determined by their location and industry. It is 
unlikely that firms sort into these peer groups in a way that correlates with their subsequent 
R&D tax credit usage, making 𝜇𝑖 negligible or zero.
21 The more serious concern leading to 
endogeneity, is the existence of unobserved correlated effects at the group level, 𝜃𝑔. It turns 
out the mechanism of excluded peers serves a double purpose. While it deals with the reflection 
problem in the absence of endogeneity – as discussed above – it also supplies valid instruments 
for endogenous peer effects. Consider firm 𝑖’s excluded peers i.e. the firms who are excluded 
from 𝑖’s peer group but who are included in the group of one or more of 𝑖’s peers. Their 
characteristics 𝑥 are by design uncorrelated with the group fixed effect of focal firm 𝑖, but are 
correlated with the mean adoption decision of 𝑖’s group through peer interactions. In terms of 
the earlier example, 𝑥𝐶 is a valid instrument for 𝑦𝐵 in group 𝐴 because 𝑥𝐶 – which is 
uncorrelated with 𝜃𝐴 since 𝐶 is not a peer of 𝐴 – affects 𝑦𝐶 and the latter affects 𝑦𝐵 through 
endogenous effects since 𝐶 is a peer of 𝐵. In our sample, the excluded peers for a firm 𝑖 include 
all firms not among the K nearest neighbours in the industry as the focal firm. Table I.1 shows 
the characteristics of peer groups in our sample for different years and values of 𝐾, in particular 
the share of firms that have at least 𝐾 nearest neighbors in their industry. These are the firms 
for which the aforementioned identification strategy based on excluded peers is empirically 
feasible in our sample. For 𝐾 = 10, we still have a majority of firms for which peer groups do 
not encompass all firms at the 3-digit NACE industry code level, and therefore serves as the 
empirical upper bound for 𝐾. For firms with less than 𝐾 nearest neighbors in their industry, the 
intransitivity principle cannot be used to identify endogenous peer effects because there are no 
excluded peers to instrument peer choice and characteristics. However, Lee (2007) and 
Bramoullé, Djebbari, & Fortin (2009) have shown that peer effects are identified if at least two 
                                                 
20 Another example would be the case of several biotech spin-off companies co-locating in the science park of their 
university and where the involved scientists learn about R&D tax credits through the TTO or a scientific 
entrepreneurship program run by the university.  
21 In other studies of peer effects this tends to be a more severe issue, e.g. when analysing students’ choice of major 
one needs to worry about (unobserved) factors like ability causing selection.   
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peer groups have different sizes. In this case, the effect of a firm’s characteristics xi on its own 
decision yi can be split into the direct effect and an indirect one, through feedback effects – xA 
affects yB, which in turn affects yA, assuming A and B are peers. This indirect effect decreases 
with group size, which is a term of the denominator of the reduced-form coefficient of xi 
(Bramoullé et al., 2009). Jointly, intransitivity and variation in group sizes are two network 
properties that ensure identification. Thus, we set 𝐾 = 10, which effectively acts as an upper 
bound on the number of peers, and instrument the endogenous peer effect 𝑊𝑦 by 𝑊𝑥 and, 
using information of excluded peers, 𝑊𝑋². For firms with less than 10 peers, identification 
comes from variation in peer group sizes. For the remainder of the paper, we use the 3-digit 
NACE industry level and ten nearest neighbours as the main peer group definition. 
Table I.1Percentage of firms with at least K peers in 3-digit NACE industries 
K 2007 2009 2011 
2 89% 94% 92% 
3 80% 87% 87% 
4 75% 83% 80% 
5 65% 78% 75% 
6 63% 69% 69% 
7 60% 65% 67% 
8 57% 64% 65% 
9 56% 60% 62% 
10 54% 55% 58% 
To estimate the model in equation (1), we use Kelejian & Prucha’s (2010) spatial IV estimator, 
which is implemented in the R package sphet (Piras, 2010). The estimator permits spatial 
correlation between the error terms i.e. they are modelled as:22  
𝑢𝑖 = 𝜃𝑀𝑢 + 𝜖𝑖.  (3) 
The resulting SARAR23 model is fairly general in its specification and has been used in prior 
work that estimates spatial peer effects, e.g. Helmers & Patnam (2014) used it to estimate 
                                                 
22 As in many applications, we set the spatial weight matrix 𝑀 = 𝑊. 
23 The spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances (SARAR) is a generalized version of the basic 
Cliff & Ord (1973) model, which contains spatial lags of the dependent variable plus a disturbance term.  
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spatial interactions among children with respect to cognitive skill formation. The generalized 
spatial two-stage least-squares (GS2SLS) estimator of Kelejian and Prucha uses a two-stage 
procedure, where the first stage instruments the endogenous peer effect 𝑊𝑦. Kelejian and 
Prucha (1998) have shown that the linearly independent columns of 𝑊𝑋 and 𝑊𝑋² can be used 
as valid instruments for 𝑊𝑦. The linear independence of the instruments is ensured, in our data, 
by the intransitivity present in peer groups (Bramoullé et al., 2009).  
As a benchmark for the SARAR estimates, we also report the results of an OLS model, which 
represents a naïve approach to the estimation of peer effects, in the sense that it ignores the 
reflection and endogeneity problems discussed above.24 
4 Analysis of Peer Effects in R&D Tax Credit Adoption 
4.1 Data 
Our data set is based on the repository of R&D active firms in Belgium, managed by the 
Belgian Science Policy Office, and based on the sampling procedures of the biannual OECD 
Business R&D survey. It includes all companies known to be R&D active and it is updated on 
a regular basis. The dataset contains R&D-related information based on the OECD Business 
R&D survey and is enriched with public support measures in the form of R&D tax credits 
(provided by the Federal Public Service Finance) and R&D subsidies (provided by the regional 
governments). The business R&D survey is organized by the regional administrations 
(Brussels-Capital Region, Flemish Region, Walloon Region) according to a harmonized 
methodology and there is no a reason to suspect spatial bias. General company characteristics 
are provided by the Federal Public Service Finance, among which main sector of activity, 
employment and financial variables. As mentioned in section 2, we observe the approximate 
location of each firm down to municipality level. Belgium contains 589 municipalities, of 
which nineteen in the Brussels-Capital Region, 308 in Flanders and 262 in Wallonia. 
We use three waves of the survey to create our analysis sample. Due to the fact that only a 
minority of firms answer two consecutive surveys, and questions related to R&D personnel 
                                                 
24 Naturally, the usage of the SARAR model amounts to a linear probability model. We believe the robustness of 
the IV estimator proposed by Kelejian & Prucha (2010), which allows for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals, 
outweigh its disadvantages. Recent work (De Giorgi et al., 2010; Claussen, Engelstätter, & Ward, 2014; Leary & 
Roberts, 2014) has also employed linear probability models to estimate peer effects in a binary choice setting.  
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cover the two years preceding each survey, our sample is effectively a pooled cross section. 
We exclude from our sample firms that have not employed any researchers in t and t-1, where 
t=2007, 2009 and 2011, as they are not eligible for tax credits, which are awarded as a partial 
tax exemption on the wages of researchers, as explained in more detail in the next section. We 
also restrict the sample to firms that have at least one peer in the same industry, which removes 
93 observations from the sample. This implies that we only analyse peer effects for those firms 
where those effects can occur, conditional on our peer group definition. The estimation sample 
contains 699, 961 and 1,018 observations on a total of 1,981 firms, for the respective years 
2007, 2009 and 2011. 
4.2 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a company has received tax credits for 
researchers for the first time in a given year.25 The measure is a partial wage withholding tax 
exemption and was introduced in 2006 for companies employing R&D personnel with PhD 
degrees and has been extended as of 2007 for Master degrees (except those in social sciences), 
across all industries. Initially, the tax exemption started at 25% of taxes on wages, but has been 
raised to 65% in 2008 and 75% from 2009 onwards. We focus on first-time adoption since this 
state transition is the change in the firm’s behaviour that we want to explain, not its repeated 
use of the measure after initial adoption.26 
The data we have at our disposal contains the population of users of the tax credit for 
researchers. However, the coverage of our sample is reduced due to the use of different sources 
for R&D data, fiscal data, and financial and employment data. As a result, our estimation data 
set is a sample of R&D tax credit users. Section 2 already discussed the implications for peer 
group definition. 
Table I.2 illustrates the evolution over time of the population of companies using the tax 
exemption and compares them with our sample. There is a clear upward trend in the number 
                                                 
25 The partial tax exemption can thus be seen as a wage subsidy. Given that it only applies to taxes on wages, it 
clearly differs from other R&D tax credits, such as for fixed asset investments. 
26 There are about 100 firms that abandon the tax credit after initially using it and we cannot attribute this change 
of behaviour to any observed characteristic, such as stopping R&D activity or bankruptcy. We are agnostic as to 
why they stop using the tax credit given our focus on explaining first-time adoption. We do drop these firms from 
the data in the years they stop using the tax credit. The rationale is that, given initial adoption, they know about 
the measure and can transfer information about it to other firms. Keeping them in the data after they abandon the 
tax credit would artificially lower the average peer group adoption rate.     
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of firms that use tax credits for R&D, especially between 2007 and 2009, with up to 1,131 
companies using the measure in 2009. However, the number further increases only slightly in 
2011 – to 1,330 users, suggesting a possible ‘saturation’ in the sense that the majority of R&D 
active firms have already become aware of and decided whether to use or not tax credits.27 
Consequently, the number of first-time adopters has grown from 245 to 395, only to decline 
afterwards to 167 new users in 2011. In terms of percentages, the rate of first-time users sees a 
steady decline from 42% of all users to 35% in 2009, and even 13% in 2011. The pattern in our 
sample is similar, although the difference in first-time adoption rates is almost zero between 
the first two periods. However, the sample does capture the drop in first-time adoption in 2011, 
from 26% to 7% of firms using the tax credit. Similarly, we see a larger increase in overall 
adoption in 2009 from 151 to 319 firms, followed by a more modest increase to 408 users in 
2011. 
Table I.2 Comparison of sample and population of tax credit users 
 2007 2009 2011 
Tax credit users (pop.) 578 1,131 1,330 
First-time users (pop.) 245 395 167 
% first-time users (pop.) 42% 35% 13% 
Tax credit users (sample) 151 319 408 
First-time users (sample) 40 83 28 
% first-time users (sample) 26% 26% 7% 
a) The difference between total users and first-time users comprises past users, irrespective of when 
in the past they have used the measure. To this effect, the first two rows are not cumulative. 
4.3 Peer effects 
Our explanatory variable measures, for each company and in each year, the average use of tax 
credits among its ten (geographically) closest peers active in the same 3-digit NACE industry.28  
We define the elements of the spatial weighting matrix 𝑊 described previously as follows: 
  
                                                 
27 A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that firms that employ R&D personnel and do not receive tax credits 
forego on average 37.6 K Euros in 2007, 65.9 K Euros in 2009 and 79.5 K Euros in 2011. The maximum amounts 
foregone by a company vary between 2.9 M Euros in 2007 and 7.3 M Euros in 2011. Reported to turnover, the 
average represents 0.7% and the maximum up to 60% of turnover. 
28 Our choice of 3-digit NACE codes to define peer groups follows Leary and Roberts (2014). 
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Next, we row-standardize W by averaging wij over the number of peers j of each firm i. 
Consequently, we construct our explanatory variable by multiplying W by the vector y’ 
containing the binary variable indicating which companies have used tax credits in the previous 
year. Note that this is different from y, our dependent variable which indicates whether a firm 
is using tax credits for the first time. As explained in section 4.2, the rationale is that firms after 
their initial adoption know about the measure and can transfer information about it to other 
firms. Hence, we test whether the increase in overall use of tax credits among a firm’s peers 
results in an increase in the firm’s probability to start using the same fiscal exemption. 
In order to calculate distances between companies, we use data on their approximate locations 
based on geographical coordinates of the town hall of the municipality each firm is located 
in.29 Due to this setup, there can be more firms with the same coordinates and in the same 
industry, in which case we randomize the attribution of firms to peer groups in those 
municipalities with more companies than the size of a peer group.30 For example, suppose we 
define firm A1’s peer group as the ten closest firms in the same industry. In cases where a 
municipality contains more than eleven companies active in the same industry (say 15 firms, 
A1-A15), we randomly attribute ten peers for firm A1 from the remaining A2-A15 firms in 
that municipality, and so forth. 
We lag the endogenous peer effect variable by one year for three reasons. First and foremost, 
the data does not allow to distinguish, within a year, when each firm has used tax credits. In 
other words, we do not know if a firm uses the measure before or after its peers in a given year. 
By lagging the variable we make sure the peers’ use precedes the focal firm’s decision. Second, 
it is unlikely that information reaches firms instantaneously, but rather needs time to diffuse 
                                                 
29 The coordinates locate town halls with a precision of 2 km. 
30 This is a very minor issue since, as explained in section I.2, the average number of firms per municipality is 3.18 
with a standard deviation of 4.23 and a maximum of 45. Hence, for the main analysis with 𝐾 = 10, the peer 
groups are larger than the number of firms in the same municipality. 
0 if firms i and j are not active in the same industry or if firm j is not among the 
ten closest peers of firm i 
 
1 if firm j is active in the same industry as firm i and is also among the ten closest 
peers of i 
wij= 
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within peer groups. Moreover, there may also be a lag between the time information reaches a 
firm and its decision to act. And third, this alleviates the reflection problem by ensuring that a 
firm’s decision does not econometrically influence the average decision of its peer group.31  
4.4 Other determinants of R&D tax credit use 
Given the volume-based nature of the R&D tax credit, the main explanatory variable is the 
R&D intensity of a firm, measured by the ratio of researchers to overall employees. The higher 
this ratio, the higher the relative savings on personnel cost and therefore we expect this variable 
to have a positive impact on the probability to start receiving tax credits.  
The size of a firm can affect the probability to receive tax credits in the sense that larger firms 
may have dedicated staff to follow up on changes in R&D support measures and may therefore 
be quicker to adopt newly introduced measures (Blanes & Busom, 2004; Neicu et al., 2016b). 
Prior research has found that larger firms are more inclined to use tax credits (Czarnitzki et al., 
2011). We control for firm size by the number of employees in full-time equivalent. 
Since the R&D tax credit initially provided a higher exemption for young and innovative 
companies – a rate of 50% from 2006 to mid-2008, while also being able to use it for R&D 
support personnel), we include a YIC binary indicator.32 The YIC indicator also captures the 
potentially higher propensity of YICs to use public support for R&D, given that innovation is 
at the heart of their value proposition, even more so than for the other R&D active companies 
in the sample. Because of this strategic emphasis on innovation and because they are more 
financially constrained than more mature and/or less innovative firms, YICs may learn about 
the R&D tax credit sooner than other companies, in particular because they may have their 
roots in government-sponsored R&D projects. Also, investors and/or members of the 
management team for such companies may be well versed in accessing the public support 
system for innovation, based on prior experience and therefore do not have to learn about the 
existence of specific support measures in the way other companies need to. Hence, we expect 
YICs to be early adopters while being less prevalent among late adopters.  
                                                 
31 While the use of excluded peers addresses the reflection problem, as explained in section 3, for a minority of 
firms the data does not allow specifying excluded peers, depending on the precise peer group definition. Therefore, 
the lagging of the peer group variable still plays a role in identification. 
32 We follow the Belgian Science Policy Office’s definition, which states that a YIC is less than ten years old, has 
less than 50 employees, an annual turnover lower than 7.3 million Euros, total assets of maximum 3.65 million 
Euros, and spends more than 15% of its total cost on R&D. 
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In order to avoid a spurious attribution of the usage of R&D tax credits to peer effects, the 
empirical analysis must control for all sources of correlation between the focal firm and the 
adopting peers that may explain the adoption decision. In other words, one needs to be careful 
claiming that a focal firm’s decision to apply for the R&D tax credit is inspired by the behaviour 
of its peers while in fact it may be due to some underlying shared characteristic. A crucial 
attribute in this respect is a firm’s savviness in using public support for R&D, which we proxy 
by an indicator of whether the company has received regional subsidies for R&D in the 
previous year. As for YICs, we expect that R&D subsidy use makes firms less likely to be late 
adopters. Table I.3 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the main variables in the estimation 
sample. Correlations between individual characteristics are presented in Appendix in Table 
I.10. 
Table I.3 Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 2007 2009 2011 
  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
First-time usea 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.17 
Overall tax credit use 0.22 0.41 0.33 0.47 0.40 0.49 
R&D intensity  18.00 23.50 17.70 22.40 19.40 23.30 
Employees 185.00 484.00 147.00 414.00 147.00 379.00 
YICs 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 
Subsidy 0.24 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43 
W*Tax credit use 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.40 0.23 
W*R&D intensity 16.80 14.10 16.90 13.70 18.60 13.00 
W*Employees 3.92 0.99 3.78 0.90 3.80 0.82 
W*YIC 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.10 
W*Subsidy 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.18 
Observations 699 961 1018 
a) The percentage of first-time users is relative to the number of R&D active firms in the sample. In 
order to obtain the values from Table I.2, row one needs to be divided by row two (slight differences 
will occur due to trimming decimals). 
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4.5 Results 
Table I.4 illustrates the estimation results of equation (1) through the GS2SLS procedure33 with 
(columns 1c, 2c, 3c) and without (columns 1b, 2b, 3b) contextual effects. As a benchmark, we 
compare the latter results with the ones of a ‘naïve’ OLS model (models 1a, 2a, 3a), in which 
we do not instrument the endogenous peer effect.34 We perform a yearly cross-sectional 
analysis due to the fact that we expect peer effects to behave differently in the first period after 
the introduction of the tax credit, when fewer companies knew of its existence, suggesting a 
greater potential for peer effects. We also assume that this different behaviour cannot be 
captured solely by year indicators.35 The first row shows the coefficient of the endogenous peer 
effect  from equation (1), while the subsequent rows show, respectively, the coefficients of 
the focal firm characteristics δ, and the parameter θ capturing the spatial correlation between 
the error terms from equation (3). Since the primary purpose of the contextual peer effects is 
to distinguish this influence from the endogenous peer effects, which capture the influence 
emanating from peers’ decisions and where our main interest lies, we omit them from the 
results presented here, but they are reported in Appendix in Table I.8. 
                                                 
33 For the estimation of our model through GS2SLS, we use the R package sphet (Piras, 2010) and define 
endogenous peer effects as the (lagged) general use of tax credits by a firms’ peers, and also include lagged 
contextual effects. 
34 We estimate an OLS model for comparability with our main GS2SLS specification, in line with our linear 
probability model. Alternatively, we have estimated the benchmark through a probit model, the results being 
highly similar in terms of significance and magnitude with the basic OLS estimation. 
35 We have also estimated the model on the pooled cross-section, but failed to find significant endogenous peer 
effects. We hypothesise that this is due to the effects weakening as the tax credit becomes pervasive in time.  
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Table I.4 Estimations of endogenous peer effects from the closest ten peers 
 2007 2009 2011 
 OLS GS2SLS OLS GS2SLS OLS GS2SLS 
 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 3c 
Endogenous peer effect 0.106** 0.282*** 0.586** -0.006 -0.043 1.122** -0.018 0.016 0.103 
 (0.046)  (0.106)  (0.259) (0.045)  (0.072)  (0.562) (0.023)  (0.046)  (0.136) 
Log(Employees) 0.015** 0.012** 0.012** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** -0.001 -0.001 0.0003 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
YIC 0.059 0.05 0.043 0.013 0.012 0.026 -0.027 -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.038)  (0.040)  (0.039) (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.055) (0.025)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Subsidies 0.012 0.006 0.005 -0.039 -0.038 -0.060** -0.019 -0.021* -0.027*** 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023) (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.028) (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.015) 
R&D Intensity -0.0005 -0.001** -0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 
 (0.0005) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.0003) (0.000)  (0.0002)   
Spatial error θ  0.058 0.233***  0.015 0.298**  -0.025 0.020 
   (0.080)  (0.091)   (0.054)  (0.120)   (0.024)  (0.048) 
Observations 699 961 1,018 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Intercept estimated but not shown in table. 
c) Standard errors in parentheses. 
d) Models 1c, 2c and 3c include contextual peer effects not shown in table – see Table I.8 in Appendix.
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The GS2SLS estimates that include contextual and correlated effects (columns 1c, 2c, 3c) show 
positive and significant endogenous peer effects in 2007 and 2009, although we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no effects in 2011. The results indicate that a firm’s decision to start using 
R&D tax credits is positively influenced by the (lagged) average use of tax credits of up to ten 
of its closest peers within the same 3-digit NACE industry code, but primarily so in the first 
few years following the introduction of the measure. 
With respect to firm characteristics explaining adoption of the R&D tax credit, we find that, on 
average, larger firms have a higher probability of being first-time users, while young innovative 
companies are less likely to adopt the tax credit in the latter period, as are subsidy users in 2009 
and 2011. As argued in section 4.4, the result for YICs is consistent with the expectation that 
YICs are at the forefront to adopt new R&D support measures. Our data seems to capture 
periods when YICs are mostly general users of tax credits rather than adopters. Out of 43 YICs 
present in the data set in 2007, 15 were already using the tax credit and only 3 were using it for 
the first time. Similarly, we observe 24 and 31 users and only 4 and 1 new adopters in 2009 and 
2011 respectively.36 This numbers suggest that we might fail to capture YIC adoption behaviour 
in years not covered by our data.37 The same observation is true for subsidy users. In 2011, only 
2 firms that had received subsidies one year before become adopters of tax credits, whereas 
there were 12 and 14 in 2007 and 2009 respectively.38 
Somewhat contrary to expectations, more R&D intensive firms are also less likely to be 
adopters in the immediate period after introduction of the measure, although the coefficient’s 
magnitude is rather small. Moreover, since we are analysing a sample of R&D active firms that 
are, in principle, all eligible for the R&D tax credit, this variable acts a control rather than a 
fundamental driver of tax credit adoption.39 
                                                 
36 The numbers are similar in terms of lagged YIC status, as the variable is used in our estimations. Moreover, of 
the adopters in 2011, none were YICs a year before. 
37 Our data is based on the biannual Belgian OECD business R&D survey. Due to the low sample overlap between 
two consecutive surveys and the fact that we lag our explanatory variables, we decided to estimate cross sectional 
models on the periods with most coverage – 2007, 2009 and 2011. 
38 The difference between adoption and general usage behaviour can also be seen in a pooled OLS estimation 
presented in Appendix in Table I.9. The first column shows that (lagged) YIC status and subsidy use do not explain 
adoption behaviour (without accounting for peer effects), but they do significantly and positively influence overall 
use of tax credits (column two). 
39 We also observe in Table I.9 in Appendix that the R&D intensity coefficient is significant at 1% in a simple OLS 
(excluding any peer effects) of general use of tax credits (column 2). Similarly, it positively affects adoption in 
2009 (again, without considering peer effects), while in the other two periods – as well as in the pooled cross 
sections – it has very limited impact and no statistical significance at 10%. 
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In most studies implementing spatial estimators, interpreting the magnitude of the endogenous 
effect – or spatial lag – is cumbersome due to feedback loops – i.e. peers’ decisions affect the 
focal firm’s decision, which in turn affects its peers and so on. However, because our 
endogenous effect variable – average peer tax credit use – is measured prior to the dependent – 
first-time tax credit use – we avoid this issue of circularity. This facilitates the interpretation of 
the magnitude of the coefficients. In 2007, a 10% increase in the number of peers having used 
tax credits the year before increases the probability that the focal firm becomes a user by 5.86 
percentage points (model 1c). Similarly, the effect amounts to 11.22 percentage points in 2009 
(model 2c) and 1.03 percentage points in 2011 (model 3c), although the latter is not significantly 
different from zero. The magnitude of peer effects is quite large given that less than 10% of the 
sampled firms adopt the tax credit in any given year. From a policy perspective, these results 
indicate the presence of an important multiplier effect. More practically, they suggest that 
geographically-targeted information campaigns can be very effective at increasing the take-up 
of tax credits. For example, ensuring that one in every ten firms knows about – and uses – the 
fiscal measure can increase adoption by as much as 11 percentage points, converting two out 
of ten firms doubles the take-up, and so forth. 
4.6 Robustness checks 
As mentioned in section 2, the definition of interactions between firms is based on their industry 
membership and geographical proximity. Notwithstanding that the definition is informed by 
theory, it is an assumption that we need to make in the absence of interaction patterns between 
firms.40 Thus, the network structure used for the analysis might only partially capture the true 
peer network. The spatial econometrics literature provides little guidance on the potential bias 
due to a misspecified spatial weights matrix 𝑊 and the resulting measurement error in the 
instruments. For the related SAR model without spatially correlated errors, Lee (2009) found 
bias from over-specification of the spatial weights matrix to be lower than bias from under-
specification in both maximum likelihood and 2SLS estimations. To investigate potential 
implications of a misspecified peer network for our results, we perform the following 
robustness tests. First and foremost, following Helmers & Patnam (2014), we randomize peer 
                                                 
40 Note that the network structure might still be misspecified even if self-reported firm data were available, due to 
perception bias and other (un)intentional misreporting by firms on whether they were affected by other firms in 
their decisions to start using the R&D tax credit. 
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groups by performing a permutation of firms over the two peer group dimensions, i.e. locations 
and industries, and then re-estimate the model. This falsification test serves to verify that our 
result on peer effects is not obtained when considering any random peer group network. Second, 
we re-run the analysis for different peer group sizes to verify whether the results are not driven 
solely by the choice of a ten nearest-neighbour network. Finally, we introduce additional 
controls in the model to check for industry-wide and regional effects on adoption behaviour 
that are not accounted for by the industry and location dimension of the peer group definitions. 
Random peer assignment 
To test the assumption of our industry and location-based peer groups, we randomly assign ten 
peers to each firm in the sample by shuffling the locations and 3-digit NACE industry codes 
across firms. Although this method ensures that peers are random, it also maintains the basic 
structure of the sample – that is, each industry and municipality will keep the true number of 
firms, but firms are randomly along these dimensions. 
As for the main results, we estimate equation (1) using the GS2SLS method and we repeat the 
procedure 100 times, each repetition generating a new random network structure. The 
histograms in Figure I.3 show the distribution of point estimates of the endogenous peer effects 
obtained in the 100 replications for each time period.41 
  
                                                 
41 We performed the same procedure for the model without the contextual effects . The results are consistent with 
the ones reported here, and are shown in Figure I.4 in Appendix. 
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Figure I.3 Histograms of point estimates of endogenous effects from 10 random peers 
 
a) Estimations include contextual peer effects. 
The mean estimate of the endogenous peer effect is 0.139 (with a standard deviation of 0.560) 
for 2007, a mean of 0.105 (s.d. 0.590) for 2009, and a mean of 0.091 (s.d. 0.130) in 2011. These 
results imply that we cannot reject the null of zero endogenous peer effects in the randomised 
networks. Furthermore, 99% of point estimates are statistically insignificant at 10% level. 
We interpret this as reassuring evidence that our main model captures the underlying network 
structure of peer groups rather than some empirical artefact arising from a misspecified 
network. 
Misspecification of peer group size 
As explained in section 2, the empirical upper bound on the peer group size implied by our data 
is about ten peers, as this allows the identification of social effects by intransitivity for the 
majority of firms in the sample, while for a minority of firms identification is based on variation 
in the peer group size.42  
                                                 
42 Note that specification is flexible enough to permit peer groups to be industry-specific. 
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We now restrict the maximum group size to five and seven firms and present the GS2SLS 
estimation results of endogenous peer effects in Table I.5. The complete results – including 
exogenous effects and individual characteristics are included in Appendix in Table I.11. 
Table I.5 Endogenous peer effects for different peer group sizes (K) 
 2007 2009 2011 
K=10 0.586** 1.122** 0.103 
  (0.259)  (0.562)  (0.136) 
K=7 0.536* 2.325* 0.235 
 (0.309) (1.245) (0.227) 
K=5 0.453 -1.234 -0.152 
 (0.364) (1.867) (0.183) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
We observe that the endogenous effect for groups of seven peers follows our main results by 
having a positive and significant coefficient in the first two periods, followed by a non-
significant and smaller effect in 2011. The same patterns arise in the case of contextual and 
correlated effects. However, when defining peer groups of five firms, we are unable to robustly 
identify the endogenous or exogenous effects. 
These results indicate that groups of 10 peers are sufficiently broad containers of firm 
interaction while progressively smaller peer groups fail to capture peer effects.43 Combined 
with the network scramble test, we are confident that the used peer groups capture the real 
network structure of firms sufficiently accurately. Similar patterns arising from under- and 
over-specification are noted by Lee (2009) and Helmers and Patnam (2014). 
Furthermore, we have defined peer groups within 3-digit NACE industries. Although we have 
based our choice on previous empirical evidence (e.g. Leary & Roberts, 2014), we now test 
whether choosing different definitions of industry boundaries also allow identify peer effects. 
Table I.6 shows the results of GS2SLS estimations for K=10 and peers defined in the same 2 
and 4-digit NACE sectors respectively. We observe that none of the endogenous peer effect 
coefficients are significant at 10% level, although they are similar in magnitude and yearly 
                                                 
43 Similar patterns arising from under- and over-specification of peer groups are reported by Lee (2009) and Helmers 
and Patnam (2014). 
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variation to our main results. These results build confidence in the fact that peer effects operate 
at 3-digit NACE sector level, as lower or higher granularity does not seem to capture any 
interaction between firms. Indeed, 2-digit NACE sectors may be too wide a definition, coupling 
together firms that in practice do not have any links, whereas 4-digit sectors are too narrow, 
which implies that there are missing links in networks defined at this level.  
Table I.6 GS2SLS estimations with groups defined in 2 and 4-digit NACE sectors 
 2007 2009 2011 
 2-digit NACE 4-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 4-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 4-digit NACE 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Endogenous effect 0.371 0.405 1.781 0.271 0.261 -0.090 
 (0.467) (0.316) (1.682) (0.499) (0.191) (0.142) 
ln(employees) 0.012** 0.012* 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
YIC 0.049 0.031 0.019 -0.010 -0.027*** -0.023** 
 (0.041) (0.037) (0.060) (0.051) (0.010) (0.010) 
Subsidy 0.014 0.005 -0.071** -0.051* -0.026** -0.016 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) 
R&D intensity -0.001 -0.0008* 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
c) Contextual effects, spatial errors and intercept estimated but not shown - see Table I.12 in Appendix. 
Omitted control variables 
Finally, we test how robust our results are to omitted variable bias. We have mentioned in the 
Data section that we do not specifically control for industry and geographical region because 
these two dimensions are part of the definition of peer groups. Since there may exist region- 
and industry-wide influences that extend beyond the reach of the peer group and that may lead 
firms to adopt the tax credit, we now re-estimate the spatial model by including binary 
indicators for the three geographical-administrative regions – Brussels (baseline), Wallonia and 
Flanders – as well as for industries aggregated into four groups – high- and low-tech 
manufacturing and services. Although including these covariates reduces the identifying 
variation of the endogenous and exogenous effects, the coefficients remain robust and show 
similar values and significance to the main specification, as can be seen in Table I.7. Moreover, 
the included region indicators are not significant, with one exception, strengthening our trust in 
our main specification. Similarly, industry affiliation seems to matter little in firms’ use of tax 
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credits, as we only find some evidence in 2009 of firms in high-tech services and low-tech 
manufacturing sectors having higher probability of adopting R&D tax credits. 
Table I.7 GS2SLS estimations of peer effects from the closest ten peers 
 2007 2009 2011 
Endogenous effect 0.672** 1.350* 0.177 
 (0.313) (0.798) (0.156) 
R&D intensity -0.001* 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Log(Employees) 0.010 0.022*** -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
YIC 0.035 -0.026 -0.026** 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.013) 
Subsidies 0.004 -0.044 -0.036** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.016) 
Flanders Region -0.008 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.025) 
Wallonia Region -0.059 -0.031 -0.043* 
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.026) 
High-tech services 0.029 0.287* 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.152) (0.021) 
Low-tech manufact. 0.082 0.241** 0.004 
 (0.056) (0.116) (0.017) 
Low-tech services 0.006 0.149 0.025 
 (0.045) (0.093) (0.022) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Intercept, contextual effects and spatially-lagged errors  estimated but not shown in table – see 
Table I.13 in Appendix for full results. 
c) Standard errors in parentheses. 
5 Conclusions 
While our analysis does not directly answer the puzzling question why firms seem reluctant to 
make use of a public support measure that clearly benefits them, it shows how peer influence 
among firms fosters the adoption of R&D tax credits. Our empirical application uses a 
methodologically innovative approach to identify these peer effects: by making the plausible 
assumption of not fully overlapping peer groups based on distance and industry, this paper is 
the first to show how peer effects play a role in firms’ response to R&D public support schemes 
in the absence of clear peer group information. In particular, we show that firms optimize their 
R&D costs through public support as information from their peers reaches them. Consistent 
with a bounded rationality perspective, we interpret this as a way for firms to cope with the 
multitude of public support measures they face, and which are not always efficiently marketed 
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by public authorities. We have also shown that a critical mass of peers is required to find such 
effects. Using intransitivity in the network structure to separate endogenous peer effects (peers’ 
decisions) from exogenous peer effects (peers’ characteristics), the results show that these are 
two separate channels through which peers influence peers influence firms’ decision-making. 
Second, positive peer effects in firms’ decisions to adopt public support for R&D are important 
given the tenacious proliferation and fragmentation of public support schemes, which is 
believed to create a situation that bewilders some firms. In particular, while our findings do not 
imply policy interventions with respect to R&D support schemes as such, they are suggestive 
of opportunities to foster adoption of public support for R&D. For example, these insights can 
be used to set up more effective government communication initiatives, such that early adopters 
in different industries are involved in promoting the measures to their respective peers. 
Adoption by eligible firms could be expedited by communicating the measure to sufficiently 
fine-grained sectors and in a geographical distributed way. As opposed to broad policy 
communications, ‘narrowcasting’ would help to reach many localized firm clusters, or peer 
groups, allowing rapid peer-to-peer influence, once initial adoption has taken place.  
Third, the establishment of peer effects as a significant factor driving firms’ selection into 
support schemes informs the methodological literature on selection bias in program evaluation 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). Namely, the existence of peer effects calls for looking beyond 
the individual firm to explain selection into support programs. Peer effects should be accounted 
for in the selection equation when estimating the effects of policy interventions in R&D, 
especially in contexts where there is reason to believe information about support measures has 
not reached all potential users. Including peer effects as an explanatory factor for firm 
participation in a programme will then help to satisfy the conditional independence assumption 
underlying matching estimators, or to identify the parameters of the selection equation in two-
step estimations. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the broader literature on peer effects between firms. Given the 
high degree of clustering in many ‘small world’ firm networks (Fleming & Marx, 2006), our 
approach of exploiting intransitivity in firms’ networks is more generally applicable to identify 
peer effects in other settings. While we have strived to be as rigorous as possible in our 
identification strategy, it is possible that due to data limitations (omitted variables, sample of 
tax credit users) the analysis misattributes some other driver of tax credit adoption to peer 
effects. For example, although prior studies have found that group membership can affect the 
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use of public support for R&D, our data does not allow including a good control for a firm’s 
membership to a corporate group. This is relevant for our analysis in the sense that the peer 
effects measure may pick up information flows between entities of the same corporate group, 
rather than between competitors. Further, there is a remaining risk of a misspecified network 
structure due to sampling and other sources of measurement error. However, we think the array 
of robustness checks instils sufficient confidence in the findings and ascertains that the 
identified peer effects are not dependent on a particular peer group definition. Finally, the 
simple information diffusion framework that provides the rationale for peer effects does not 
seem to fully explain the observed time pattern. In particular, the peer effect disappears in 2011, 
without, it seems, a clear rationale why non-adopters at that stage would cease to be influenced 
by their peers. Nevertheless, the framework accommodates the fading of peer effects provided 
a saturation effects occurs. This could occur as follows. In 2006, year of the introduction of the 
R&D tax credit, little is known about its existence. However, a small number of ‘fiscal pioneers’ 
– mostly larger firms – have already benefited from the measure from its introduction. One year 
later, in 2007, information spills from these pioneers to the ‘followers’, which are situated in 
close proximity to the former and are active in the same industries.  This phenomenon continues 
through 2009, three years after the introduction of the new tax credit. However, by 2011, local 
groups of firms are saturated with the aforementioned information, thus the peer effect loses its 
significance. Although it is still possible that knowledge still travels the inter-company space 
to larger distances – and thus in larger peer groups – the size of our sample does not allow to 
investigate whether the effect would persist in more broadly defined peer groups.  
Our work triggers several avenues for further research. First, recent work on firms’ combination 
of R&D support measures shows evidence of complementarities between R&D grants and 
fiscal support in terms of R&D additionality (e.g. Neicu et al., 2016b). In the light of the finding 
of peer effects for the adoption of R&D tax credits, this begs the question whether those 
companies that are driven by peer effects in their adoption decision show the same additionality 
effects as early adopters. Second, the hypothesis of firm heterogeneity in peer effects could be 
explored further, by a more comprehensive analysis of the strength of the effect conditional on 
individual characteristics, or on who are the leaders and followers in peer groups, similarly to 
Leary & Roberts (2014) or Claussen et al. (2014). However, due to the relatively low numbers 
of first-time users in our data, split-sample analyses would suffer from lack of variation in the 
dependent variable, which would render identification of endogenous and exogenous effects 
more difficult in the GS2SLS framework. 
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6 Appendix 
Figure I.4 Histograms of point estimates of endogenous effects from 10 random peers 
 
a) Estimations exclude contextual peer effects. 
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Table I.8 GS2SLS estimation results of main models including exogenous peer effects 
 2007 2009 2011 
 1c 2c 3c 
Endogenous peer effect 0.586** 1.122** 0.103 
  (0.259)  (0.562)  (0.136) 
Log(Employees) 0.012** 0.020*** 0.0003 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
YIC 0.043 0.026 -0.029*** 
  (0.039)  (0.055)  (0.010) 
Subsidies 0.005 -0.060** -0.027*** 
  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.015) 
R&D Intensity -0.001** 0.001 -0.0002 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0002)   
W*R&D Intensity -0.002 -0.011** 0.0004 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
W*log(employees) -0.042* -0.133** -0.013 
  (0.024)  (0.066)  (0.017) 
W*YIC -0.159 0.019 -0.108* 
  (0.104)  (0.160)  (0.060) 
W*Subsidies 0.014 -0.267 -0.017 
  (0.074)  (0.170)  (0.044) 
Spatial error θ 0.233*** 0.298** 0.020 
  (0.091)  (0.120)  (0.048) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Intercept included but not shown in table. 
c) Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table I.9 OLS estimations of tax credit adoption and general usage 
 Adoption Usage 
Adoption 
2007 
Adoption 
2009 
Adoption 
2011 
 1 2 3 4 5 
ln(employees) 0.011*** 0.133*** 0.017*** 0.019*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
YIC 0.020 0.200*** 0.065* 0.013 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.038) (0.044) (0.025) 
Subsidy -0.015 0.162*** 0.015 -0.040* -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.014) 
R&D intensity 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2009 0.033*** 0.144***    
 (0.011) (0.020)    
2011 -0.027** 0.205***    
 (0.011) (0.020)    
Intercept 0.010 -0.460*** -0.011 0.002 0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.018) 
Observations 2678 2678 699 961 1018 
R2 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.00 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
c) Columns 1 and 2 are OLS estimations of first-time use (‘Adoption’) and overall use (‘Usage’) of tax 
credits on the pooled cross sections. 
Table I.10 Correlation between dependent and independent variables 
 Adopters Users Empl. YIC Subsidy 
2007 
Users 0.46     
Employees 0.12 0.30    
YIC 0.02 0.08 -0.28   
Subsidy 0.06 0.30 0.06 0.18  
R&D intensity -0.05 0.22 -0.41 0.39 0.29 
2009 
Users 0.44     
Employees 0.07 0.33    
YIC 0.01 0.11 -0.24   
Subsidy -0.03 0.24 0.08 0.09  
R&D intensity 0.02 0.23 -0.38 0.36 0.20 
2011 
Users 0.21     
Employees 0.01 0.30    
YIC -0.01 0.09 -0.27   
Subsidy -0.04 0.24 0.10 0.04  
R&D intensity -0.03 0.17 -0.38 0.25 0.14 
a) ‘Adopters’ refers to first-time use of tax credits; ‘Users’ refers to general use. 
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Table I.11 GS2SLS estimations of peer effects from the closest 5 and 7 peers 
 5 peers 7 peers 
 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 
Endogenous effect 0.453 -1.234 -0.152 0.536* 2.325* 0.235 
 (0.364) (1.867) (0.183) (0.309) (1.245) (0.227) 
W*R&D intensity -0.003 0.010 0.001 -0.003 -0.019* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
W*log(employees) -0.033 0.160 0.016 -0.040 -0.270* -0.033 
 (0.037) (0.234) (0.023) (0.029) (0.145) (0.027) 
W*YIC -0.056 0.137 -0.002 -0.113 -0.115 -0.224** 
 (0.084) (0.268) (0.084) (0.095) (0.256) (0.104) 
W*Subsidies 0.012 0.231 0.071 0.014 -0.635** -0.054 
 (0.069) (0.391) (0.054) (0.074) (0.330) (0.071) 
Spatial error θ 0.235* 0.148 -0.077* 0.245*** 0.538*** 0.099** 
 (0.136) (0.113) (0.054) (0.096) (0.099) (0.043) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
c) Intercept estimated but not shown. 
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Table I.12 GS2SLS estimation with groups defined in 2 and 4-digit NACE sectors 
 2007 2009 2011 
 2-digit 4-digit 2-digit 4-digit 2-digit 4-digit 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Endogenous effect 0.371 0.405 1.781 0.271 0.261 -0.090 
 (0.467) (0.316) (1.682) (0.499) (0.191) (0.142) 
ln(employees) 0.012** 0.012* 0.022*** 0.016*** 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
YIC 0.049 0.031 0.019 -0.010 -0.027*** -0.023** 
 (0.041) (0.037) (0.060) (0.051) (0.010) (0.010) 
Subsidy 0.014 0.005 -0.071** -0.051* -0.026** -0.016 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) 
R&D intensity -0.001 -0.0008* 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
W*ln(employees) -0.015 -0.034 -0.184 -0.030 -0.033 0.017 
 (0.053) (0.026) (0.208) (0.064) (0.023) (0.018) 
W*YIC -0.032 -0.004 -0.111 0.134 -0.161* 0.014 
 (0.117) (0.104) (0.388) (0.105) (0.091) (0.061) 
W*Subsidy 0.040 -0.029 -0.462* -0.086 -0.083 0.010 
 (0.068) (0.074) (0.258) (0.131) (0.073) (0.039) 
W*R&D intensity -0.002 -0.002 -0.014 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Spatial error θ -0.007 0.094 0.709*** 0.119 0.103 -0.034 
 (0.162) (0.089) (0.131) (0.103) (0.129) (0.022) 
Intercept 0.039 0.123 0.593 0.109 0.123** -0.006 
 (0.220) (0.116) (0.684) (0.226) (0.058) (0.041) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table I.13 GS2SLS estimation of peer effects from the closest ten peers 
 2007 2009 2011 
Endogenous effect 0.672** 1.350* 0.177 
 (0.313) (0.798) (0.156) 
R&D intensity -0.001* 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Log(Employees) 0.010 0.022*** -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
YIC 0.035 -0.026 -0.026** 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.013) 
Subsidies 0.004 -0.044 -0.036** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.016) 
W*R&D intensity -0.002 -0.012* -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) 
W*log(employees) -0.051* -0.156* -0.024 
 (0.028) (0.089) (0.021) 
W*YIC -0.207* -0.369 -0.141* 
 (0.109) (0.306) (0.084) 
W*subsidies 0.028 -0.186 -0.042 
 (0.074) (0.153) (0.052) 
Flanders Region -0.008 0.000 -0.008 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.025) 
Wallonia Region -0.059 -0.031 -0.043* 
 (0.041) (0.066) (0.026) 
High-tech services 0.029 0.287* 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.152) (0.021) 
Low-tech manufact. 0.082 0.241** 0.004 
 (0.056) (0.116) (0.017) 
Low-tech services 0.006 0.149 0.025 
 (0.045) (0.093) (0.022) 
Spatial error  0.248*** 0.308*** 0.048 
 (0.090) (0.122) (0.063) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Intercept included but not shown in table. 
c) Standard errors in parentheses. 
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II. Mix and match: evaluating the additionality of an 
R&D policy mix 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the additionality of a policy mix of R&D tax credits and subsidies on firms’ 
R&D investment. Using non-parametric matching models and instrumental variables 
estimations on a rich dataset of R&D-active companies from Belgium, the results reveal that 
tax credits and subsidies have different effects on firms’ budgetary decisions regarding basic 
and applied research and development. First, although both support measures increase private 
R&D spending, the effect of subsidies is only significant when they are combined with tax 
credits. Second, tax credits outperform subsidies in every comparison, showing positive 
additionality on all parts of R&D. On the other hand, subsidies do not affect development 
spending, while they do have an impact on research when combined with fiscal stimuli. 
Mitigating to some extent hidden treatment effects and selection bias, I demonstrate that there 
are complementarities between direct and indirect R&D support. 
 
Keywords R&D policy mix, output additionality, behavioural additionality, tax credits, 
subsidies. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of public intervention in private R&D stems from the link between research, 
innovation and economic growth (Mansfield, 1972). Underinvestment in R&D hinders growth, 
which paves the way for governments to support firms’ efforts in research and development in 
order to achieve a ‘social optimum’ of R&D and innovation activity. 
Underinvestment in R&D is based on two market failure arguments (Arrow, 1962). First, 
because knowledge is a non-rival and non-exclusive good, firms cannot fully appropriate the 
returns on their R&D investments; this stems from knowledge having high fixed costs of 
production and low marginal costs of utilisation. Secondly, uncertainty is a defining 
characteristic of innovative activity. When firms engage in R&D, they cannot fully predict the 
output by the inputs they employ. If economic actors are risk averse, they will discriminate 
against risky projects (Arrow & Lind, 1970). 
The latter argument is aggravated for types of R&D projects that are farther away from the 
market, as is the case for basic or even applied research, compared to development. As 
uncertainty about returns is higher for these projects, firms encounter more barriers to financing 
them externally and thus need to rely more on internal funds (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011). 
Higher returns’ uncertainty of basic and, to some extent, applied research arises from their 
characteristics. Both basic and applied research comprise activities geared towards acquiring 
new knowledge, whereas development builds on existing knowledge to create new or improved 
products or processes. The difference between basic and applied research stands in that the 
former creates knowledge that is not directed at practical use, unlike the latter (OECD, 2002). 
Whichever the reason for the market failure, governments saw the need to provide incentives 
to firms in order to bridge the gap between the private and social returns to investment in R&D. 
Over the decades, this has usually been done by directly subsidising research projects. R&D 
grants have, at least in theory, the advantage of directly addressing market failures by allowing 
policy makers some control over which type of research they finance. However, information 
asymmetries, bureaucracy or political pressure can result in the mismanagement of public 
funds and an aggravation of the market failure that required intervention in the first place. 
More recently, countries have started to implement various systems of tax credits for firms 
engaging in R&D. Among OECD member states, the percentage of governments offering some 
form of tax credits doubled between 1995 and 2011, reaching 75% of countries implementing 
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such policies (OECD, 2013). The attractiveness of tax credits to governments stands mainly in 
their administrative simplicity and lower information asymmetries, while also providing firms 
with a more predictable policy than subsidies (Haegeland & Møen, 2007a).44 
With the increasing use of R&D tax credits alongside subsidies comes the risk that different 
policies might crowd each other out, thus the need to properly assess the effects and interactions 
between these measures. Indeed, most empirical studies to date assess solely the impact – or 
additionality – created by one of these tools, rather than their combined effects45. However, a 
growing literature on the combined use of different policies is emerging. On the one hand, 
studies compare the effects of tax credits with those of subsidies on firms’ total or private R&D 
expenditure (Haegeland & Møen, 2007b; Dumont, 2015; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015; Marino, 
Parrotta, & Lhuillery, 2015). On the other hand, there are a few studies distinguishing the 
impact of subsidies on either research or development spending (Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, & 
Thorwarth, 2011; Hottenrott, Lopes Bento, & Veugelers, 2014). However, to the best of my 
knowledge, there are no studies analysing both input and behavioural additionality of subsidies 
and tax credits when used solely and combined. 
Therein the contribution of this paper. I evaluate whether subsidies and tax credits increase 
R&D spending in firms that are using either measure or combining them in a policy mix. 
Moreover, the analysis goes beyond the classical input additionality approach and studies if 
the two policies crowd each other out in terms of total R&D expenditure, but also whether they 
have different effects on basic research, applied research, or development activities. 
I find strong evidence of input additionality from tax credits used alone or combined with 
subsidies, but cannot rule out crowding out for subsidies alone. Moreover, I show some 
evidence that both policies induce a behavioural change away from development and towards 
research. From an econometric perspective, I mitigate possible bias arising from hidden 
treatments and selection of firms into programmes, two hot issues in contemporary policy 
evaluation research. 
                                                 
44 Although fiscal policy may be on average more predictable than subsidy budgets, the reverse can also be true – 
in Belgium, for example, wage-based tax credit rates have been constantly raised on an almost yearly basis from 
2006 to 2013. 
45 See García-Quevedo (2004) for a meta-analysis of the impact of public funding on private R&D. 
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2 Theory and hypotheses 
In this section I will briefly sum up the main existing empirical findings on the effectiveness 
of direct grants and tax credits for R&D, based on which I formulate my research hypotheses. 
2.1 R&D grants and tax credits as separate policies 
In a survey of econometrical studies on the impact of direct R&D grants on firms’ R&D 
expenditure, David et al. (2000) argue that most previous research can be criticised for not 
accounting correctly for the selection of firms into subsidy programmes. Consequently, results 
were inconclusive, either showing that direct grants substitute or complement private R&D 
spending. More recently, positive additionality of public grants on firms’ R&D expenditure 
has been found in Germany (Czarnitzki & Licht, 2006), France (Duguet, 2004), Germany and 
Flanders (Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013), Italy (Carboni, 2011) and 
Spain (González & Pazó, 2008).46 However, crowding-out can sometimes still take place, as 
Görg and Strobl (2007) find to be the case of Irish firms. Although they find positive 
additionality of small grants on firms’ R&D expenditure, larger subsidies appear to finance 
projects that would have been implemented even without public support. 
On the other hand, because tax credits have been introduced by governments later than grants, 
econometric evaluations of their effectiveness are more scarce. Nevertheless, in a 
comprehensive analysis of econometric evidence on US and non-US tax credit systems, Hall 
and Van Reenen (2000) found that most results point towards a dollar-for-dollar increase in 
firms’ R&D spending due to tax credits. They do, however, find that the effects are smaller in 
the first years after the introduction of each measure. 
More recent studies have generally confirmed the positive effects of R&D tax credits on R&D 
inputs, for example Haegeland and Møen (2007), Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2009),  Duguet 
(2010), or Czarnitzki, Hanel, & Rosa (2011). Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) perform an analysis 
of the Dutch R&D tax incentive introduced through the Wage Tax and Social Insurance Act. 
The level-based tax deduction is applied to R&D labour costs, similarly to the Belgian system 
analysed in the current paper. They find that the Dutch programme stimulates R&D investment 
and the bang-for-the-buck is larger for small firms than for larger ones. 
                                                 
46 Most recent studies address in some way the selection bias, overcoming the issues signalled in David et al. (2000). 
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In Belgium, Dumont (2013, 2015) analyses the same tax credit on researchers’ wages and 
subsidy system that are the focus of my paper. Splitting the tax credit into its four components 
– wages of researchers involved in collaboration with universities, those with master degrees, 
PhD degrees, or employed in young innovative companies – he finds that results vary with the 
estimation method. Without controlling for (self-) selection, three of the four parts of the tax 
credit show positive effects on firms’ private R&D expenses, the exception being the fiscal 
exemption for young innovative companies. Controlling for selection into programmes by 
using instrumental variables fails to mimic those results, and the only robust effect remains that 
of the tax exemption on wages of researchers with a Master’s degree, although using a 
matching estimator does produce significant average treatment effects for all exemption 
categories. Similarly, results for additionality of subsidies on private R&D expenditure vary 
with the econometric method employed, and their economic impact seems smaller than (parts 
of) the wage withholding tax exemption. Apart from methodological differences, my paper 
diverges from his analysis in that I investigate the overall impact of the wage-based fiscal 
exemption, rather than focusing on each specific line. I do so in the belief that the mechanism 
through which the measure affects firms is common for all its components – targeting 
employment of highly-skilled researchers to increase investment in R&D in firms. I also offer 
more robust econometric evidence concerning the separate additionality on research and on 
development spending, as I discuss in Section 2.3. 
Ientile and Mairesse (2009) conclude, after analysing over 30 studies on the effectiveness of 
tax credits, that evidence is scattered based on the methodology used and on the design of the 
incentive scheme itself. A more recent meta-analysis for the European Commission confirms 
that additionality depends on the design of the measure and econometric results are highly 
country-specific, but also that tax credits have varying effects on different groups of firms. 
However, most evidence does point towards a stimulating effects on R&D expenditure 
(Straathof et al., 2015). 
In light of this – although somewhat varying – evidence of the additionality created by R&D 
tax credits and subsidies, I build the first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Subsidies and tax credits increase firms’ private R&D spending. 
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2.2 The policy mix 
As I have already signalled, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the interaction between 
direct and indirect – and, more generally between different levels of – support for R&D, which 
has been signalled multiple times in recent years (Flanagan et al., 2011; Aranguren et al., 2014). 
A study for the European Commission concludes: “the limited empirical evidence indicates 
that interactions between different policy measures probably exist” (Straathof et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the interaction between (inter-)national and regional policy is even more opaque, 
in the context of distribution of authority from national level ‘downstream’ – to regional level 
– but also ‘upstream’ – to international structures (Flanagan et al., 2011; Lanahan & Feldman, 
2015; Martin, 2016). Federal systems of governance provide an ideal context to study 
interactions between policies at different levels of administration (Lanahan & Feldman, 2015, 
p. 1387). Although incomparable in size to the US, Belgium does offer fertile ground for study 
by having numerous R&D policies spread across federal and regional governmental agencies, 
and my analysis provides evidence that federal fiscal exemptions and regional subsidies do 
seem to interact in ways that increase firms’ response to receiving them – but that also depend 
on how responses are defined. 
Although empirical evidence is not yet abundant, the theoretical consensus seems to be that 
different policies will interact with one another, sometimes in unpredictable ways. Martin 
(2016, p. 167) provides a useful analogy with healthcare, where drugs used to treat different 
ailments may interact in complex manners. Even though each drug may be the best treatment 
for its target illness, other drugs may counteract its effect and vice-versa; as physicians need to 
take all these interactions into account, policy makers should also design R&D instruments 
without neglecting how they may affect each other. 
The reasons to expect such interactions stem both from the characteristics of direct and indirect 
support and from the possibility of their simultaneous use. 
Grants have been the main policy tool used to provide up-front financing to companies 
pursuing R&D projects, while tax credits are comparatively new on the public agenda. Whereas 
subsidies allow granting agencies some form of control over how firms use the public funds, 
tax credits impose lower administrative costs on both the firm and the policy maker. Moreover, 
receiving a grant can act as a signal to other financing bodies and thus indirectly increase firms’ 
attractiveness to venture capitalists or private lenders (Takalo & Tanayama, 2010), while tax 
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credits may oftentimes only apply to profit-making companies.47 Furthermore, direct grants are 
usually earmarked for use within a specific R&D project, while tax incentives can be redirected 
to non-R&D activities, in certain fiscal environments – including the one analysed in this paper. 
Clearly, different policies not only have different goals, but also function in different ways at 
a managerial level. Thus the need to better understand the interactions between the more rigid 
– in terms of application process and destination – direct R&D grants, on the one hand, and the 
more flexible R&D tax credits, on the other, is paramount to new evaluation studies for 
innovation policy (Diez, 2002; Aranguren et al., 2013). 
In this vein, more recent research has focused on how firms simultaneously use direct R&D 
subsidies and tax credits, either by measuring the impact on private R&D inputs (Haegeland & 
Møen, 2007a; Carboni, 2011), on innovative output (Bérubé & Mohnen, 2009), or by exploring 
the drivers behind the choice of each support policy (Busom et al., 2014).  
Hall and Maffioli (2008) review a number of direct and indirect R&D subsidy programmes in 
Latin America and generally find positive additionality on firms’ R&D expenditure. Moreover, 
they show that the effects differ by type of financing mechanism, tax credits being more 
effective than direct grants. Haegeland and Møen (2007) find that both subsidies and tax credits 
prompt Norwegian firms to invest more in R&D, again finding that tax credits outperform 
grants. Carboni (2011) reports similar results from Italian firms. On the other hand, direct 
support has been found to have greater impact than tax credits in a panel of 19 members states 
of the OECD (Westmore, 2013). Recently, Guerzoni & Raiteri (2015) have used matching 
estimators to find that additionality of tax credits used as a single measure decreases when 
controlling for other support that firms use, while it disappears altogether in the case of 
subsidies. On the other hand, combining the two in a policy mix results in positive additionality 
on R&D expenditure. Similarly, Marino et al. (2015) find substitution effects in firms that 
combine subsidies with tax credits, although complementarity cannot be ruled out at medium 
levels of support. A drawback of these analyses is the fact that they are based on matching 
estimators, which heavily rely on the conditional independence assumption. Should there be 
                                                 
47 However, in some cases, tax credits are not related to the overall tax position of companies. My analysis involves 
a partial exemption on the wage-withholding tax in Belgium, and thus applicants are not restricted to profit-
making firms. 
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unobserved characteristics that play a part in firms’ choice of policies, treatment effects will 
be biased.  
As empirical findings seem to be country- or at least policy-specific, my hypothesis regarding 
the effect of the policy mix needs to be constructed in view of existing evidence from Belgium. 
In an analysis of the Belgian R&D support system, Dumont (2013) showed that some financing 
lines of wage-based tax credits display higher additionality on R&D expenditure than 
subsidies. Although additionality decreases (but remains positive) when the estimation controls 
for the possible simultaneous use of direct and indirect support, this cannot be interpreted as a 
substitution effect, but rather as a reduction in bias resulting from controlling for ‘hidden 
treatments’. Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) find a similar behaviour of the estimates, arguing that 
this is due to confounding factors in a system of multiple R&D policies, an issue that most 
previous studies have not tackled. 
In an update to Dumont (2013) covering the period 2003-2011, Dumont (2015) finds some 
evidence that subsidies and part of the wage withholding tax exemption are substitutes, 
although the magnitude of the effect is limited. However, his specification is based on ordinary 
least squares and does not consider possible selection of firms into different policies nor 
combination of policies, which can produce biased estimates of additionality on private R&D 
expenditure. Furthermore, because his data includes subsidies received as of 2001 and tax 
exemptions started in 2006, there is a strong possibility that the positive additionality effect of 
subsidies is driven by the period before the wage-based tax credits were introduced – i.e. before 
2006. In this sense, the interaction between the two support measures may not be completely 
captured in the panel. I diverge from this part of his research by estimating the effect of the 
policy mix – defined the simultaneous use of tax credits for researchers and subsidies – while 
controlling for (self-) selection into policies and their combination, in an attempt to reduce the 
inherent bias. I describe the identification strategy in Section 3.3. Moreover, I analyse tax 
exemptions and grants throughout the same period – i.e. when both measures were available to 
firms. 
The interaction between direct and indirect support can emerge for different reasons and in 
various ways, and it stems from the characteristics of the policies. Tax credits have the main 
advantage – from the market’s perspective – or disadvantage – from the policy maker’s 
perspective – of leaving the decision on what R&D projects to pursue up to the firms. 
Moreover, in some policy designs, firms are not required to invest the exempted amount in 
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R&D activities. Subsidies, however, are funds directly provided by public authorities, usually 
after a selection procedure based on the perceived quality of the proposed R&D project and 
track record of performing R&D, among others. Complementarity can arise as a simple volume 
effect – pooling together more resources allows firms to engage in larger R&D projects, which 
in turn require more private investment.48 Substitution, on the other hand, can occur when firms 
choose to redirect resources to activities unrelated to R&D when they receive more than one 
type of support. It can arise, for example, when tax credits and subsidies can be combined on 
the same R&D project and their amount covers the necessary funds, the firm not needing to 
top-up with private cash for the project to take place. This points to a possible upper bound to 
how much firms can invest in R&D – that is, once they assure funding for a portfolio of 
projects, they do not have incentives to seek additional investment opportunities. An alternative 
explanation – albeit with similar effects –  is that financial constraints do not allow companies 
to increase their portfolio through private funds. 
As existing empirical research on the issue of mixing policies is rare and results that point to 
substitution among support measures lack both robustness and magnitude, I choose to test the 
hypothesis that their interaction is positive, although this is purely for exposition reasons in 
this part of the paper, and whether the hypothesis holds or policies are substitutes will be 
decided by the empirical analysis. 
Hypothesis 2: Each policy used alone generates smaller additionality on private R&D 
expenditure than the policy mix. 
2.3 Effects of R&D support on basic, applied research, and 
development spending 
Focusing on private R&D expenditure as an input in the innovation process, although 
undoubtedly informative, does not capture the inner workings of how firms combine direct 
grants with tax stimuli in managing their R&D. 
                                                 
48 Note that I use the word ‘complementarity’ to define rather loosely the interaction between different policies that 
does not result in them crowding each other out. Different meanings of this term exist and have been analysed, 
such as policies having varying targets and scopes – for example, subsidies being more useful for SMEs facing 
financing constraints (Busom, Corchuelo, & Martínez-Ros, 2014). 
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When evaluating public policy, it is oftentimes forgotten that R&D is not a monobloc. Instead, 
it has different components that make up the entity, and these components might be very 
different in their characteristics. The Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002) distinguishes three 
separate activities within the R&D process: basic research, applied research, and development. 
The market failures inherent to R&D might affect disproportionately each of its components. 
Outcome uncertainty plays a bigger role when firms engage in basic research, as the intrinsic 
characteristics of this activity make it more prone to risk and distance it from a potential market. 
Externally financing basic research is thus more difficult than projects which are closer to the 
market, i.e. applied research and development projects. Furthermore, knowledge created in 
basic and applied research is harder to appropriate than knowledge created by development 
activities. Coupled with the larger contribution of basic research to innovation, this translates 
into private rates of return from research being smaller than the social rates of return 
(Rosenberg, 1990; Mansfield, 1991). 
Current empirical evidence shows that research activities are more sensitive to operating 
liquidity than development activities, as firms need to rely more on internal funds to finance 
basic and applied research and thus cash-strapped firms will have less resources for research, 
whereas they should find it easier to finance development through market loans (Czarnitzki et 
al., 2011). In this vein, the Flemish regional government has devised specific policies to 
directly subsidise firms’ research and development activities separately. Hottenrott et al. (2014) 
analyse this framework and find that the policy has direct effects on private spending – i.e. 
research (development) subsidies increase private spending on research (development) – but 
also cross-effects, from research grants to private development expenditure and vice-versa. In 
earlier work, Clausen (2009) found that subsidies for projects farther from the market do 
stimulate additional spending in Norwegian firms, while those granted for projects closer to 
the market crowd out private funding. My paper differs from the latter two in two significant 
ways. First, both studies only analyse subsidies’ impact on R&D, without accounting for other 
support firms might use simultaneously. This ‘hidden treatment’ can induce upward bias in the 
estimation of treatment effects, as previous research has shown (Dumont, 2013; Guerzoni & 
Raiteri, 2015). My results also point towards complementarity between subsidies and tax 
credits, another feature that is not present in the aforementioned papers. 
In his analysis of the Belgian R&D support system, Dumont (2015) briefly addresses the 
question of additionality on the orientation of R&D activities. He finds that subsidies shift 
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firms’ activities from development towards basic research, while tax credits for YICs seem to 
move activities towards applied research. His analysis does not measure the amount of funds 
spent on each activity, but rather the percentage, thus does not capture input additionality for 
each component of R&D. Moreover, the results are likely to suffer to some extent from 
selection bias, which is not accounted for in this part of his analysis, whereas I will try to 
mitigate this issue through robust econometric techniques. 
These previous findings lead to the construction of the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Subsidies increase firms’ spending on basic and applied research, but 
their additionality is smaller or insignificant on development. 
On the other hand, tax credits can usually be freely spent by firms, and are more likely to be 
used to finance projects with high private rates of return (David et al., 2000). Czarnitzki et al. 
(2011) evaluate the Canadian tax credit system and bring empirical support for this argument. 
They find that firms that use tax credits do invest more in R&D, but some investment is in 
short-term projects that lead to incremental innovations. It can thus be argued that firms use 
tax credits to invest more on development, rather than basic or even applied research. On the 
other hand, fiscal exemptions can also finance marginal projects which might be deemed too 
risky to be subsidized. 
The Belgian tax credit I analyse is granted to firms that employ highly-skilled researchers, 
which are more prone to engage in basic and applied research than development. The argument 
of the federal authorities for introducing the fiscal exemption was that it would increase R&D 
investments and contribute to achieving the Lisbon strategy’s objective of spending 3% of GDP 
on R&D. Dumont et al. (2015) find that using the tax credit induces an increase of PhD-holders 
in firms’ research departments. Considering this, it could well be the case that the tax credit 
increases research rather than development spending, a hypothesis partially supported by 
Dumont (2015). He finds that only one of the four lines of exemption produces a shift from 
development to applied research. However, the finding could be biased by selection of firms 
into treatment categories, which is not accounted for. As the balance between the two theories 
is unclear, I do not have a specific hypothesis regarding the effect of tax credits on research 
versus development activity and will let the results shed light onto this matter. 
Recently, Neicu et al. (2016b) have shown that there are important differences in how firms 
respond to receiving a policy mix rather than a single measure. They find that direct grants 
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increase the effects that tax credits have on the speed and scale of R&D projects. Moreover, 
using the policy mix allows firms to spend more resources on research rather than development, 
compared to what they would have spent had they received only tax credits. However, their 
data do not allow to assess the effect of tax credits alone, nor to calculate the magnitude of 
additionality. They can only observe the complementarity or extra effect brought on by 
subsidies to firms that already receive tax credits. Following this work, my fourth hypothesis 
states: 
Hypothesis 4: The policy mix increases (basic and applied) research more than 
development spending. 
3 Data and method 
3.1 R&D subsidies and tax credits in Belgium 
R&D subsidies in Belgium are granted by regional authorities in each of the three 
administrative regions – Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. Firms pass through a selection 
procedure at the end of which projects are either funded or rejected by the granting authority. 
They can also be specifically earmarked for research or development projects (research grants 
and development grants). The Region of Flanders subsidises research, development or mixed 
(R&D) projects to varying degrees, offering extra incentives for SMEs, as do the other two 
regions. Moreover, Flanders and Brussels also sponsor feasibility studies, while Flanders and 
Wallonia target specific industries based on their economic needs. 
Tax credits are a federal measure which applies to all firms within the country. The specific 
tax credit I analyse is a partial wage withholding tax exemption on researchers’ salaries and 
has been introduced in October 2005, at first only for researchers working on collaborative 
R&D projects with universities or other research centres. In 2006 it has been extended to all 
employees with a PhD degree in science and all R&D personnel employed in young innovative 
companies (YICs), and from 2007 it is applicable to researchers with a Master degree too. It is 
thus somewhat different from the more common R&D tax credits used in other countries – and 
also to lesser extent in Belgium – and which are dependent on turnover or profits. The amount 
exempted started at 50% of wage withholding tax for YICs and collaborative projects and 25% 
for PhD and MA holders, but the rate was raised to 65% in 2008 and 75% from 2009 for all 
categories. The Belgian measure can be freely spent by firms on any activity, be it related to 
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R&D or not. This specific provision is in contrast with subsidies, which are grants with a 
specific destination in R&D activities within pre-approved projects. 
It is important to note that the tax exemption has been implemented to replace a previous – 
somewhat similar – fiscal measure which applied only to newly-hired researchers, and that 
forced beneficiaries to return the exempted amounts when ending the contracts of the 
researchers receiving the tax credit. The importance of examining the effects of regional 
(direct) and federal (indirect) measures together stems from such an institutional context in 
which authorities at different levels amend and replace existing policy. It is reasonable to 
believe that, in this case, federal authorities decided to introduce the new tax credit in 2006 
while being fully aware not only of the fiscal instruments they would replace or work in parallel 
with, but also of the R&D subsidies granted by regional governments. New policy was thus 
introduced in the context of pre-existing policies, which paves the way for interactions between 
the former and the latter (Uyarra, 2010; Lanahan & Feldman, 2015; Martin, 2016). 
In Table II.1 I briefly illustrate the evolution over time of the population of users of tax credits, 
subsidies and the policy mix. We see an abrupt increase in the uptake of tax credits in 2006 
and 2007, as the measure opened to more categories of researchers, but also in 2009, when the 
percentage of exempted tax was raised to 75%. This increase is also visible in the average tax 
credit per firm, which raises steadily before 2008 from 36 to 92 thousand Euros, then 
encountering a more abrupt rise for two years up to 217 thousand Euros, only to slightly drop 
in 2010 and 2011. This decline is mostly due to a larger number of users, as the total amount 
of foregone tax in the economy remained at similar levels in 2009-2011, at around 290 million 
Euros. Subsidies, on the other hand, show a steadier trend, mostly due to a more even policy 
over time. Subsidy users remain around or above 800 firms per year, with a drop in 2009 and 
2010, possibly correlated with the downturn in world financial markets. Regarding the amount 
of subsidies received on average by firms, it started almost four times the average tax credit, at 
133 thousand Euros. There is no clear trend though, as it raises and drops in an apparently 
disordered fashion up to 2011, when it surges by almost 80 thousand Euros to 259 thousand. 
The last panel displays firms combining tax credits and subsidies in the same year. As expected, 
the trend follows the lines of the singular policies, but we mostly see a steady increase in the 
number of firms choosing the mix and the average amount received. The average amount of 
the policy mix in 2005 was 870 thousand Euros, many times higher than the average tax credit 
and subsidy amounts combined. This is most probably due a few firms with very large R&D 
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departments, given that only 33 companies used the mix in that year. Moreover, the tax 
exemption in 2005 only applied to researchers hired on collaborative projects and stood at 50% 
of their wage withholding tax. The drop to almost half the average amount in 2006 follows 
from almost six times more users. There is also a large increase in 2009 of about 200 thousand 
Euros, on average, which is matched by an increase in the overall budget spent on firms 
combining the two by almost 65 million Euros. 
Table II.1 Population statistics by support type and period 
 Tax credits Subsidies Policy mix 
 Users Average Total Users Average Total Users Average Total 
2005 52  36   1,875  778  133   103,000  33  870   28,700  
2006 427  78   33,200  856  110   94,500  184  459   84,500  
2007 673  92   62,000  844  164   139,000  243  521   127,000  
2008 887  158   140,000  813  136   110,000  288  537   155,000  
2009 1242  217   270,000  703  141   98,900  299  735   220,000  
2010 1402  207   290,000  776  178   138,000  350  641   224,000  
2011 1459  198   289,000  885  259   229,000  394  788   311,000  
a) Numbers refer to the entire population of public support users. 
b) Tax credits and subsidies categories include users of the policy mix. 
c) Average and total columns in thousand Euros. 
Figure II.1 illustrates the evolution of the average amounts received per company split into four 
groups: firms that receive only tax credits or only subsidies, and those receiving both measures 
simultaneously. It reveals that policy mix users receive on average larger amounts of both tax 
credits and grants compared to single policy users. The difference in average subsidies starts 
off high and diminishes in time, while tax credits follows the opposite trend – similar amounts 
for single policy and mix users, followed by a jump in 2008, simultaneous with the raise in 
exemption rates. 
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Figure II.1 Evolution of average amounts by policy 
 
a) Categories are mutually-exclusive, thus numbers are not identical to, but based on Table II.1. 
b) Average amount received expressed in thousand Euros. 
3.2 Data 
I use a dataset comprising the 2008, 2010 and 2012 OECD Business R&D surveys on Belgian 
firms, coupled with employment, financial, fiscal and subsidy information from the Belgian 
Federal Public Service Finance49. Although non-R&D data is a panel, the OECD Business 
R&D surveys have been applied to different samples of companies over the years, rendering 
the data usable in the form of repeated cross sections.50 
As I am interested in the effect of each type of public support on the private R&D intensity of 
firms, the main dependent variables are extracted from survey questions where firms were 
asked the amounts spent on internal R&D. However, rather than focusing solely on total R&D 
expenditure, I also consider the allocation of R&D budgets over different activities. Thus, I use 
survey questions regarding the share of R&D expenditure by type of activity – basic research, 
                                                 
49 The dataset is a collection of data managed by the Belgian Federal Public Service Finance and collected from the 
following sources: the Belgian Federal Public Service Finance (tax credit data), the National Bank of Belgium 
(financial data), the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (R&D survey), and the regional agencies involved in 
R&D subsidy allocation – the Walloon government’s R&D services, the Flemish governmental Agency for 
Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT) and the Institute for Scientific Research and Innovation of Brussels 
(IRSIB). 
50 Only around 220 firms have full data covering the three waves of the survey. 
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applied research, and development – to test whether different types of public support for R&D 
have (dis)similar, if any, effects on the R&D budget allocation decision of firms.51 The three 
different waves of the survey provide data on the outcome variables for the years 2007, 2009 
and 2011.  
Data on subsidies granted by the regional governments and on the federal tax credit for 
researchers is exhaustive and comprises the amounts received by the complete population of 
recipients. Firm characteristics – employment, location, financial data, etc. – are available as a 
panel, thus I am able to use lags of most independent and control variables in order to tackle 
possible simultaneity biases. 
After checking the data for consistency, the sample contains 2,650 observations on 1,809 
firms.52 
3.3 Method 
The main issue present in evaluation studies of public policy is the fact that funds are not 
randomly attributed to firms. In the case of subsidies, public authorities decide which projects, 
and thus firms, to finance from limited funds. On the other hand, firms using tax credits for 
R&D do not have to go through such an evaluation process, but have their own considerations 
when deciding whether or not to demand such tax breaks. Be it third party selection or self-
selection, this issue implies that firms using some type of public support for their R&D differ 
ex ante from firms that do not use such measures, and the differences might be hidden to the 
researcher. Heckman et al. (1999) provide an overview of estimation strategies under the 
presence of selection bias, among which matching estimators and instrumental variables 
regressions. The former is a non-parametric method that relies on the assumption that selection 
into programs is based on observable characteristics of participants. The IV method requires 
that selection be tackled by exogenous instruments that only affect outcomes through their 
                                                 
51 Respondents to the survey are given guidelines and examples on how to attribute expenses to each category, 
based on the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002). While it is plausible that for some companies this distinction might 
not be obvious, I suspect that firms active in high-tech sectors have good knowledge of the difference between 
these categories. For the former, the guidelines, definitions and examples provided to them should offer enough 
information to mitigate measurement issues stemming from subjective interpretations. 
52 Only firms that have responded to the survey are analysed (estimated values by the Science Policy Office have 
been removed). Moreover, firms that report no internal R&D expenditure or a number that is higher than total 
costs (R&D intensity higher than 100%) are removed the sample. 
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impact on the treatment variables. Trade-offs need to be made when choosing either method, 
as none is robust to all possible bias. 
Matching estimator 
In order to measure the effects each different policy has on the design of R&D budgets, I first 
perform nearest-neighbour matching using a flexible definition of treated and control groups 
on a pooled cross section of firms. For each outcome, I create four mutually-exclusive groups 
of firms: users of tax credits, users of subsidies, users of both tax credits and subsidies (policy 
mix), and firms that do not receive any public support. The fact that groups are mutually 
exclusive deals with the ‘hidden treatment’ issue – when multiple policies are used as 
treatments, they can have a confounding effect on each other (Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015). 
Based on the methodology developed by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), I consider grants, tax 
credits and the policy mix as heterogeneous treatments and analyse their effect on each 
outcome as the average treatment effect on the treated, 𝛼𝑡,𝑐, as 
𝐸(𝛼𝑡,𝑐) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑡|𝑆 = 𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑐|𝑆 = 𝑡) (1) 
where Yt and Yc denote the outcomes for the ‘treatment’ and the ‘counterfactual’ states. 
I form pairwise comparisons of t and c states with the types of firms described above (policy 
mix users, tax credit users, subsidy users, non-users of public funds) as shown in Table II.2. 
Table II.2 illustration of the different definitions of treated and control groups 
 Treatment 
   Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No funding Definition 1 Definition 2 Definition 3 
Policy mix  Definition 4 Definition 5 
Tax credits Definition 6  Definition 7 
Subsidies Definition 8 Definition 9  
    
a) ‘Definition 1’ analyses the effect on each outcome variable of the policy mix (tax credits and 
subsidies), versus the counterfactual of not having used any public funding. Analogously, 
‘Definition 7 analyses the additionality of subsidies compared to the counterfactual of using tax 
credits. 
This method allows the direct comparison of policies with each other, but also disentangling 
each individual effect that policies have compared to the counterfactual of not using any public 
funding. However, in this part of my analysis I only define treatment groups by simple dummy 
variables denoting whether a firm has received tax credits or subsidies (or both) for R&D. 
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I employ a two-step matching procedure, as follows: first, I estimate the propensity scores as 
the probability of being in each of the four groups. In order to do so, I employ a multinomial 
probit model on the four treatment groups – being a policy mix user, a tax credit user, a subsidy 
user, or not receiving any support – and condition on company characteristics that might play 
a role in the use of each of these policies. 
In order to make sure that a comparison between the estimated effects of each treatment 
definition is valid, I restrict the entire sample to common support so that all firms have the 
possibility of participating in all four states. This comes down to keeping only those 
observations with probability of being observed in state t (Pt) larger than the highest minimum 
and smaller than the lowest maximum of all probabilities Pt observed for each state t=1..4. 
In a second step, for each combination of states t and c, for each firm in state t, a similar firm 
in state c is found based on the smallest Mahalanobis distance calculated on the propensity 
scores Pt and Pc. Furthermore, given that I use a pooled cross section, an exact match on the 
year in which the outcomes are measured is required. When a match is found, the firm in state 
t is taken out of the sample, while the one in state c is kept as a possible control for the 
remaining firms in state t (matching with replacement). When all firms in state t have been 
matched, the treatment effects are estimated using the matched firms in states t and c. 
Next, I employ categorical matching for analysing whether the effects of treatment differ by 
the amount received, similarly to Görg & Strobl (2007) or Marino et al. (2015). I split each 
treatment at the median, creating the following categories: small and large tax credits (cut-off 
at 49,520 Euros), small and large subsidies (cut-off at 36,968 Euros), and small and large policy 
mix (cut-off at 280,084 Euros). Although a finer cut could provide better depth of the analysis, 
I split each policy into two groups due to the relative small sample size and in order to obtain 
proper balance between each treatment – counterfactual groups. The matching is done by first 
estimating probit models for each categorical comparison (e.g. small subsidy versus large 
policy mix) and obtaining propensity scores that are used to match treated and control groups. 
For each comparison, a common support restriction is applied, unlike the general matching 
where common support is defined to ensure that all firms could in theory receive any treatment. 
Although the common support restriction in this second part of categorical matching is less 
strict due to data restrictions, it nevertheless ensures each control used to compute ATT’s has 
a theoretical probability of receiving the treatment category. 
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Instrumental variables regressions 
In order for the matching estimators to be valid, all characteristics affecting selection into 
subsidy or tax credit programs must be observed. In other words, potential outcome and 
participation in a programme must be independent given the observed set of characteristics X 
– the conditional independence assumption (Rubin, 1977). As this assumption cannot be tested 
empirically, I also estimate the treatment effects by other methods which are robust to selection 
on unobserved characteristics. 
The main concern is that, although the dataset is quite extensive, some variables that have been 
previously used in similar studies are not available. The main unobserved factor in most studies 
is the intrinsic quality of the firm and of its R&D projects. Authorities base their selection of 
grant winners on comprehensive description of the proposed projects, the past achievement of 
candidates and other characteristics that are not available in my data base. Among them, group 
ownership of a firm has been used to capture the lower incentives such firm might have due to 
lower subsidy budgets made available to them, but also the fact that network structures within 
a group may allow members to be better informed about funding sources (Czarnitzki & Lopes-
Bento, 2013). Successful innovators might also have higher chances of receiving support, and 
the patent stock of a firm has been used as a proxy in previous studies (Hussinger, 2008). Due 
to the confidential character of my data, I cannot use external sources for these variables – e.g. 
Amadeus for group ownership or EPO/PATSTAT for patent statistics. 
Furthermore, matching estimators only provide a general view of the effects of policies on 
outcomes. Even though I try to solve this issue by matching on different categories of treatment, 
this solves the issue only partially. Dose response methods based on a generalised propensity 
score have been employed to some effect in literature in order to assess whether treatment 
effects vary with treatment level (Hottenrott et al., 2014; Marino et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
such models only allow comparisons between different levels of the same treatment, rather 
than between different treatments. 
Taking all of the above into consideration, I test the robustness of the results from the matching 
estimation through methods that deal with unobserved heterogeneity among firms and that 
model parametrically the effect of the amount of each treatment received controlling for each 
other type of treatment. 
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Should selection not be an issue – for example if firms were randomly attributed public funds 
for R&D – then regressing the outcome variables on the subsidy and tax credit amounts by 
ordinary least squares would provide an unbiased estimation of the effects of each policy 
measure on private R&D. However, in the presence of (self-) selection, the subsidy and tax 
credit amount variables are endogenous and need to be instrumented. Valid instruments should 
be correlated with subsidy and tax credit use, but uncorrelated with any unobserved factors 
influencing outcome – R&D intensity, total and split by activity. A robust instrument would 
thus be the amount of subsidies and tax credits that each firm could potentially receive 
(Lichtenberg, 1987). I use two distinct features of subsidies and tax credits in Belgium to 
identify the endogenous variables. 
First, subsidies are granted by regional governmental agencies with budgets that are fixed prior 
to the payment period. Thus, the overall subsidy budget for each agency is exogenous to firm 
characteristics. However, following Wallsten (2000), one cannot assume that the entire budget 
of an agency is potentially available to each firm. Therefore, I calculate the average amount of 
subsidies received by a firm per year, administrative region, industry defined by 4-digit NACE 
codes, and size class – indicated by an SME dummy. I also calculate the number of firms 
supported by subsidies within these groups. These two instruments together capture the 
variation over time of the overall budgets of granting agencies, the variation of the budgets of 
different agencies, and also the availability of subsidies to different industries. 
Second, tax credits differ from subsidies in that there is no fixed budget available to firms. 
Thus, in theory, the amount of tax credits can vary from zero to infinity. However, following 
work by Neicu, Kelchtermans, & Teirlinck (2016a), I rely on the existence of peer effects in 
the spread of new policy for R&D. Analysing the same tax credit for Belgian firms, they show 
that firms have a higher propensity of using the measure if their peers – firms within the same 
industry and geographical location – use it too. By defining the average amount of tax credits 
per firm and the number of users by year, region, industry and size class, I construct an 
instrument that is correlated with each firm’s amount of tax credits used, while exogenous to 
its R&D spending.53 
                                                 
53 However, there might be instances where theoretical arguments can be made against the exogeneity of my 
instruments. For example, in a Cournot model, competitors’ use of public support lowers their cost of R&D and 
improves their competitive position. This, in turn, can have two effects: first, it can reduce incentives to engage 
in R&D if these activities are strategic substitutes; on the other hand, if R&D results in innovations that lower the 
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3.4 Variables 
Dependent variables 
In order to assess the effects of each policy on firms’ R&D activity, I first employ a standard 
dependent variable used in input additionality literature – the log of private R&D intensity (LN 
R&D NET). I define private R&D intensity as intra-mural R&D expenditure, net of any public 
support received. I select my sample to include only firms that have non-negative private R&D 
expenditure, and positive total R&D. That is to say that I only analyse R&D-active firms. 
Although this might drive down some of the significance of the results, I consider it appropriate 
to exclude firms in periods when they do not report any R&D activity. 
Further, I split total R&D expenditure by type of activity: basic research, applied research, and 
development. Firms were asked in the OECD Business R&D Survey what percentage of their 
total internal R&D expenses make up each category. I multiply each percentage with the total 
R&D expenditure to create a variable that captures the overall volume of R&D by activity (LN 
BASIC RES, LN APPLIED RES, LN DEVELOPMENT). Lastly, I test the effects of policies on 
the percentage of development in total R&D (DEVELOPMENT INT), and, by extrapolation, 
the percentage of total research as (1-DEVELOPMENT INT). The difference between the last 
two sets of outcome variables stands in that the former allow to examine the input additionality 
that policies create in terms of increasing or decreasing the volume of basic, applied research 
or development activities of a firms, while the latter allows an analysis of the behavioural 
additionality induced by policies. In other words, one shows us if receiving public subsidies or 
tax credits has lead firms to increase their private expenditure in either of the three categories, 
while the other will indicate if firms have shifted funds from development to research as a 
result of using public support for R&D. Note that it is entirely possible that a company that 
receives support increases its private expenditure on both research and development, but the 
increase is less for one category than the other; in this case, the effect of the support used by 
                                                 
cost of production, increased investment in R&D is a competitive response. Both results illustrate that my 
instruments are possibly correlated with the outcome. Nevertheless, the issue is somewhat mitigated by the non-
significant Hansen J tests. Under H0, all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of the main equation. 
My estimations show that the null cannot be rejected at 10%, which provides assurance that the Cournot effects 
are minimal. 
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the firm would be positive on all log-level variables, but negative on either development or 
research intensity. 
Treatment variables 
The variables used to define treatment status in the matching estimators are binary variables 
indicating whether a firm has received a ‘treatment’ comprising only subsidies (SUBS), only 
tax credits (TAX), both subsidies and tax credits (MIX), or no support (NOSUP) during the 
years covered by each survey (i.e. 2007, 2009 and 2011).54 This specification allows to estimate 
the average effect of each treatment on the outcomes, irrespective of the amount of support 
received. Indeed, it assumes that, on average, the amounts are the same between the three 
treatment statuses. 
I then use the available data on the amount of tax credits and subsidies received by firms in the 
categorical matching and the instrumental variables estimation. By taking the natural logarithm 
of these amounts, I can interpret the coefficients in terms of the effect of percentage increases 
in the independent variables on the dependent one. Because the model is parametric, I am able 
to model the impact of both the amount of subsidies (LN SUBS) and tax credits (LN TAX) 
received simultaneously. This allows establishing the marginal effect each policy has on the 
outcomes. In a second step, I define the total amounts for firms that both policies (LN MIX). 
This definition allows me to examine, similarly to the matching estimator, whether subsidies 
and tax credits show more (or less) additionality when combined in a policy mix. 
Instrumental variables 
As mentioned before, I instrument each endogenous variable by two exogenous instruments: 
the average of that variable by size class (SME or large firms) year, region and industry, and 
the number of firms with a non-zero value for the variable. Thus, I instrument LN SUBS with 
LNSUBSAVG and NRSUBS, LNTAX with LNTAXAVG and NRTAX, LNSUBSONLY with 
                                                 
54 This definition of each treatment is rather strict. An alternative would be to consider treatment over two-year 
periods – e.g. a policy mix user would have used tax credits and subsidies either in period t or t-1, and not 
necessarily both at the same time. As matching estimators require that treated and control groups be balanced 
before treatment receipt, this would imply matching on observed characteristics in t-2, which would drastically 
reduce the data set by requiring to observe each firm in two consecutive surveys. 
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LNSUBSONLYAVG and NRSUBSONLY, LNTAXONLY with LNTAXONLYAVG and 
NRTAXONLY, and LNMIX with LNMIXAVG and NRMIX.  
Control variables 
Based on previous findings regarding the determinants of R&D and of the probability of firms 
to enter public support programs, I employ a set of control variables both in the matching 
estimator – when calculating the propensity of each firm to use public support – and in the 
instrumental variables equations. In this section I explain each variable’s role in each model. 
The age and size of firms have been shown to capture experience effects in dealing with public 
support agencies. The logarithm of age (LN AGE) will capture such effects, as one expects 
older firms to rely on more past knowledge regarding the availability of public funding. 
Moreover, the variable should capture whether younger firms invest more in R&D than 
established firms in the instrumental variables regressions. The size of a firm is usually found 
to affect the probability of receiving public support either by capturing scale effects on the 
opportunity cost of applying or the specific targeting by funding agencies of categories of firms 
(Blanes & Busom, 2004; Neicu et al., 2016b). I include the lagged number of employees in 
logarithm in the estimation to account for size effects (LN EMP). At least in the Flanders 
region, there are explicit grants for small and medium enterprises (Hottenrott et al., 2014). I 
capture this by including an SME dummy (SME). Size effects might also play a role in 
determining a firm’s R&D budget and how it is split between research and development 
Capital-intensive firms have been found to have a higher probability of engaging in R&D, and, 
consequently, having higher chances of receiving public support for R&D (Blanes & Busom, 
2004). I include a measure of capital intensity as the ratio of fixed assets to employees in 
logarithm (LN CAPINT).  
Moreover, I control for a firm’s financial health with its current ratio (CURR), defined as the 
ratio of current to total assets. Whether a company has enough financial resources can have an 
influence on its incentive to request public support, but also invest more (less) on R&D 
activities. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) have found that working capital – the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities – has a positive impact on total R&D spending, but also a 
larger impact on R than on D. 
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In order to capture sectorial patterns related to R&D activity and also the possible targeting of 
specific industries by policy makers, I define high- and low-tech service and manufacturing 
industries, and include binary variables for each in the estimation. 
Given that subsidies in Belgium are managed by the regional governments, while tax credits 
are managed by the federal government, I include dummy variables for firms located in 
Flanders and Wallonia, keeping Brussels as baseline. Year dummies are included to account 
for the different waves of the business R&D survey covered by the sample. 
I also include in the parametric estimation of R&D expenditure, total and per activity, the 
financial leverage (LEVER), denoting a firm’s debt to equity ratio in order to capture firms’ 
access to the credit market. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find that this variable has a significant 
impact on R&D activity, as firms with higher debt rates perform less research, while the impact 
on development is insignificant. 
The control variables – with the exception of age, industry and region dummies – are measured 
in the year prior to the measurement of outcomes. This ensures, to the extent possible given 
the data, maximum sample size and addresses possible simultaneity concerns. 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table II.3 displays mean values and standard deviations for the control and outcome variables 
before the matching procedure. They are aggregated by treatment, i.e. by type of support 
received. In the 3 pooled cross sections, 1,363 firms did not receive any public funding for 
R&D, 644 only received tax credits, 237 received only subsidies, and 406 used a mix of both. 
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Table II.3 Summary statistics 
 
No support 
(N=1363) 
Tax credits only 
(N=644) 
Subsidies only 
(N=237) 
Policy mix 
(N=406) 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Tax creditsa 0.00 0.00 188 883 0.00 0.00 482 1,444 
Subsidya 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 140 550 466 1,219 
Policy mixa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 948 2,458 
R&D exp. a 531 2,521 4,341 30,000 1,537 6,821 9,151 34,500 
Basic R exp. a 22 172 196 1,825 130 779 1,044 7,639 
Applied R exp. a 224 824 1,213 3,332 805 2,711 3,971 13,400 
Develop. exp. a 285 2,331 3,119 29,800 742 6,000 5,083 23,300 
% basic R. 5.82 15.54 5.50 13.07 7.72 15.42 8.22 14.39 
% applied R. 50.73 37.02 53.27 33.73 57.66 33.72 52.61 30.94 
% develop. 43.45 37.40 41.23 33.80 34.62 32.96 39.17 31.67 
Age 25.16 17.63 24.13 18.10 22.75 17.25 26.29 24.78 
Employees 86.58 232.97 197.43 512.41 99.96 305.35 349.32 640.16 
SME 0.92 0.27 0.81 0.39 0.92 0.28 0.69 0.46 
Leverage 3.87 21.22 148.14 2757.19 38.22 532.63 3.12 8.58 
Current ratio 2.22 3.01 2.70 5.11 2.21 2.47 2.98 4.64 
Capital intensity 187 1,630 283 1,982 157 795 184 418 
High-tech man. 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.49 
High-tech serv. 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.47 
Low-tech man. 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 
Low-tech serv. 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.36 0.09 0.28 
Brussels 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 
Flanders 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.84 0.37 0.83 0.37 
Wallonia 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.45 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 
a) Amounts in thousand Euros. 
The first three rows paint a similar picture to the one seen in Table II.1 and Figure II.1. As in 
the population statistics, policy mix users receive almost three times the amounts of subsidies 
and tax credits than the users of single-measures. They receive the two measures in almost 
equal quantities – 482,000 Euros in tax credits and 466,000 Euros in grants. 
We also observe that receivers of public support have higher net R&D expenditure than non-
receivers. Subsidy users spend three times more, tax credit users up to eight times more, while 
firms receiving the policy mix spend on average seventeen times more on R&D from private 
sources. All treatment groups show higher average spending on basic and applied research, but 
also on development. 
Firms that use the policy mix are older and larger than the other categories. On the other hand, 
SMEs are better represented in the subsidy-only users group, which was expected due to the 
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specific grants for these firms offered by all regional authorities. However, only 69% of policy 
mix users are SMEs, significantly lower than the other groups. Leverage shows the debt to 
equity ratio of firms, and we can see that single policy users have higher leverage ratios, 
although the number are driven by a few outliers. 
The industry split shows that most firms receiving any type of support are active in high-tech 
sectors, and policy mix users are more concentrated in high-tech manufacturing. Finally, we 
note an over-representation of firms from Flanders in the sample, which can either be a missing 
data issue or an effect of the region harbouring relatively more R&D active firms. 
These statistics already show some interesting facts about the distribution of firms into each 
treatment group by their characteristics, and their relative clustering is in line with the different 
policies implemented by each funding agency (e.g. subsidies being targeted at SMEs). 
4 Results 
4.1 Estimated propensities of receiving treatment 
In a first step, I estimate a multinomial probit model on the four (mutually exclusive) categories 
denoting the receipt of each treatment (only tax credits, only subsidies, and a policy mix) or 
not receiving any support. The sample comprises 2,650 firm-year entries, of which around half 
(1,363) have not received any treatment (‘no support’).55 
The results presented in Table II.4 indicate that, as expected from the distribution of 
characteristics over the four treatment groups, larger and younger firms in high-tech industries 
have a higher probability of receiving tax credits or using the policy mix. Somewhat surprising, 
being an SME translates into a lower propensity of accessing R&D subsidies, although regional 
governments have a pro-SME policy in Belgium (Hottenrott et al., 2014). Instead, high-tech 
firms from Brussels and Flanders have a higher propensity of receiving subsidies from the 
respective regional governments. Furthermore, the financial resources of a firm, measured by 
the current ratio, have a positive impact on their propensity to receive the policy mix. 
  
                                                 
55 The sample only includes firms that report positive intra-mural R&D expenditure. 
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Table II.4 Multinomial probit estimation of treatment categories 
 MIX SUBS TAX 
 a b c 
LN AGE -0.52*** -0.12 -0.39*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
LN EMP 0.34*** -0.06 0.34*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
SME -0.62*** -0.36 -0.21 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.18) 
CURR 0.01* -0.03 0 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
LN CAPINT 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HITECH M 1.03*** 0.79*** 0.53** 
 (0.3) (0.25) (0.23) 
HITECH S 0.99*** 0.63** 0.70*** 
 (0.3) (0.25) (0.23) 
LOWTECH M -0.07 0.11 0.02 
 (0.31) (0.25) (0.22) 
LOWTECH S 0.16 0.29 0.32 
 (0.32) (0.26) (0.24) 
FLANDERS 0.38* 0.31 0.18 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) 
WALLONIA -0.58** -0.54** 0.31 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.19) 
2009 0.11 -0.38*** 0.55*** 
 (0.1) (0.12) (0.1) 
2011 0.36*** -0.14 0.83*** 
 (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) 
Wald chi-square 467.76***   
a) Base category = unsupported firms. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
c) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
d) Intercept term not shown. 
Following these results, I use the estimated propensity scores and apply a ‘common support’ 
restriction that drops 407 companies with estimated probabilities of being in treatment group t 
larger than the lowest maximum probability over the four treatment groups t, or smaller than 
the highest minimum probability over the same groups. 
Consequently, for each combination of treatment t and control group c, each treated firm in 
group t (where t is based on each definition of treatment – policy mix, only tax credits, only 
subsidies) is matched to the most similar firm in group c (comprising the three treatments and 
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the firms not using any policy), based on the Mahalanobis distance between the two firms’ 
propensities to be in groups t and c (Pt and Pc). Furthermore, exact matches are required on the 
year in which the measurements are taken. 
4.2 Average treatment effects on private R&D expenditure 
The method allows for the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) to be calculated for 
each combination of treatment t and counterfactual c. The estimations of the effects of each 
policy on private R&D expenditure are presented in Table II.5. Due to the fact that the group 
of firms only receiving subsidies is only half the size of tax credits and policy mix user groups, 
the procedure does not result in proper balance between treatment and counterfactual groups 
when the latter comprises subsidy users, even though the matching is done with replacement. 
The Wald chi-square statistics for the tax credits-subsidies and policy mix-subsidies are 
significant at 1% level, so the ATT’s are not reported in the table below as they violate the 
method’s main assumption – i.e. that the only difference between treated and non-treated firms 
comes from the treatment itself, conditional on covariates.56 However, when treatment is 
subsidy receipt, the control groups are larger than the treatment group, thus the estimation of 
ATT’s is implemented on groups that are balanced on the covariates. Throughout the paper I 
only report ATT’s on balanced groups post-matching, i.e. for which the matching procedure 
produces reliable results. 
  
                                                 
56 I calculate the Wald chi-square statistic of a probit on the binary variable indicating treatment receipt, where the 
sample includes only firms that have been matched. The statistic tests the balance between treated and control 
groups, the null being that the observed characteristics do not explain treatment receipt, i.e. groups are balanced 
on covariates. 
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Table II.5 ATT on log-levels of private R&D expenditure 
 
 Actual state 
 
 Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No support 1.45***
 0.96*** 0.02 
Policy mix  -0.47*** -0.89*** 
Tax credits 0.40***  -0.80*** 
Subsidies    
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Tax credits and subsidies groups refer to use of each policy as a single measure. 
c) The first row displays additionality of each treatment compared to the counterfactual of not 
receiving support. Each column benchmarks treatments with each other. 
The first row of the table shows the effect of each policy compared to the counterfactual of not 
having used any support. The results indicate that using tax credits solely or combined with 
subsidies has a positive effect on the private R&D of recipient firms compared to the 
counterfactual of not having received any support. On average, policy mix users spend 1,45 
times more on R&D from their own funds, while tax credits users spend 96% more than firms 
that do not receive any support. However, the results also show that subsidies users do not 
spend a significantly different amount of own funds on R&D than they would have spent 
without having received any public support. 
The comparison of different policies reveal that the policy mix outperforms both tax credits 
(by 40% extra R&D expenditure) and subsidies (by 89%) that are used separately.57 Moreover, 
subsidy recipients spend 80% less of their own funds on R&D than they would have spent had 
they received tax credits instead. 
My first hypothesis is only partially confirmed, as only tax credits show positive and significant 
additionality on the private R&D expenditure of firms.  
Overall, it is the combination of subsidies and tax credits that induces the larger effect on how 
much firms spend on R&D, which confirms my second hypothesis. 
                                                 
57 Note that due to the different sizes of treatment groups and the fact that matching is done with replacement, the 
ATT’s are not symmetrical – e.g. the difference between the policy mix treatment and the tax credits 
counterfactual is different than the tax credits treatment versus the policy mix counterfactual. However, the 
differences are small in absolute value (0.49 vs. 0.31). Because the tax credit users group is larger than the other 
two treatment groups, the ATT’s calculated when this group is the counterfactual are more significant and thus 
preferred in the analysis. 
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In order to analyse whether treatment effects vary with the volume of public support received, 
I perform categorical matching by size of treatment as described in section 3. Table II.6 
illustrates the ATT’s of each treatment category on the log-levels of private R&D expenditure. 
Table II.6 ATT on log-levels of R&D expenditure by size 
 Actual state 
 Policy mix S Policy mix L Tax credits S Tax credits L Subsidies S Subsidies L 
No support 0.55*** 2.20*** 0.30*** 1.39*** 0.06 0.39 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
As expected, larger amounts of support received show higher positive additionality on the 
private R&D of firms across treatment categories, although the results for subsidies are not 
significant at 10%. Yet again, compared to the counterfactual of not receiving any support, the 
policy mix users have the higher levels of private R&D than firms not receiving support by 
55% for small amounts of the mix and up to 2.44 times higher for firms receiving larger 
amounts of the mix, while large tax credits amounts increase private spending in R&D 1.39 
times and small amounts by 30%. 
The key takeaway from this analysis is that subsidies seem to have no significant effect on 
private R&D, while significant, positive effects are seen from small amounts of tax credits and 
continue to grow sequentially to small amounts of the policy mix, and reaching the largest 
additionality from the use of large volumes of tax credits and of the policy mix. 
4.3 Average treatment effects on basic research 
I now switch my analysis to the behavioural additionality of each policy on the different 
components of R&D expenditures. I first compute the average treatment effect on the treated 
on basic research expenditure. But before interpreting the results, a note on the distinction 
between this analysis and the previous one is in order. Because the OECD Business R&D 
survey does not ask firms to provide numbers on private expenditure on R&D divided by its 
three components, I can only assess whether there has been any additionality of public support 
in the sense of changing a firm’s budgets for basic or applied research and development 
irrespective of how they finance their R&D. Thus, it is entirely possible that, for example, an 
increase in basic research spending can be induced by a specific subsidy that a firm has received 
for a basic research project. This may increase R&D spending on basic research only by the 
amount of the subsidy without creating any input additionality, i.e. without increasing the 
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firm’s private spending on basic research. That being said, if that firm or a similar one had 
spent less resources on basic research prior to receiving the subsidy, this does imply that the 
subsidy itself has induced a behavioural change in the user (controlling for the propensity to 
receive subsidies based on observed characteristics). The difference between input and 
behavioural additionality is relevant up to the point of the policy maker’s interest in 
disentangling all the possible effects a policy may have. 
With this in mind, I shift attention to analysing whether policy had any effect on the behaviour 
of supported firms and whether different policies had different effects, if any. The results are 
presented in Table II.7. 
Table II.7 ATT on basic research 
 
 Actual state 
 
 Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No support 3.15***
 1.03*** 1.52*** 
Policy mix  -1.90*** -0.38 
Tax credits 1.49***  0.72 
Subsidies    
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Tax credits and subsidies groups refer to use of each policy as a single measure. 
c) The first row displays additionality of each treatment compared to the counterfactual of not 
receiving support. Each column benchmarks treatments with each other. 
All policies have a positive effect on the amount that firms spend on basic research activities. 
On average, a recipient of the policy mix spends 3.15 times more on basic research than what 
they would have spent without receiving support. Tax credits users spend 1.03 times more on 
basic research, while subsidy users 1.52 times more, compared to the counterfactual of not 
having used support. The policy mix also outperforms tax credits by a factor of 1.49 or more, 
but the difference in additionality between subsidies and the policy mix is not significant. This 
might imply that subsidies drive most of the effect, or that the volume of support may play a 
role, such that when faced with greater volumes of financial slack, firms are more inclined to 
use it on farther-from-the-market research activities. In order to test if this is the case, I estimate 
ATT’s by category of treatment, similarly to the previous section and present the results in 
Table II.8. 
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Table II.8 ATT on basic research spending by size of treatment 
 Actual state 
 Policy mix S Policy mix L Tax credits S Tax credits L Subsidies S Subsidies L 
No support 2.32*** 4.65*** 0.56 2.08*** 1.20** 2.56*** 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The positive and significant ATT’s of the policy mix and tax subsidies are present at both levels 
of the policies, while the additionality of tax credits seems to rely mostly on large treatment 
volumes. Contrary to total private R&D expenditure, subsidies do show significant effect on 
basic research budgets.  
4.4 Average treatment effects on applied research 
Subsequently, I analyse the effect of each policy on the expenditure on applied research in 
order to verify whether there is any difference in additionality on the two components of 
research. Table II.9 shows that all types of public support have a positive effect on this 
outcome, compared to the counterfactual of not receiving public support for R&D (row one). 
Table II.9 ATT on applied research 
 
 Actual state 
 
 Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No support 3.48***
 1.90*** 1.20*** 
Policy mix  -1.43*** -1.19*** 
Tax credits 1.35***  -0.20 
Subsidies    
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Tax credits and subsidies groups refer to use of each policy as a single measure. 
c) The first row displays additionality of each treatment compared to the counterfactual of not 
receiving support. Each column benchmarks treatments with each other. 
On average, the policy mix increases spending on applied research activities 3.48 times, while 
tax credits only 1.9 times and subsidies by a factor of 1.2. The difference between tax credits 
and subsidies, on the one hand, and the combination of the two, on the other hand, is significant 
at 1%. Indeed, policy mix users spend 1.35 times more on applied research than tax credit users 
and 1.19 times more than subsidy users, while the difference between the latter two groups is 
not significant, albeit negative in favour of tax credits. 
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These results suggest that the effect of policy on applied research spending is purely based on 
the amount received, irrespective of the type of policy. I set out to further test this in the 
categorical treatment analysis presented in Table II.10. 
Table II.10 ATT on applied research spending by size of treatment 
 Actual state 
 Policy mix S Policy mix L Tax credits S Tax credits L Subsidies S Subsidies L 
No support 2.78*** 4.68*** 1.20*** 3.25*** 0.03 1.75*** 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Overall, it does indeed seem that size effects drive to some extent the ATT’s on applied 
research. The larger the amount of support received, the larger the effect compared to smaller 
levels of support, this results being seen across all treatments. The fact that small grants show 
no additionality is in line with my previous findings, as these types of support positively affect 
spending on basic research. The effect of subsidies on applied research is thus driven by large 
grants, firms that receive them spending on average 1.75 times more on this activity than non-
receivers. The ATT’s provide evidence that firms use small grants for their basic research, 
while larger grants are used for both types of research. 
The greatest effect stems from using large amounts of the policy mix, a finding which is in line 
with the volume-driven explanation of the results shown in Table II.9. 
4.5 Average treatment effects on development 
Lastly, the policy effects on development spending are analysed and the results presented in 
Table II.11. Users of the policy mix experience positive additionality on their development 
budgets by a factor of 1.51 compared to firms receiving no support, while those using tax 
credits increase spending 1.04 times. On the other hand, subsidies do not show any significant 
effect, and, moreover, firms using subsidies spend, on average, significantly less on 
development than policy mix or tax credit users. 
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Table II.11 ATT on development spending 
 
 Actual state 
 
 Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No support 1.51***
 1.04*** -0.55 
Policy mix  -0.55 -1.68*** 
Tax credits 0.65  -1.55** 
Subsidies    
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Tax credits and subsidies groups refer to use of each policy as a single measure. 
c) The first row displays additionality of each treatment compared to the counterfactual of not 
receiving support. Each column benchmarks treatments with each other. 
Combined with my previous results, these numbers point towards a significant difference in 
how subsidies and tax credits influence firms’ spending on R&D. One cannot rule out subsidies 
crowding out private spending on development, and it might be the case that users shift their 
research orientation towards basic and applied research when receiving this type of support. 
On the other hand, combining subsidies with tax credits in a policy mix has a positive effect 
on all three components of R&D. 
The non-significant effect of subsidies confirms my third hypothesis and the intuition behind 
it, namely that subsidies crowd-out private spending on development projects, which that are 
closer to the market than research. 
The amount of support seems to mitigate the effects of policy on development spending too. 
The results in Table II.12 reveal that the positive effects of the policy mix and of the tax credits 
are solely due to larger treatment values, while smaller amounts of treatment show no effect. 
Subsidies, on the other hand, show no effects on development spending at both levels of 
treatment.  
Table II.12 ATT on development spending by size of treatment 
  Actual state 
  Policy mix S Policy mix L Tax credits S Tax credits L Subsidies S Subsidies L 
No support 0.16 3.41*** -0.11 1.35** 0.49 0.18 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
In order to verify the implication that stems from the previous results, namely that the policies 
provoke a shift in R&D budgets away from development and towards (basic and applied) 
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research, I calculate the ATT’s on the percentage of total R&D that firms spend on 
development activities (development intensity). The results are presented in Table II.13. 
Table II.13 ATT on development intensity 
 
 Actual state 
 
 Policy mix Tax credits Subsidies 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
a
c
tu
a
l No support -7.35**
 -4.18 -8.67* 
Policy mix  4.56 -1.97 
Tax credits -5.03*  -9.97* 
Subsidies    
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Because the outcome is measured as the percentage of R&D devoted to development, the 
results can be interpreted as evidence of the shift of funds between development and research 
activities. The average effect of subsidies is an 8.67 percentage points decrease in development 
intensity, which implies that the same amount is shifted towards (an increase in) research 
spending. The effect of the policy mix stands at 7.35 percentage points, while tax credit users 
show not significant change of behaviour. 
The combined results show that tax credits and the policy mix increase firms’ spending on 
basic and applied research, and, to a smaller extent, on development. The more interesting 
conclusion is that the policy mix also creates behaviour changes in firms, leading them to focus 
more resources on research activities compared to development. Combined with the positive 
effect the policy mix has on research spending, this proves my forth hypothesis. 
Subsidies, on the other hand, show an even stronger behavioural effect, as they do not increase 
spending in development altogether, but they also cause a shift in funds from development 
towards research. However, as I mentioned previously, firms can receive subsidies either for 
research or development projects. This is the case of the IWT, the Flemish funding agency, 
which grants higher percentages of project costs for research than for development projects. In 
2007, research subsidies amounted to around 35% of total subsidies granted by the IWT, while 
development grants over 50%. In 2009, the difference between the two contracted to under 
10% (Hottenrott et al., 2014). Given that 83% of subsidy-only recipients in my sample are 
Flemish firms, the effects could well be driven by this specific policy design. Hottenrott et al. 
(2014) do find positive and significant direct effects of both types of subsidies on research and 
development, but they also find cross-effects from research subsidies to development and vice-
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versa. However, they do find larger effects on research for the period between 2005 and 2009, 
which corresponds to a policy shift towards targeted support. As I analyse three periods – 2007, 
2009 and 2011, it could well be that the driver behind my results is an increase in research 
grants relative to development grants post 2009, combined with higher direct additionality of 
research grants would explain my findings that on average, subsidies increase spending on 
research but not on development. 
4.6 Instrumental variables estimation 
Because the matching procedure only accounts for selection of firms into treatments based on 
observed characteristics, it may provide biased estimates if this assumption does not hold. One 
can think of a number of ways this could happen, as the researcher rarely has extensive data on 
(self-) selection procedures. For example, firms might have a better chance of receiving larger 
subsidies if they have used them to good effect in the past, whatever ‘good effect’ might mean 
to the policy maker. Similarly, a firm’s decision to request tax credits might lay in the hands 
of its overseas headquarters. As I mentioned in the Data section, there are a few variables that 
have been used in similar previous studies that are not comprised in my data set. Among them, 
firms’ patent stock or group affiliation might play a role in selection into programmes. 
Moreover, the categorical matching analysis only goes so far in to capturing size effects of tax 
credits or grants on firms’ internal R&D. A parametrisation of some sort is needed in order to 
obtain better insight into how the amounts received affect firms’ budgetary choices. 
In order to do so I introduce the instruments described in section 0, but also a new variable 
(LEVER) denoting a firm’s debt to equity ratio in order to capture firms’ access to the credit 
market. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find that this variable has a significant impact on R&D activity, 
as firms with higher debt rates perform less research, while the impact on development is 
insignificant. 
I estimate the effect of the level of tax credits and subsidies, used separately and combined, on 
the private R&D spending and on the basic and applied research and development spending of 
firms by a series of instrumental variables regressions presented in Table II.14. 
I test the instruments’ relevance with Anderson’s canonical correlation statistic and their over-
identification with Hansen’s J test. The former confirms that the instruments are relevant in 
explaining the endogenous regressors in all equations, while the latter’s insignificance confirms 
that the instruments are exogenous in the main equations. However, if I would instrument 
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policy mix use with the excluded variables used to instrument tax credits and subsidies, the 
over-identification would fail in the policy mix equations. This is a direct consequence of the 
fact that I would exclude part of the effect of tax credits and subsidies from the estimation, 
passing them to the error term, which becomes correlated with the excluded instruments used 
for the endogenous variable of the policy mix. The solution of estimating in the same equation 
the coefficients of subsidies, tax credits and the policy mix is not viable, as I do not have a 
specific set of instruments for tackling endogeneity of the policy mix variable. In consequence, 
the estimates of the policy mix coefficient will be biased. In order to circumvent this issue, I 
construct instruments for the policy mix variable similar to those used for tax credits and 
subsidies: the average amount of policy mix received and the number of firms receiving it per 
year, industry and size category. The two instrumental variables are valid in that they are 
correlated with the amount of policy mix received and uncorrelated with the error term of the 
main equation58. The results of the first-stage estimations on the amount of each treatment 
received is presented in Table II.17 in Appendix. 
The results are presented in Table II.14, where the first two rows show the average effects of 
tax credits and of subsidies, and the following three rows disentangle their impact when used 
as single measures from that of the policy mix. 
  
                                                 
58 Note that average amount of policy mix received and number of users are not linear combinations of the average 
amounts of tax credits and subsidies and the number of users of each. 
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Table II.14 Instrumental variables (2SLS) estimations of policy effects 
 LN R&D NET LN BASIC RES LN APPLIED RES LN DEVELOPMENT 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15***  0.18***  0.23***  0.20***  
 (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  
LN SUBS 0.04**  0.15**  0.14***  0.05  
 (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  
LN MIX  0.18***  0.32***  0.36***  0.22*** 
  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
LN TAX ONLY  0.14***  0.19**  0.20***  0.17** 
  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
LN SUBS ONLY  0.01  0.18  0.06  0.00 
  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
LN AGE -0.12** -0.12** 0.15 0.17 -0.00 0.01 0.05 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) 
LN EMP 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.18 0.17 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
SME -0.04 -0.04 -0.69 -0.67 0.17 0.18 -0.56 -0.60 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.53) (0.53) (0.37) (0.37) (0.47) (0.47) 
LEVER 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LN CAPINT 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.17** 0.16** 0.01 0.01 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
HITECH M 0.37** 0.38** -0.77 -0.81 0.82* 0.85* -0.12 -0.05 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.55) (0.56) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
HITECH S 0.85*** 0.87*** -0.68 -0.71 1.04** 1.08** -0.15 -0.08 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.57) (0.57) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
LOWTECH M -0.19 -0.18 -0.44 -0.43 0.55 0.56 -0.15 -0.14 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.52) (0.52) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) 
LOWTECH S 0.33** 0.35** -0.07 -0.08 -0.20 -0.15 0.31 0.35 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.56) (0.56) (0.50) (0.51) (0.48) (0.48) 
FLANDERS -0.34** -0.34** 1.13** 1.12** 0.28 0.27 0.47 0.48 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) 
WALLONIA -0.19 -0.19 -0.06 -0.05 -0.43 -0.44 1.22** 1.20** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.52) (0.52) (0.48) (0.49) (0.54) (0.53) 
Observations 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 
Firms 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 
Hansen J 0.56 0.55 0.62 1.23 1.77 1.57 0.98 4.92 
Hansen J (df) 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 
Anderson u-id 238.10 108.40 238.10 108.40 238.10 108.40 238.10 108.40 
Anderson u-id(df) 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
d) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
e) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
f) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories 
for region is Brussels. 
g) Instruments include the number of users of each policy and average amount received by 4-digit NACE 
industries, year and size group. Details of first-stage regressions are provided in Table II.17 in Appendix. 
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Additionality on private R&D expenditure 
Both policies have, on average, a positive and significant impact on firms’ private R&D 
expenditure (first column), while tax credits also show a significantly larger coefficient than 
subsidies. As the variables are measured in natural logarithms, the interpretation is the 
following. Increasing the amount of tax credits by 10% would increase private R&D spending 
by 1.5%, while the same increase in subsidies only brings a 0.4% increase in spending. 
However, the effects are averaged over all firms that receive each type of support. In order to 
estimate whether they have a different impact when used as a single policy, I estimate the 
equation by separating the amounts received as a single treatment from the amount received in 
a policy mix. The second column reveals that subsidies do not significantly increase private 
R&D spending if they are used alone, whereas tax credits add an extra 1.4% for each 10% 
increase in their volume if used without subsidies, comparable to their average effect we saw 
before. Finally, increasing by 10% the amount of the policy mix causes firms to raise their 
private spending by 1.8%. 
The results are similar to the ATTs reported in section 4.2. However, the parametric 
specification allows estimating the different effects of each instrument when it is used alone or 
combined. This was not possible in the matching framework without possibly including 
‘hidden treatment’ bias by ignoring the existence of both types of support. This results in the 
interesting finding that subsidies do increase private R&D spending only if they are used 
together with tax credits, which I interpret as evidence of complementarity between the two 
measures. Haegeland and Møen (2007b) also found evidence of complementarity in Norway, 
although Dumont (2015) provided some indication that Belgian subsidies and tax credits are 
substitutes. Although based on the same data set, the latter finding can be the effect of selection 
bias that is unaccounted for, as the analysis does not consider the endogeneity of support 
measures. Moreover, the negative effect of combining the policies is economically small, albeit 
highly significant in his study. 
Other firm characteristics that influence the amount spent on R&D include age, size, debt, 
capital intensity and industry affiliation, but also geographical location. Younger and larger 
firms spend more on R&D net of public support, as do firms with higher debt-to-equity ratios 
and capital intensity values. Similarly, companies in high-tech industries record higher 
amounts spent on R&D, but also – surprisingly – firms in low-tech service sectors. 
  
85 
Additionality on components of R&D 
Both instruments show positive additionality on basic and applied research spending. 
Increasing tax credits by 10% boosts basic and applied research expenditure by 1.8% and 2.3% 
respectively, while the same increase in subsidies raises them by 1.5% and 1.4% respectively. 
The average effect of subsidies seems to be driven again by complementarity with tax credits, 
as additionality is not significant in firms that only receive grants. Tax credits do ‘work alone’, 
too, but their effect is smaller than that of the policy mix, which increases basic and applied 
spending by 3.2% and 3.6% respectively, for a 10% raise in the amount received. 
Tax credits and the policy mix also show positive additionality on development spending to 
the ratio of 2-to-10 in percentages. On the other hand, subsidies do not seem to affect this 
category in neither setting. This result should nevertheless be interpreted with caution, as it 
might be the effect of more grants for research projects than for development being awarded 
to firms in my sample. Nevertheless, Hottenrott et al. (2014) report that in 2007 and 2009 over 
50% of subsidies for Flemish companies were for development projects, 30% to 40% for 
research, and 15% to 20% mixed. Mixed and development grants are also significantly larger 
than research grants. The study finds positive overall additionality of each type of subsidy on 
net R&D intensity, direct additionality (of research grants on research intensity and 
development grants on development intensity), but also cross additionality from research grants 
to development intensity and vice-versa. On the other hand, Dumont (2015) finds that Belgian 
R&D grants increase the basic research intensity while decreasing the percentage of 
development projects firms pursue. Again, his results do not account for selection of companies 
into the subsidy programme. Compared to their analyses, I diverge by analysing grants 
provided by all three regional governments – Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia – and by 
mitigating (self-)selection bias. Considering the detailed description of the amounts and 
number of research and development grants by Hottenrott et al. (2014), it does not seem that 
my results are driven by a larger share of research subsidies being granted to firms. The only 
way this distribution would drive the insignificant effect on development expenditure from 
Table II.14 would be if my sample were skewed, containing substantially less recipients of 
development grants. However, due to data confidentiality, I cannot check whether this is the 
case, nor extend the data to include details on the type of grants awarded. 
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Finally, I find that size and leverage have a positive and significant effect on applied research 
and development spending, although the size of the coefficient of debt-to-equity ratio is of the 
magnitude 10-4. More capital intensive firms spend more on basic research and development, 
while those active in high-tech sectors record higher spending on applied research. 
In general, the instrumental variables estimators produce similar results as the non-parametric 
matching method. However, some differences do exist – such as a loss of significance of the 
effect of subsidies on basic and applied research spending, when they are used as a single 
policy. This result can have two causes. First, it can be inherent to applying a parametric 
function to firms’ expenditure on research, resulting in a loss of efficacy. Alternatively, it 
points to a possible violation of the CIA assumption of the matching estimator, which can bias 
the average treatment effect. By performing both parametric and non-parametric analyses, I try 
to mitigate, to the extent possible, the known issues that are integral to each method and provide 
robust comparisons of the effects of direct and indirect support for R&D. 
Variation in the effects of policies 
In this section I explore whether the effects of tax credits, subsidies and the policy mix vary in 
different samples of firms. I have shown that, on average, the policy mix creates positive 
additionality on firms’ R&D expenditure, either aggregate or split by activity. The effect seems 
to be larger than the impact of tax credits alone, which is still positive. On the other hand, 
subsidies do not seem to spur additional R&D unless alongside tax credits. This sort of 
interaction between direct and indirect support measures deserves further scrutiny, as policies 
are frequently created with the intention to attenuate issues encountered by particular sectors 
or types of firms. For example, Belgian regional subsidies come in wide variety, and all three 
administrative regions offer specific grants for SMEs, but also for industries deemed to 
underperform in terms of R&D. 
A number of studies have analysed whether policies have different effects on SMEs than on 
larger firms. The intuition behind this assumption resides in the difficulties encountered by 
SMEs to access external finance for their R&D, but also in the ability of direct and indirect 
support to address different sources of underinvestment in R&D. For example, Busom et al. 
(2014) find that Spanish SMEs are more prone to use subsidies than tax credits if they face 
financing constraints, but the same is true for large firms. Also in Spain, tax credits were not 
found to increase innovation activity in small firms by Corchuelo & Martínez-Ros (2009). In 
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the Netherlands however, SMEs have invested more in R&D than large companies if they 
received wage-based fiscal incentives (Lokshin & Mohnen, 2012). In Belgium, Dumont (2015) 
has shown that the most impact of subsidies on private R&D is encountered in either small or 
large firms, while wage-based tax credits seem to spur spending in small firms more than in 
large ones. Overall, the effects seem to be country- and policy-dependent, but there is variation 
in how different firms respond to receiving direct and indirect support (Castellacci & Lie, 
2015). 
In order to assess whether subsidies and tax credits – combined or not – have different effects 
according to firm size, I estimate the same 2SLS models from section 4.6 on two subsamples 
split by SME status. The coefficients of the amounts of support received are presented in Table 
II.15.59 
Table II.15 IV estimation of additionality: SMEs vs. large firms 
 SME (N=2,275) LARGE FIRMS (N=375) 
 LN 
R&D 
NET 
LN 
BASIC 
R 
LN 
APPLIED 
R 
LN 
DEVELOP 
LN 
R&D 
NET 
LN 
BASIC 
R 
LN 
APPLIED 
R 
LN 
DEVELOP 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15*** 0.11 0.22*** 0.09 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.33*** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
LN SUBS 0.04 0.11 0.16** -0.04 0.04* 0.23** 0.07 0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
LN MIX 0.19*** 0.25*** 0.40*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.45*** 0.27*** 0.48*** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) 
LN TAX ONLY 0.13*** 0.11 0.18** 0.07 0.13*** 0.32*** 0.24** 0.3** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
LN SUBS ONLY 0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.5** 0.13 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.25) (0.22) (0.29) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Each column presents coefficients from two different estimations. LN TAX and LN SUBS are estimated 
simultaneously through 2SLS, and LN MIX, LN TAX ONLY and LN SUBS ONLY are grouped in another 2SLS 
estimation, similarly to section 4.6. 
d) Control variables included but not shown in table. 
e) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
f) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
g) Instruments include the number of users of each policy and average amount received by 4-digit NACE 
industries, year and size group. 
                                                 
59 For ease of exposition control variables are not shown; full tables of structural equations are available in Table 
II.18 and Table II.19 in Appendix. 
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Columns a and e illustrate the additionality of each policy on total private R&D spending in 
SMEs and large firms respectively. There seems to be little difference in the workings of the 
policies – either used separately or in a mix – between firms of different sizes, when looking 
at aggregated R&D activity. On the other hand, there is some variation in additionality on its 
components, showing that the 2,275 sampled SMEs respond differently from large firms in 
terms of research behaviour. For example, SMEs increase basic research spending only if they 
use the policy mix, as column b shows a 2.5% increase in basic research due to increasing the 
amount of the mix by 10%. In contrast, column f shows that large firms significantly increase 
basic research spending no matter which policy measure they receive, although the largest 
effect comes from subsidies (a 5% increase in spending arising from a 10% increase in 
subsidies received) and the policy mix (for each 10% extra received, spending is increased by 
4.5%). The effects on applied research are similar for both types of firms, but columns d and h 
paint a different picture regarding development activities. SMEs are not affected in a significant 
manner by the receipt of public support, while large firms respond positively to tax credits and 
the policy mix especially. 
The overall picture seems to show that, while policies work similarly on aggregate R&D for 
SMEs and large firms, the former are more responsive to the policy mix in terms of basic 
research and also increase applied research spending when using any measure, while large 
firms are more varied in their responses across all three R&D activities. Finally, it is worth 
noting that subsidies, if used alone, only increase basic research spending of large firms and 
have little significant effect on other activities for any type of firm. Corroborated with the fact 
that SMEs only increase basic research if they receive the policy mix, it seems that there is 
indeed a scale effect in the sense that firms need to reach a certain threshold of funding in order 
to increase investment in this activity. Larger firms can arguably receive larger amounts of both 
policies – due to engaging in bigger projects – whereas small companies need to combine them 
in a mix in order to achieve the same impact on basic research. 
The way in which tax credits and subsidies affect firms may be related to the financial health 
of the latter. I have argued in the introduction that scale effects arising from mixing two policies 
may be countered by a lack of financial resources to pursue larger projects. If this were the 
case, one would expect the additionality created by the policy mix to be similar in size and 
significance to that of separate policies. In other words, there may be an upper limit to how 
much firms can invest in R&D. The comparison between SMEs and large firms has not 
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revealed such an effect, although it has shown that small and medium firms only respond to 
single policies by increasing applied research spending, while using the policy mix also 
increases basic research. This result may have two underlying explanations. First, it may be 
that subsidies received by SMEs are awarded for applied research projects to start with, but the 
data does not contain the information required to check this supposition. Second, basic research 
is farther from the market and thus small firms may find it harder to access external financing 
or indeed be more reluctant to invest own funds in riskier activities (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 
2011). Using a policy mix decreases the need for additional funds and thus allows these firms 
to engage in more applied research. 
If the latter explanation is true for the average SME and if indeed the effects of policies relate 
to financing constraints, one would expect evidence to show up in larger companies with 
funding barriers too. In order to test this assumption, I perform a split-sample analysis 
comparing firms with lower debt levels to those that show higher values than the median 
leverage in the sample. The results are presented in Table II.16.60 
  
                                                 
60 For ease of exposition control variables are not shown; full tables of structural equations are available in Table 
II.20 and Table II.21 in Appendix. 
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Table II.16 IV estimation of additionality: low vs. high leverage 
  LOW LEVERAGE (N=1,325) HIGH LEVERAGE (N=1,325) 
  
LN 
R&D 
NET 
LN 
BASIC 
R 
LN 
APPLIED 
R 
LN 
DEVELOP 
LN 
R&D 
NET 
LN 
BASIC 
R 
LN 
APPLIED 
R 
LN 
DEVELOP 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15*** 0.14* 0.21*** 0.14* 0.15*** 0.20** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
LN SUBS 0.06** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) 
LN MIX 0.21*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.19** 0.15*** 0.21** 0.27*** 0.25*** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) 
LN TAX ONLY 0.12*** 0.15* 0.18** 0.11 0.15*** 0.22* 0.25** 0.26** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
LN SUBS ONLY -0.02 0.30 0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.09 
  (0.08) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20) (0.05) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Each column presents coefficients from two different estimations. LN TAX and LN SUBS are estimated 
simultaneously through 2SLS, and LN MIX, LN TAX ONLY and LN SUBS ONLY are grouped in another 2SLS 
estimation, similarly to section 4.6. 
d) Control variables included but not shown in table. 
e) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
f) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
g) Instruments include the number of users of each policy and average amount received by 4-digit NACE 
industries, year and size group. 
The two groups of firms behave similarly, with the exception of how they respond to subsidies 
that are used in a mix (row two). Companies with higher debt ratios do not increase their R&D 
when receiving subsidies, whereas firms with lower leverage respond positively to this policy 
by spending more on basic and applied research, which results in higher private R&D spending 
overall. Comparing columns a and e shows that in terms of total private R&D investment is 
increased in a similar manner by both firms with low and high debt to equity ratios. However, 
subsidies only show significant additionality in the low-leverage sub-sample. Similarly, basic 
and applied research is increased, on average, in firms with low debt levels that receive 
subsidies, while this policy has no impact on development. On the other hand, tax credits seem 
to increase development spending of firms with higher debt ratios (column h). The policy mix 
seems to provide enough resources for both types of companies all across the board. It increases 
R&D overall and per component with between 1.5% and 4.4% for each extra 10% of the 
amount of grants and tax credits received. These results suggest that combining policies in a 
mix provides ‘critical mass’ that allows even debt-ridden firms to increase investment in both 
research and development activities, but that this effect rests mostly on tax credits and less on 
subsidies. 
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5 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the scarce empirical evidence on the additionality of R&D subsidies 
and tax credits, while at the same time providing a much needed multiple-treatment analysis of 
this policy mix. Using a rich dataset of R&D-active Belgian firms, I perform multiple matching 
and instrumental variable estimations in order to trace how using tax credits and grants allows 
companies to change how they manage internal R&D processes. 
First, I cannot exclude crowding out of overall private R&D expenditure by subsidies if they 
are used alone. I find robust evidence that firms that only receive grants do not spend more of 
their own funds than what they would have spent without support. This result is in line with 
similar findings by Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015), but conflicts with previous analyses on 
Flemish firms by Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013), or Hottenrott 
et al. (2014). Although Dumont (2015) finds some indication that Belgian subsidies have a 
positive impact, the effect is not robust to different estimation techniques accounting for 
selection of firms into treatment. Moreover, as he uses a longer panel for subsidies, results 
could be driven by effects of grants received before tax credits were introduced in their current 
form in 2006. The latter three studies, on the other hand, do not control for possible ‘hidden 
treatment’ effects – such as the use of tax credits alongside subsidies. Both Guerzoni and 
Raiteri (2015) and Dumont (2013) show that failure to account for this issue can bias estimates 
by increasing the apparent treatment effect of the observed policy. My analysis is partially 
robust to this bias by controlling for the simultaneous use of subsidies and wage-based tax 
credits. However, other support measures available to Belgian firms are not accounted for, such 
as tax credits for new R&D investments, patent boxes, European subsidies or public 
procurement, all of which have been shown to affect private R&D (see e.g. Czarnitzki & Lopes-
Bento, 2014; Dumont, 2015; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015). 
Second, I find that subsidies can increase private R&D spending if they are used together with 
tax credits and vice-versa, concluding that there is some interaction between the two policies. 
Similar effects are found by Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015), while the opposite is concluded by 
Dumont (2015), although the latter does not properly control for selection into multiple 
treatments. Tax credits, whether used separately or together, increase R&D spending of firms 
compared to what they would have spent had they not received any support and substantially 
outperform subsidies, confirming a part of extant evidence (Haegeland & Møen, 2007b; 
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Carboni, 2011). Moreover, combining tax credits and subsidies in a policy mix further 
increases spending in R&D, excluding complete substitution effects between the two policies. 
Third, I show that the two policies have different action zones in terms of firms’ expenditure 
on basic and applied research and development. Subsidies show a positive effect on basic and 
applied research only in combination with tax credits, but do not impact development activities. 
Tax credits, on the other hand, are more potent and increase all categories of R&D whether 
used in isolation or combined. Similar to the effects on total expenditure, the policy mix also 
shows higher additionality than subsidies or tax credits alone on the three subcategories or 
R&D. 
An interesting finding is that using grants or the policy mix changes the way firms behave in 
their R&D. I find some evidence of a behavioural additionality effect of turning firms away 
from development and towards research. I emphasize ‘some evidence’ because the effect might 
be due to a specific policy design in which Belgian regional authorities provide separate grants 
for research and for development projects, and the amount of each of these could drive the 
effect I mentioned. Without more refined subsidy data, I cannot clearly state whether this is the 
case or whether the effect can be called ‘additionality’. 
Fourth, my results also complement recent analyses by comparing the impact of policy through 
two estimation techniques. Similarly to Dumont (2013, 2015) and in line with Guerzoni and 
Raiteri (2015), I find that parametric estimators point to less stringent effects than non-
parametric methods. This result may point to a possible upward bias driven by selection on 
unobservables. In other words, there might be company characteristics that matter in 
authorities’ choice of subsidy recipients, but that are unobserved by the researcher. As more 
econometric evidence of policy impact is being produced, such method effect should always 
be addressed. 
The key takeaway for policy makers is that wage-based tax credits seem to outperform 
subsidies in increasing private R&D in the Belgian context. Even though – contrary to subsidy 
recipients – firms benefitting from the wage-based tax credit I analyse are not restricted in the 
destination of the amounts made available by the measure, the analysis points to increased 
investment in R&D activities. This result is interesting by itself, as it suggests that market 
forces work towards more research and development, once access to funding barriers are 
lowered. On the other hand, one cannot conclude that subsidies should be scrapped from the 
support system altogether. Not only do they seem to positively interact with tax credits and 
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create an increased effect on private R&D, but they may also serve complementary purposes – 
for example providing aid to specific industries, regions or types of firms that require it at a 
given point.  
Finally, I end this paper with a renewed call for better data. Although my data set is rather rich 
research-wise, I have already mentioned some of its shortcomings. The fact that I can use the 
amounts of grants and tax exemptions is a step forward compared to most previous studies, 
which have to settle for binary treatment indicators. However, the fact that subsidy data is not 
systematically gathered in a similar fashion across administrative boundaries, corroborated 
with over 15 different subsidy schemes, poses issues with the interpretation of their impact on 
research versus development activities. The fact that the average effect of all these different 
grants is not significant does not imply that, for example, research subsidies do not increase 
research spending, as other papers have been able to show (Hottenrott et al., 2014). Moreover, 
the wage-based tax credits are also split into four different categories, and Dumont (2015) 
shows solid evidence that only one of the four actually increases R&D spending. In light of all 
these, policy makers would be well advised to either simplify the support environment, which 
would benefit both firms and themselves, or streamline the data gathering process in order to 
have better analyses in their drive for evidence-based policy – where such drive exists.  
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6 Appendix 
Table II.17 First stage of 2SLS estimations 
 LN TAX LN SUBS LN MIX LN TAX ONLY LN SUBS ONLY 
 a b c d e 
            
LN AVG MIX   0.24*** -0.16*** -0.12*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
# MIX RECEIVERS   0.71*** -0.18** -0.15** 
   (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
LN AVG TAX 0.50*** -0.03 0.02 0.46*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
# TAX USERS 0.06*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 0.13*** -0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
LN AVG SUBS -0.01 0.36*** 0.10*** -0.14*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
# SUBS USERS -0.07** 0.18*** -0.23*** -0.07* 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
LN AGE -1.00*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.49*** 0.02 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) 
LN EMP 1.13*** 0.29*** 0.52*** 0.60*** -0.20*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
SME -1.06** -2.16*** -1.36*** 0.47 -0.62*** 
 (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.39) (0.22) 
LEVER 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
LN CAPINT 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.10 0.08** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) 
HITECH M 0.73 1.09** -0.14 0.53 0.85*** 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.38) (0.43) (0.27) 
HITECH S 0.57 0.09 -0.43 0.97** 0.48 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.41) (0.48) (0.31) 
LOWTECH M -0.37 -0.38 -0.79** 0.27 0.23 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.33) (0.41) (0.24) 
LOWTECH S 0.29 0.27 -0.34 0.50 0.49* 
 (0.49) (0.46) (0.34) (0.44) (0.26) 
FLANDERS -0.59 -0.87** -0.69* 0.16 -0.16 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.38) (0.37) (0.29) 
WALLONIA 0.10 -1.68*** -1.04*** 1.15*** -0.63** 
 (0.46) (0.39) (0.36) (0.40) (0.28) 
Obs. 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650 
Firms 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
d) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories 
for region is Brussels. 
e) Instruments include the number of users of each policy and average amount received by 4-digit NACE 
industries, year and size group. 
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Table II.18 Structural equations (2nd stage) on SME sub-sample 
 LN R&D NET LN BASIC R LN APPLIED R LN DEVELOPMENT 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15***  0.11  0.22***  0.09  
 (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  
LN SUBS 0.04  0.11  0.16**  -0.04  
 (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
LN MIX  0.19***  0.25***  0.40***  0.03 
  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
LN TAX ONLY  0.13***  0.11  0.18**  0.07 
  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
LN SUBS ONLY  0.01  0.09  0.08  -0.08 
  (0.05)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
LN AGE -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.47** -0.49** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.22) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) 
LN EMP 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.30** 0.28** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) 
SME a 0.25 0.25 -4.46* -4.32* -0.12 -0.05 -2.69*** -2.81*** 
 (0.29) (0.31) (2.49) (2.56) (0.68) (0.82) (0.64) (0.62) 
LEVER -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LN CAPINT 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.02 0.29*** 0.30*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
HITECH M 0.34** 0.35** -0.54 -0.58 0.99* 1.01* -0.01 0.05 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.58) (0.58) (0.54) (0.55) (0.50) (0.50) 
HITECH S 0.78*** 0.79*** -0.19 -0.24 1.33** 1.34** 0.05 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.61) (0.60) (0.55) (0.56) (0.52) (0.52) 
LOWTECH M -0.14 -0.13 -0.23 -0.22 0.76 0.79 -0.46 -0.46 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.52) (0.53) (0.50) (0.51) (0.45) (0.45) 
LOWTECH S 0.33** 0.35** 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.19 0.22 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.56) (0.57) (0.55) (0.56) (0.49) (0.49) 
FLANDERS -0.40*** -0.41*** 1.03** 0.98* 0.43 0.38 0.72 0.73 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.52) (0.52) (0.49) (0.50) (0.58) (0.58) 
WALLONIA -0.28* -0.29* -0.35 -0.35 -0.24 -0.27 1.24** 1.23** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.61) (0.61) 
Obs. 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
Firms 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 1594 
Hansen J 0.56 0.35 1.61 2.20 0.58 0.40 2.37 4.75 
Anderson u-id 149.16 90.63 149.16 90.63 149.16 90.63 149.16 90.63 
a) Lagged SME status included as control. 
b) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
c) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
d) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
e) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
f) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
g) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories for region is 
Brussels. 
  
96 
Table II.19 Structural equations (2nd stage) on large firms’ sub-sample 
 LN R&D NET LN BAISC R LN APPLIED R LN DEVELOPMENT 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.14***  0.25***  0.22***  0.33***  
 (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09)  
LN SUBS 0.04*  0.23**  0.07  0.19***  
 (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.07)  
LN MIX  0.18***  0.45***  0.27***  0.48*** 
  (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
LN TAX ONLY  0.13***  0.32***  0.24**  0.30** 
  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
LN SUBS ONLY  0.01  0.50**  0.13  0.07 
   (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.22)  (0.29) 
LN AGE 0.13 0.13 0.58 0.58 0.32 0.32 1.07** 1.08** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.53) (0.52) (0.31) (0.31) (0.46) (0.46) 
LN EMP 0.85*** 0.85*** -0.34 -0.31 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.23 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) 
SME a 0.60 0.60 -0.41 -0.41 -0.07 -0.05 -0.72 -0.67 
 (0.37) (0.38) (1.68) (1.68) (0.99) (0.99) (1.57) (1.56) 
LEVER 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.17** 0.17** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
LN CAPINT 0.17*** 0.17** 0.12 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.47** 0.48** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.23) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) 
HITECH M 0.41 0.41 -2.34 -2.47 -0.67 -0.69 0.79 0.83 
 (0.43) (0.44) (1.75) (1.62) (0.64) (0.65) (1.74) (1.76) 
HITECH S 1.58*** 1.60*** -3.82** -4.01** -2.17* -2.21* 0.60 0.66 
 (0.52) (0.53) (1.86) (1.72) (1.28) (1.31) (2.02) (2.05) 
LOWTECH M -0.29 -0.31 -2.34 -2.19 -1.59*** -1.56** 1.92 1.84 
 (0.41) (0.43) (1.70) (1.61) (0.60) (0.62) (1.62) (1.66) 
LOWTECH S 0.50 0.50 -1.25 -1.23 -2.74** -2.74** 2.89 2.87 
 (0.53) (0.54) (2.00) (1.90) (1.14) (1.13) (1.88) (1.89) 
FLANDERS 0.05 0.06 1.36 1.29 -0.86 -0.88 0.17 0.22 
 (0.37) (0.37) (1.23) (1.22) (0.83) (0.84) (0.83) (0.82) 
WALLONIA 0.38 0.41 1.75 1.54 -1.61 -1.69 1.66 1.72 
  (0.48) (0.49) (1.69) (1.64) (1.31) (1.33) (1.39) (1.39) 
Obs. 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Firms 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 
Hansen J 3.88 5.23 1.29 1.94 0.70 0.80 0.92 1.15 
Anderson u-id 71.49 21.15 71.49 21.15 71.49 21.15 71.49 21.15 
a) Lagged SME status included as control. 
b) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
c) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
d) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
e) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
f) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
g) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories for region is 
Brussels. 
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Table II.20 Structural equations (2nd stage) on low leverage sub-sample 
 LN R&D NET LN BAISC R LN APPLIED R LN DEVELOPMENT 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15***  0.14*  0.21***  0.14*  
 (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)  
LN SUBS 0.06**  0.27***  0.25***  0.05  
 (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
LN MIX  0.21***  0.39***  0.44***  0.19** 
  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
LN TAX ONLY  0.12***  0.15*  0.18**  0.11 
  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
LN SUBS ONLY  -0.02  0.30  0.14  -0.01 
  (0.08)  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.20) 
LN AGE -0.17* -0.14 0.17 0.19 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29) (0.28) 
LN EMP 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.17 0.16 0.38** 0.38** 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
SME -0.05 -0.04 -0.87 -0.85 0.34 0.34 -1.00* -1.00* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.73) (0.73) (0.53) (0.54) (0.60) (0.60) 
LEVER -0.00* -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.0*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
LN CAPINT 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.19* 0.19* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
HITECH M 0.17 0.20 -0.89 -0.93 0.75 0.82 -0.92 -0.89 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.76) (0.76) (0.72) (0.72) (0.63) (0.63) 
HITECH S 0.61** 0.63** -1.28* -1.32* 0.89 0.97 -0.73 -0.70 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.77) (0.77) (0.75) (0.75) (0.67) (0.67) 
LOWTECH M -0.37 -0.36 -0.79 -0.78 0.66 0.67 -1.31** -1.30** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.58) (0.58) 
LOWTECH S 0.24 0.30 -0.52 -0.53 -0.60 -0.52 0.25 0.29 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (0.82) (0.63) (0.64) 
FLANDERS -0.45** -0.50** 1.35** 1.36** -0.00 -0.04 0.73 0.69 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.62) (0.62) (0.57) (0.59) (0.68) (0.67) 
WALLONIA -0.24 -0.28 0.40 0.41 -0.53 -0.60 1.52** 1.50** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) (0.70) (0.73) (0.73) 
Obs. 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 
Firms 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 970 
Hansen J 1.15 0.66 1.65 2.06 3.26 3.53 2.44 4.28 
Anderson u-id 143 41.7 143 41.7 143 41.7 143 41.7 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
d) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
e) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
f) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories for region is 
Brussels. 
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Table II.21 Structural equations (2nd stage) on high leverage sub-sample 
 LN R&D NET LN BAISC R LN APPLIED R LN DEVELOPMENT 
 a b c d e f g h 
LN TAX 0.15***  0.20**  0.25***  0.26***  
 (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
LN SUBS 0.02  0.03  0.01  0.07  
 (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)  
LN MIX  0.15***  0.21**  0.27***  0.25*** 
  (0.03)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
LN TAX ONLY  0.15***  0.22*  0.25**  0.26** 
  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.13) 
LN SUBS ONLY  0.03  0.07  0.01  0.09 
  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.18) 
LN AGE -0.08 -0.08 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.16 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.26) 
LN EMP 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.22 0.22 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) 
SME -0.09 -0.08 -0.73 -0.73 -0.13 -0.07 0.02 -0.11 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.76) (0.76) (0.48) (0.47) (0.71) (0.70) 
LEVER 0.00*** 0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CURR 0.05* 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.13* 0.13 0.25*** 0.24*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
LN CAPINT 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.18* 0.18* -0.10 -0.11 0.29** 0.30** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
HITECH M 0.53*** 0.53*** -0.70 -0.70 0.90 0.87 0.55 0.64 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.79) (0.79) (0.63) (0.65) (0.70) (0.70) 
HITECH S 1.06*** 1.05*** -0.14 -0.14 1.05 1.06 0.28 0.34 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.81) (0.81) (0.64) (0.66) (0.71) (0.72) 
LOWTECH M -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 -0.16 0.49 0.51 0.89 0.86 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.76) (0.76) (0.58) (0.59) (0.61) (0.61) 
LOWTECH S 0.43** 0.42** 0.14 0.13 -0.14 -0.12 0.60 0.58 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.78) (0.78) (0.63) (0.64) (0.67) (0.68) 
FLANDERS -0.23 -0.24 0.90 0.88 0.46 0.47 0.18 0.16 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.69) (0.70) (0.59) (0.60) (0.64) (0.66) 
WALLONIA -0.12 -0.12 -0.45 -0.47 -0.40 -0.36 0.98 0.90 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.71) (0.71) (0.66) (0.66) (0.73) (0.74) 
Obs. 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 1325 
Firms 989 989 989 989 989 989 989 989 
Hansen J 0.023 0.35 0.64 0.96 0.30 2.41 0.69 4.03 
Anderson u-id 129 66.2 129 66.2 129 66.2 129 66.2 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
c) Intercept term and year dummies included but not shown in table. 
d) All Hansen’s J over-identification tests insignificant at 10% level. 
e) All Anderson under-identification tests significant at 1% level. 
f) Base category for industry indicators comprises firms that do not fit in high- or low-tech groups. Base categories for region is 
Brussels. 
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III. Do R&D subsidies foster behavioural 
additionality effects of R&D tax credits?61 
Abstract 
We analyse how behavioural additionality effects of wage-based R&D tax credits are 
influenced by the firm’s joint use of R&D subsidies. Using matching estimators and a 
multivariate probit analysis of cross-sectional survey data on Belgian firms, we find that R&D 
subsidies induce tax credit users to focus more strongly on research relative to development 
and to accelerate the execution of R&D projects. To a slightly lesser extent, we also find size 
effects, firms scaling up current R&D or initiating additional projects. Overall, these findings 
suggest that companies that benefit from the ‘policy mix’ respond more strongly to R&D tax 
credits and use the tax-exempted resources to adopt a more strategic approach to R&D. 
 
Keywords Behavioural additionality, tax credits, subsidies, policy mix. 
JEL Codes D01 – D03 – D04 – D78 – O30. 
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61 This chapter is based on Neicu, D., Teirlinck, P., and Kelchtermans, S. (2016). Dipping in the policy mix: do 
R&D subsidies foster behavioral additionality effects of R&D tax credits? Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology, 25(3), 218-239. 
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1 Introduction 
Tax credits have been used as enablers of R&D activity in a growing number of countries for a 
few decades now. The number of OECD countries offering some form of tax exemptions for 
R&D more than doubled between 1995 and 2011, up to 75% of members offering such indirect 
support. At the same time, the ratio of indirect versus direct support through subsidies (R&D 
grants) increased in almost half of the OECD countries and tax credits are now equally 
important as R&D subsidies in over one third of the member states (OECD, 2013). 
As more data became available, the number of studies on the effects of indirect R&D support 
increased markedly in the past few years. The effects of R&D tax credits have been considered 
in recent studies in terms of input and output additionality (Köhler et al., 2012), but also in 
terms of economic performance (Cappelen, Raknerud, & Rybalka, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 
2011). However, in spite of a large and growing body of empirical work, the effects of such 
policies are not yet fully understood (Köhler et al., 2012; Lokshin & Mohnen, 2012; Zúñiga-
Vicente et al., 2014). Our paper complements the literature on additionality of public funding 
for R&D by analysing how R&D subsidies moderate behavioural additionality effects of R&D 
tax credits.  
Behavioural additionality has so far been largely ignored when studying the effects of R&D tax 
credits. The concept refers to the difference made by policy intervention in the supported firm’s 
approach to R&D (speed, scale, risk, etc.), rather than the effect on R&D investment or R&D 
performance (Buisseret et al., 1995; Georghiou, 2002). The interest in behavioural additionality 
stems from the potentially restrictive view on impact attributed to the input and output 
additionality concepts (Georghiou, 2002; Falk, 2007). In the wage-based R&D tax credit 
scheme in Belgium, which is the one we study, additional financial resources generated by an 
R&D tax exemption can be freely used by the firm for any purpose, hence our interest in 
examining behavioural outcomes. 
The focus of our paper is not on behavioural additionality of R&D tax credits as such. The 
novelty of the paper stems from studying whether firms’ behavioural response to receiving 
R&D tax credits differs if they also enjoy direct support through R&D subsidies, versus using 
only indirect support. Gauging the combined effects on firms who benefit from such a policy 
mix is of great interest to policy makers who aim to design effective support schemes and wish 
to understand the potential synergies between R&D support measures. So far, different R&D 
incentives have largely been analysed in isolation (Falk et al., 2009), with a few notable 
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exceptions (Bérubé & Mohnen, 2009; Busom et al., 2014; Dumont, 2013, 2015; Guerzoni & 
Raiteri, 2015). The potential for interaction effects between multiple (types of) support 
measures stems from the inherent differences between them. In particular, while R&D subsidies 
provide the benefit of targeted support, tax credits are comparatively easier to integrate in the 
firm’s long-term financial planning and impose a lower administrative burden (Köhler et al., 
2012). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
behavioural additionality in support of our central hypothesis on the effect of R&D subsidies 
on firms also benefiting from R&D tax credits. The third section provides background 
information on the availability and use of R&D subsidies and tax credits in Belgium. It also 
discusses the survey data and our empirical approach. The fourth section presents the results 
and reports on various robustness checks. We conclude with a reflection on the main insights 
of our analysis for policy, and indicate avenues for further research. 
2 Literature review 
In this section, we provide a more elaborate motivation for our focus on behavioural 
additionality and clarify how this paper builds on prior research. We first explain the concept 
of behavioural additionality and the way we measure it. Next, we relate it to the importance of 
tax credits and to the R&D policy mix. 
2.1 Behavioural additionality 
The concept of behavioural additionality refers to permanent changes in firm processes and 
behaviour, such as newly acquired competences, the entry into new business areas or a change 
in working procedures, occurring as a result of policy intervention. Such changes may arise due 
to, among others, learning effects and knowledge spillovers (Clarysse, Wright, & Mustar, 
2009). 
The growing interest in behavioural additionality resulted from the fact that the traditional input 
and output additionality concepts can be questioned in terms of their ability to fully and 
adequately capture the impact of public intervention on the innovation process (Falk, 2007). 
More specifically, it has been argued that government support can be motivated not only based 
on the neoclassical market failure argument, i.e. the aim to address underinvestment in 
knowledge production (Nelson, 1959; K. Arrow, 1962), but can alternatively be prompted from 
an evolutionary-systemic policy perspective (Flanagan et al., 2011; Magro & Wilson, 2013). 
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This perspective provides an alternative rationale for policy intervention in the sense that the 
primary purpose shifts to modifying (in a permanent way) the firm’s approach to R&D. This 
view naturally translates into behavioural additionality as a complementary way to evaluate 
policy measures, besides the classical input and output additionality approaches. Attention for 
behavioural additionality as an evaluation concept has further been justified by the argument 
that persistent changes in firm behaviour create the necessary condition for a policy's ability to 
eventually induce output additionality (Georghiou, 2002). Moreover, it is methodologically 
challenging to judge the effectiveness of public support in terms of output additionality, e.g. 
due to long lags before ‘sleeper technologies’ find a productive use (Luukkonen, 2000). 
Behavioural additionality fits within an evolutionary-structuralist perspective if the policy 
intervention ultimately leads not only to adjustments in the approach to R&D, but also to a 
change in cognitive capacity of the firm (Bach & Matt, 2002). 
The OECD (2006) report on behavioural additionality highlights for example that Finnish 
companies that had received R&D funding for specific projects assessed that this permitted 
them to focus on long-term and riskier research. In Japan, national research funding allowed 
companies to engage in large-scale research projects and, to a greater extent, improve the 
efficiency of R&D. Another series of case studies presented in the report investigate the impact 
of government support on R&D activities of firms, including accelerating projects or setting-
up projects with higher technological challenges. However, their results only refer to the direct 
effect of public grants for R&D, rather than the moderating effect of subsidies on tax incentives 
– as is the case of our study. 
To measure behavioural additionality, (Falk, 2007) integrates previous insights and addresses 
scope additionalities – expanded coverage of an activity to a wider range of markets, 
applications or players, advancement into new research areas – possibly reflected in a greater 
risk profile of the innovation projects, new partnerships between the realms of business and 
academe – resulting in cognitive capacity additionality (Bach & Matt, 2002), the timing of 
projects – acceleration additionalities which, if going hand in hand with scope additionality, 
can also result in long-term projects geared towards strategic objectives, and scale 
additionalities – engagement in larger innovation projects. Her paper also emphasizes that 
different aspects of behavioural additionality can and should be addressed in order to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of a policy measure. The UK Department of Trade and 
  
103 
Industry uses the subcategories of scale, acceleration and scope to measure behavioural 
additionality (Georghiou, 2002).62 
In our paper, we analyse the following dimensions of a firm’s R&D activities: scale, speed of 
execution, the ratio of R (research) versus D (development),63 and the number of projects that 
the firm is engaged in (details will be given in the third section and their relation with tax credits 
will be made clear at the beginning of the next section). These R&D descriptors allow assessing 
key aspects of behavioural additionality as they have been put forward in the literature. While 
not all four outcome variables at our disposal map clearly onto one of these dimensions, we 
believe the set of outcomes available in the survey allows for a meaningful analysis of the 
behavioural additionality effects of R&D tax credits, as moderated by R&D subsidies. 
2.2 Behavioural additionality of tax credits 
Behavioural additionality of R&D tax credits is not guaranteed and, if it occurs, may manifest 
in different ways. Research by Goolsbee (1998) with US data  and  Haegeland & Møen (2007) 
on Norwegian firms indicates an important influence of R&D tax credits on raising researchers’ 
wages, but also on the probability of firms starting to invest in R&D where they have not done 
so preceding the introduction of tax incentives. However, related to the tax credit in the 
Netherlands, Lokshin & Mohnen (2012) find that small firms have a larger R&D cost elasticity, 
whereas there seems to be a crowding out effect on larger firms. Such deadweight loss is a 
distinct possibility if the firm can freely spend the tax exempted financial resources. 
Alternatively, they might be (partially) channelled back to R&D activities, but in ways that do 
not represent a fundamental departure of the firm’s usual way of doing R&D. In particular, the 
firm may increase the staffing of current projects, which may affect the scale and/or speed of 
execution, without really changing the firm’s R&D agenda. 64 Conversely, a firm may also take 
decisions that more fundamentally affect its R&D strategy, such as taking on additional R&D 
projects or changing the balance between research and development. The changes in the firm’s 
approach to R&D are ultimately determined by the decisions it makes in response to the slack 
                                                 
62 More dimensions of behavioural additionality have been proposed in the literature, such as the expansion of a 
firm’s network. In our empirical analysis we do not have measures for such outcomes, so we necessarily leave 
them out of scope. 
63 Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) argue that studies that consider the impact of public support on research and 
development separately provide inconclusive results. 
64 Note that a firm may also respond by replacing employees who work on R&D projects but who are not eligible 
for the tax credit with people who do meet the formal requirements in terms of e.g. educational qualification. 
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resources freed up by the R&D tax credit. For example, if the firm decides to replace R&D 
workers who are not eligible for the measure by highly-qualified people who do comply with 
the requirements – such as replacing non-PhDs with PhD holders – then this may have an impact 
on the composition of the firm’s skill base rather than the total available R&D (wo)manpower. 
Assuming that a different and more diverse set of competences represents an incentive to 
undertake projects in which those skills are put to use, one may expect an upward influence on 
the ratio of research versus development and/or the number of projects. An alternative response 
could be that the firm does not increase the share of highly qualified R&D workers, but instead 
chooses to hire more people to help executing R&D work, e.g. lab technicians, which does not 
represent a substantial expansion of the firm’s expertise. In that case, one would expect an effect 
on the scale and speed of R&D activities, rather than on more scope-oriented outcomes. While 
the actual reaction of a given firm will end up somewhere along the spectrum of skill-upgrading 
versus pure capacity-building, these alternatives provide a useful framework for making sense 
of differential effects across the sub-dimensions of behavioural additionality. 
2.3 Behavioural additionality of R&D tax credits in the presence of 
R&D subsidies 
There is long-standing interest in the interactions that may arise in a ‘mix’ of policy instruments: 
Cunningham et al. (2013) trace the emergence of the policy mix concept in the policy-oriented 
literature back to the 90s. Supported by the growing emphasis on a systemic view of innovation, 
scholars and policy makers have banked on the concept to better understand the complexities 
in stimulating innovation. Despite the need for a more comprehensive approach to evaluating 
interactions between different support measures (Diez, 2002; Aranguren et al., 2014), the policy 
mix concept remains a rather ill-defined and under-conceptualized term (Flanagan et al., 2011). 
In this paper we operationalize the policy mix as the joint use of R&D tax credits and subsidies, 
which are by far the two most important policy instruments used to stimulate private R&D 
activity. We briefly introduce the key differences between these instruments in terms of their 
objectives and usage by firms. 
In general, subsidies provide up-front financing independent of the firm's tax position and are 
more interesting for firms facing appropriability difficulties. Subsidies may also help to attract 
additional funding, since they produce a certification effect, unlike tax credits (Takalo & 
Tanayama, 2010). On the other hand, tax incentives typically require less administrative burden 
and do not suffer from winner-picking by government agencies, but require that the firm has 
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the capacity to appropriate the returns of its innovation to benefit from the measure (Busom et 
al., 2014). Related to the latter argument, tax incentives are more likely to benefit stable R&D 
performers, whereas subsidies tend to increase the number of R&D performers (Arqué-Castells 
& Mohnen, 2015). 
In terms of criteria, subsidies are typically awarded based on the innovative content of the 
proposal, technical ability of the firm and potential market (Busom et al., 2014). Conversely, 
R&D tax credits do not require the approval of a specific government agency and funding is 
provided irrespective of the quality of the project. An advantage of tax-based support is that it 
leaves the choice of how to conduct and pursue R&D programs in the hands of the private sector 
and thus avoids inefficiencies due to uninformed steering of firms’ R&D (Hall & Van Reenen, 
2000). At the same time, this allows firms to fund R&D projects that yield the highest private 
return rather than the ones with the highest social value (David et al., 2000). Conversely, the 
existence of tax deductibles may tempt firms to game the system, for example by labelling 
expenses as research activities while in fact they are related to other kinds of business activities 
unrelated to R&D (Antonelli & Crespi, 2013). R&D subsidies that impose conditions on the 
execution of R&D may, in principle, improve allocation decisions, but issues like asymmetric 
information, lobbying and red tape may lead to suboptimal funding decisions (Hall & Van 
Reenen, 2000). 
Given that the policy goals and granting mechanisms of tax credits and subsidies are quite 
different, it is not trivial to predict the results when they are used jointly. In fact, little is known 
about the interaction between R&D tax incentives and direct subsidies for R&D. More 
generally, which particular form of public support should be used to correct for market failures 
is not clear, nor is the question whether or not there exists an optimal mix of tax credits and 
subsidies (Busom et al., 2014). 
Most existing input or output additionality studies that consider multiple instruments do not 
analyse interactions. (Cunningham, Gök, & Larédo, 2012) report higher success levels of firms 
that combine direct and indirect support. Haegeland & Møen (2007) find that both subsidies 
and tax credits lead to input additionality but they don’t explicitly study interactions. Carboni 
(2011) studies Italian firms and finds evidence of input additionality, tax incentives seemingly 
being more effective than direct grants, although grants encouraged the use of funding sources 
internal to the firm. Corchuelo & Martínez-Ros (2009) find evidence of a stepping stone logic, 
subsidised Spanish firms being more likely to take advantage of tax credits. Finally, Falk (2007) 
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reports evidence that firms enjoying a mix of direct and indirect support have a higher 
likelihood to innovate radically. Bérubé & Mohnen (2009) apply matching estimators to show 
that Canadian firms using a mix of tax credits and subsidies have a higher innovative 
performance than firms using only tax credits. We will follow a similar set-up in this paper, 
albeit we will zoom in on behavioural additionality rather than innovation output. More 
specifically, we analyse whether subsidies moderate the behavioural additionality effects of 
wage-related tax credits. The intuition for such a treatment effect is the following: while R&D 
subsidies are generally targeted towards long-term research projects, there may be spillovers 
with respect to the way R&D tax credits are used by the firm. In order to justify the existence 
of such spillovers, one needs to analyse how the subsidy (i.e. R&D project) changes the R&D 
environment such that the firm uses the tax credit differently. We argue that it may be a very 
real possibility that subsidized firms direct the financial resources freed up by the tax exemption 
towards the subsidized project(s), and as such provide direction for the use of the R&D tax 
credit. In other words, those financial resources may find a productive home within the context 
of the subsidized project.65 More specifically, the subsidized R&D projects may serve as a 
roadmap, pointing to a more productive way for allocating additional R&D resources. For 
example, the tax credit may create room for additional experimentation in the subsidized R&D 
activities that the firm would not have undertaken otherwise. We do not explicitly disentangle 
our hypothesis conditional on the outcome variable since prior work provides few, if any, 
handles to argue differential effects for scale, speed or the share of R versus D. 
Hypothesis: The use of R&D tax credits together with R&D subsidies creates stronger 
behavioural additionality effects than the use of R&D tax credits alone. 
3 Background, Data & Method 
3.1 R&D subsidies and R&D tax credits in Belgium 
While the discussion will yield insights that extend to other countries, our empirical analysis is 
constructed on Belgian data. Therefore, we start by highlighting the main features of the wage-
based R&D tax credits and the R&D subsidy system implemented in Belgium. First, it should 
be noted that R&D tax credits are a federal authority, whereas R&D subsidies are 
predominantly awarded – EU subsidies aside – by the three regional governments in Belgium, 
                                                 
65 Note that nothing prevents the firm from using the tax credit for activities related to subsidized projects. 
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i.e. the Flemish Government, the Walloon Government and Government of the Brussels Capital 
Region. While this is not of primary importance from the perspective of firms, it does have 
ramifications for policy making as any coordination on these R&D support measures requires 
interaction between different governments. 
As in many other countries (Busom et al., 2014), R&D subsidies have long been the most 
important source of funding for R&D in Belgium. Subsidy policies are largely inspired by a 
bottom-up approach, meaning that they are tailored to the specificities of the enterprises located 
in the region. Important aims of subsidy programs include fostering co-operative research and 
other forms of networking in order to stimulate knowledge spillovers. R&D subsidies are 
typically geared to address firms’ risk averseness, some subsidies being specifically earmarked 
for small and medium sized enterprises who face stronger financial constraints for R&D 
(Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011; Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2012). In Belgium, firms pass through 
a selection procedure at the end of which projects are funded or rejected by the public authority. 
The Region of Flanders subsidises research, development or mixed (R&D) projects, offering 
extra incentives for SMEs, as do the other two regions.66 Moreover, Flanders and Brussels also 
sponsor feasibility studies, while Flanders and Wallonia target specific industries based on their 
economic needs. 
The Belgian R&D tax credit we analyse operates as a wage subsidy for R&D workers, which 
sets it apart from tax credit systems in many other countries. More accurately, it offers 
companies a partial exemption of the wage-withholding tax for highly qualified R&D 
personnel. Note that this implies that a firm needn’t generate profits in order to benefit from the 
tax credit. The operation of the measure is illustrated in Figure III.1. 
  
                                                 
66 The balance between the specific Flemish subsidy schemes for research or development (or mixed) may drive part 
of our results in terms of research orientation. However, as our data does not offer any information regarding the 
type of subsidies firms receive, we rely on observations by Hottenrott, Lopes Bento, & Veugelers (2014) related 
to the amounts of each measure granted over time. Before 2009, development subsidies were more prominently 
handed out to firms, whereas research grants were lagging behind. However, there has been a steady shift in policy 
to increase the latter, and by 2009 they became almost as important in value as development subsidies, while mixed 
grants faded. 
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Figure III.1 Operation of the R&D tax credit as a wage subsidy 
 
The tax credit was introduced in January 2006 for researchers holding PhDs in exact or applied 
sciences, (veterinarian) medicine, or civil engineering. At the beginning of 2007 it was extended 
to researchers with a master’s degree, with the exception of masters in the social sciences and 
humanities. The rate of the tax exemption amounted to 25% and was increased to 65% in July 
2008, to 75% in January 2009, and (out of scope of our analysis) augmented to 80% from June 
2013 onwards. Young innovative companies (YICs) have benefited of the 75% rate since 2006. 
For them, R&D support personnel has also been eligible for the tax credit since the introduction 
of the system. For these reasons, we will control for the YIC status of firms in the analysis. 
There is high persistence in tax credit usage, with a very limited number of companies 
abandoning the system once they start using it.67 This implies that the vast majority of firms 
that report in 2011 that they have used the R&D tax credit (see details on the survey below) 
have enjoyed the maximum rate of 75%.  
As stated in the previous section, the exempted amount of the wage-withholding tax can be 
freely used by the company. While a strict condition to channel this reduction in wage cost back 
to R&D is absent, the aim of the policy measure nevertheless is to stimulate R&D investment, 
mainly through the employment of highly qualified researchers. In sum, this wage-based R&D 
tax credit system in Belgium is different from tax-related incentive schemes for R&D in many 
                                                 
67 Only 101 companies out of the cumulative population of 1,131 firms who used the tax credit at least once between 
2006 and 2009 abandoned its use. The reasons for this are unknown, but seem mostly unrelated to bankruptcies or 
other forms of exit as we find evidence of continued activity for most of these 101 firms. Given that most of the 
101 firms are relatively small in size, around 70% being SMEs, the main reason might be that changing the 
composition of their personnel or lack of substantial R&D made these firms no longer eligible.  
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other countries (Busom et al., 2014), which provide an ex-post stimulus through tax deductibles, 
effective only when the firm is profitable.  
Both R&D tax credits from the federal government and R&D subsidies from regional 
governments represent sizeable public support for innovation in the business sector. In 2011, 
1,459 companies benefited from the tax credit, representing a reduction in wage cost of 289 
million Euros.68 At the same time, R&D subsidies from regional governments amounted to 229 
million Euros, benefiting 885 companies. The average tax credit per beneficiary firm was 
198,000 Euros compared to 259,000 Euros for subsidies. On the other hand, 394 firms 
combined tax credits and subsidies in 2011, receiving an average mix of 788,000 Euros, and 
the overall budgetary effort for the policy mix was 311 million Euros.69 
3.2 Data 
In June 2011, the Belgian Science Policy Office (Belspo) conducted an electronic survey aimed 
at evaluating the behavioural additionality effects of the wage-based R&D tax credit measure. 
It was sent to all R&D tax credit users in Belgium that were also included in the 2010 OECD 
business R&D survey, which draws on the exhaustive inventory of 2,706 (quasi) permanent 
R&D-active firms in the country. The electronic questionnaire yielded 412 responses. After 
internal consistency checks and removal of incomplete answers, a total of 177 firms provided 
information on all the variables necessary for the analysis conducted in this paper. Data from 
the survey was combined with firm characteristics from the Belfirst database (Bureau Van 
Dijk). The resulting sample for the empirical analysis thus consists of surveyed companies that 
have used the tax credit in any of the years between 2006 and 2010 (N=177). The treatment 
group is defined as those firms using both subsidies and tax credits (N=105), while the control 
group consists of the firms that have used the tax credit but not subsidies (N=72).  
Although the survey provided a cross-section of tax credit users, the respondents had to provide 
yearly figures (2006-2010) of the number of R&D employees and the number of researchers 
supported by the R&D tax credit measure. This allows us to observe when each firm has first 
                                                 
68 These number refer to the wage withholding tax exemption for researchers with master and doctoral degrees and 
those employed by YICs, but also include a fourth line of the measure which is attributed to researchers engaged 
on collaborative R&D with universities and public research institutes. 
69 The numbers have been calculated based on a database comprising the population of tax credit and subsidy 
receivers from the Belgian Federal Public Service Finance. 
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used the R&D tax credit and construct the control variables for the matching procedure 
described in the next section. 
To assess the representativeness of our sample of respondents for all R&D tax credit users, we 
have used data from the Federal Public Service Finance on the population of 1,131 R&D tax 
credit users in 2009 – the most recent year with complete data. The overall statistical tests of 
differences in means for a broad range of firm characteristics indicate that – while the sample 
is relatively small – it allows for a valid analysis.70 
Four indicators of firms’ R&D behaviour are investigated: scale, speed of execution, the ratio 
of R (research) versus D (development), and the number of R&D projects. The indicators reflect 
the outcome of tax credit use over the entire 2006 – 2010 period and cannot be split into separate 
periods. More specifically, firms were asked to indicate, on a 5-point Likert scale, the level of 
agreement with the following statements: ‘1) The budget freed up by the partial wage 
withholding tax exemption has been used to: a) conduct more research (relative to 
development); b) start extra R&D projects. 2) Without the R&D tax credit measure71: a) R&D 
activities would have gone through at a slower pace; b) R&D activities would have gone 
through on a smaller scale.’ The survey relies on firms’ capacity to assess the additionality 
effects of tax credits relative to the counterfactual of not having benefited from R&D tax credits. 
This approach may be prone to measurement errors and requires us to assume that firms’ self-
reporting qualitatively reflects the underlying data72. Although we acknowledge that this might 
not always be the case, prior work has shown that, in general, this is a legitimate assumption 
(Clarysse et al., 2009; Falk, 2007).73 The Likert-scale responses have been recoded into 
                                                 
70 We compared our sample of firms with the population of R&D tax credit users in terms of firm size, age, NACE 
sector, geographical region, current ratio, R&D intensity (defined as the share of researchers in all employees), the 
percentage of firms that have used the tax credit from 2006 (‘tax leaders’). The only statistically significant 
differences concern low-tech manufacturing firms and tax leaders, which are slightly overrepresented in our 
sample. 
71 The actual formulation in the survey uses the wording ‘fiscal measure’ rather than ‘R&D tax credit’. In order to 
avoid confusion with respect to terminology, we consistently use the term ‘R&D tax credit’ throughout the paper. 
72 Moreover, our research question refers to the additional effect of subsidies on whatever impact tax credits might 
have. Although the survey questions refer unambiguously to the latter, there might still be response bias present 
in the policy mix users group. We acknowledge that such bias might be present, but the design of the survey does 
not permit a more comprehensive analysis of its extent. 
73 Although the reliability of surveys can be put into question, they are a valuable tool to assess the impact of policy 
on issues that are not easily quantifiable nor observed in company accounts or similar data (Ientile & Mairesse, 
2009). For example, the speed of execution of R&D projects, their scale or the exact use of the exempted amount 
are research questions which are very hard – if not impossible – to proxy through some variables. For such issues 
as the ones we address, we think that a survey of the direct users of fiscal measures is possibly the most reliable 
way of gathering the data needed for analysis. 
  
111 
dichotomous variables: ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ were coded 1, while ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘N/A’ were coded zero.74 
3.3 Method 
In order to detect whether subsidies mitigate the effects of tax credits on companies’ R&D, we 
adopt a non-parametric matching approach complemented by a parametric multivariate model. 
We use 𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝑇  to denote the behavioral outcome 𝑚 of firm 𝑖 if it receives both R&D subsidies and 
tax credits (𝑆 = 1), and 𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝐶  for the same outcome of the same firm if it uses only tax credits 
(𝑆 = 0). The effect for a firm 𝑖 enjoying the policy mix of using both tax credits and subsidies 
instead of only tax credits is given by 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝐶 |𝑆 = 1]. Empirically, the treatment effect 
for outcome 𝑚 is then calculated as: 
𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑚 =
1
𝑁𝑇
∑ [𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝑇 − 𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝐶 ]𝑖|𝑆=1  (1) 
with 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇 denoting the Sample Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and 𝑁𝑇 the number 
of treated firms. It is not possible to directly calculate the effect of using both measures since a 
firm is only observed as either having received the treatment or as being in the control group, 
i.e. there is a missing data problem (Heckman et al., 1997). The idea behind a matching 
approach is to find a proxy for the missing case by finding another firm with similar 
characteristics 𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
 but that only uses tax credits. The matching on observable 
characteristics addresses the problem of a potentially non-random selection of firms into the 
treatment, provided that the conditional independence assumption holds (Rubin, 1977). This 
means that the treatment status and potential outcome are assumed independent for firms with 
the same set of exogenous characteristics: 
𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝑇 , 𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝐶  ⊥  S𝑖|𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑥  (2) 
In addition, we impose a common support restriction, meaning that, for all treated firms, a valid 
counterpart should be present in the control group, and, conversely, every tax credit user should 
represent a potential subsidy recipient.75  
                                                 
74 Using dichotomous outcomes serves the purpose of answering our research question, while sidestepping the issue 
of heterogeneous interpretation of the detailed answer levels by the respondents. In addition, the size of the dataset 
does not lend itself to analysing the fine-grained response levels.  
75 In practice, this comes down to discarding all treated firms with propensity scores larger than the maximum and 
smaller than the minimum in the control group. 
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Under these assumptions, we can rewrite the SATT as the mean difference of the matched 
samples: 
𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑚 =
1
𝑁
∑ [(𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝑇 |𝑆 = 1, 𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑥) − (𝑦𝑖𝑚
𝐶 |𝑆 = 0, 𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑥)]𝑁𝑖=1   (3) 
Note that due to the nature of the survey questions, the matching design effectively yields a 
difference-in-differences estimation of the treatment effect. In particular, companies were asked 
what the additional effect of the R&D tax credit was on the scale, speed, etc. of their R&D. 
Thus, the answers represent the difference between the pre-treatment period t0 and the post-
treatment period t1, the latter being the moment when the survey was conducted, in 2011. 
Different methods exist to match the treated firms with their most similar counterparts in the 
control group. We use propensity score matching, 𝑃(𝑆 = 1|𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔), introduced by 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), which is estimated using a probit regression. Subsequently, each 
treated company is matched to one firm from the control group based on the propensity score.76  
After matching, we run follow-up regressions including, besides the treatment variable, the 
control variables employed in the matching probit to correct for any remaining imbalance 
between treated and control groups (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2011). We also include the following 
four variables: years of tax credit use, average tax importance, demand pull and technology 
push.77 We provide further justification for their inclusion in section 4.2. Furthermore, we 
exploit the fact that we observe multiple behavioural outcomes in these adjustment regressions 
by estimating a multivariate probit model,78 which allows for correlation between unobserved 
                                                 
76 We employ single nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, i.e. control firms are not removed from the pool 
of potential controls after matching with a treated firm. We follow this approach to ensure good quality matches 
given the specific composition of our sample: the treatment group is larger than the number of possible controls 
because most companies that have accessed tax credits have also used subsidies. We use the Stata command teffects 
psmatch to perform the propensity score matching and calculate average treatment effects on the treated with 
robust standard errors. 
77 The reason for not including these variables when estimating the propensity to use both tax credits and subsidies 
is that they are not measured pre-treatment. The first two variables are, respectively, a count and average over the 
entire 2006-2010 period, thus spanning both pre- and post- treatment periods. The demand pull and technology 
push variables stem from answers provided by the survey respondents in 2011 without referring to a specific 
period, making it impossible to attribute the variables to the pre-treatment period. To avoid endogeneity of the 
matching variables, we only include in the matching estimation those variables that unambiguously apply to the 
pre-treatment period (see also section 4.1 for details on the matching). 
78 Leveraging the matching approach, the multivariate probit model is estimated using all firms on common support. 
As a robustness check, we also estimated the same model using only the matched sample, yielding a better balance 
but which leaves us with fewer observations (130 firms instead of 163). The results, presented in Table III.8 in 
Appendix, are very similar. We opted to report the findings using the larger dataset as the main results in the paper, 
and reckon that this approach represents a reasonable trade-off between achieving good quality matching and 
accommodating the drawbacks of the available data. 
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factors driving the behavioural outcomes of a single firm – while still requiring the error terms 
to be uncorrelated across firms – and hence permits a more efficient estimation. 
We estimate the following 4-equation multivariate probit model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑚
∗ = 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠′𝑋𝑖
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
′
𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
′
𝑋𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚 ; 𝑚 = 1. .4 (4) 
The observed binary outcome 𝑦𝑖𝑚 equals 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑚
∗ > 0, whilst it equals 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑚
∗ ≤0. 𝑦𝑖𝑚
∗  is the 
latent variable that captures the change in the outcome 𝑚 (scale, speed, research orientation, 
number of R&D projects) for firm i. 
𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔
 represent the matching variables, which are included to control for remaining 
imbalance. 𝑋𝑖
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠 denotes whether firm 𝑖 received a subsidy, 𝑋𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠include measures of the 
importance of the tax credit for firm i and dummies if the firms consider that their R&D is 
driven by demand pull or technology push factors.79 The error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑚 are assumed 
multivariate normal80 with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix 𝑉 where 𝜌𝑗𝑗 = 1 and the 
off-diagonal correlations are estimated from the data under the restriction that 𝜌𝑗𝑘 = 𝜌𝑘𝑗.  
Recall that the binary outcome variables 𝑦𝑖𝑚 have been coded as 1 if the respondent at least 
agrees or strongly agrees that there is an effect on the corresponding behavioral outcome, which 
is consistent with the idea of a latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑚
∗  exceeding a threshold value.   
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Matching 
To construct a control group for the firms who benefit from R&D subsidies and tax credits, we 
include a range of variables that may be expected to affect the probability of a firm using both 
types of support, compared to only tax credits. Note that since all firms in the sample use R&D 
tax credits, the groups may be expected to be relatively homogenous, as all firms use public 
R&D support. While prior work provides little guidance on the precise characteristics that may 
distinguish between subsidized and non-subsidized firms, conditional on tax credit usage, we 
                                                 
79 The importance of the tax credit is measured via three indicators: the yearly average percentage of R&D personnel 
for which the firm received the tax exemption – taking into account the different levels of the exemption – whether 
the firm is a tax leader (if it used the tax credit from 2006), and the number of years each firm has benefitted from 
the tax credit. 
80 In our estimation of the model, we specified 30 random draws from the multivariate standard normal distribution 
to be used for calculating the simulated maximum likelihood function in each iteration. This exceeds the guideline 
of using at least √𝑁 with 𝑁 the number of observations (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003). 
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will draw on related work that has relied on matching techniques to study the effects of R&D 
support. 
To avoid endogeneity of the matching variables, they need to be measured prior to the firm 
receiving the treatment, i.e. the combination of R&D tax credits and subsidies. While we do not 
have information on the precise timing of subsidy use, we do observe in which years a firm 
uses tax credits. By definition, the year prior to the firm’s first use of R&D tax credits is a pre-
treatment year since at most one of the support measures (subsidies) is being used by the firm.81 
Therefore, we use the values of the matching variables in that year, if the data is available. 
However, due to the small sample size and incomplete data, for a number of companies (119 
out of 177), some variables can only be measured in the first year of tax credit use.82 Prior work 
using matching estimators has followed an analogous approach to deal with limited data 
availability (e.g. Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento 2013). Table III.6 in Appendix details the year that 
is used for each variable in the empirical analysis. 
As a first matching variable, we follow Lhuillery, Marino, & Parrotta (2013) and control for 
the firm’s R&D intensity, measured as the percentage of researchers relative to the total number 
of employees. Given our focus on behavioural additionality, it is important to construct a 
control group of firms for which R&D plays a comparable role as for the treated firms. Firms’ 
R&D investments are hence treated differently in our research set-up compared to studies that 
analyse input additionality, in which R&D investments are used as a dependent variable. An 
important methodological concern about using R&D intensity as a matching variable is that it 
may be endogenous to the receipt of R&D subsidies, as an R&D grant may allow a firm to hire 
additional researchers. In other words, we need the pre-treatment R&D intensity, net of R&D 
employees financed through subsidies. Since we do not have this information, we use the 
following approach to mitigate endogeneity concerns: we rely on the observation that there is 
high persistence among firms that benefit from R&D subsidies (Busom et al., 2014). Therefore, 
                                                 
81 Given the purpose of the matching to construct a control group of tax credit users that is similar to the firms that 
also use subsidies, the matching variables in the pre-tax credit year should not be ‘contaminated’ by R&D 
subsidies. This condition is only met if the firm’s first subsidy use succeeds its first R&D tax credit use. 
Conversely, if a firm benefits from an R&D subsidy prior to receiving R&D tax credits - which we cannot observe 
- then certain matching variables may be affected by the subsidy. For the matching variable most likely to be 
affected by this issue, we apply an additional correction to obtain a ‘subsidy-corrected’ R&D intensity (described 
later in the current section). In sum, while the approach we follow is not perfect, it strives to the maximum extent 
possible for an accurate matching of treated and untreated firms given the available data.  
82 This period was used to measure firm size in 24 cases, R&D intensity for 122 companies, and current ratio for 20 
firms for which pre-treatment values were not available. 
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we corrected a (subsidized) firm’s R&D intensity by using information in the survey on the 
relative importance (in terms of each firm’s budget) of subsidies compared to tax credits at the 
time the survey was performed. Jointly with the information on the number of researchers the 
firms received tax credits for, this allowed us to correct for the number of R&D workers 
supported by subsidies, and hence to calculate a ‘subsidy-free’ R&D intensity in the year 
preceding the first time a company benefitted from the R&D tax credit. 
Further, we match firms on industry, as industry affiliation has been shown to be a factor in the 
decision to grant subsidies to firms. For example, Hyytinen & Toivanen (2005) show that 
government funding disproportionately helps firms from industries that depend more on 
external financing. Due to the relatively small size of the dataset, we merely use an aggregate 
industry classification. In particular, we use dummies for high- and low-tech manufacturing 
and service industries, following Eurostat guidelines.83 However, note that the inclusion of 
R&D intensity as a matching variable helps control for different propensities across industries 
to invest in R&D (Mathieu & de la Potterie, 2010). 
Company size and age have been found to have an impact on the use of public R&D support, 
with larger and younger firms more likely to benefit from it, although the findings are mixed 
(Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Blanes & Busom, 2004; Dirk Czarnitzki & Licht, 2006; Aerts & 
Schmidt, 2008). We control for these firm characteristics by using the logarithm of the number 
of employees and the age of the company in the first year it uses tax credits. 
A firm’s financial health has been found to affect a firm’s likelihood to apply for subsidies 
because financially constrained firms have a stronger incentive to acquire external financing 
(Caiumi, 2010; Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011). At the same time, such firms might not be 
primary targets for policy makers because of their uncertain financial future, which is at odds 
with ‘picking the winner’ strategies that may be followed by public funding agencies. We use 
the current ratio, defined as current liabilities to current assets, a frequently used measure to 
capture the firm's short-term financial health (Bromiley, 1991; Latham & Braun, 2010). 
The Young Innovative Company (YIC) status of a firm is included in the estimation, as such 
firms benefitted from special treatment from the tax authorities, as mentioned in section 3. 
                                                 
83 The use of a more detailed industry classification is likely to be less relevant in our setting since only R&D-active 
companies are considered, and differences between sectors are found to be more related to the propensity to engage 
in R&D rather than the characteristics of the R&D active firm (Teirlinck, Dumont, & Spithoven, 2010). 
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Companies being part of a corporate group84 may benefit from internal funding, and may be 
better informed about public support thanks to internal company information networks. 
Furthermore, group headquarters may enjoy reduced costs in applying for subsidies (Takalo, 
Tanayama, & Toivanen, 2013). 
The experience of a firm in actively seeking and using other forms of R&D support may serve 
as a signal for its use of subsidies (Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013). Hence, we include a 
dummy (tax leader) capturing whether the firm used tax credits in 2006, when the measure was 
introduced. 
Furthermore, the relative importance of the R&D tax credit for a firm’s R&D operations might 
also be correlated with the probability that a firm obtains R&D subsidies. We control for this 
via a tax importance variable, measuring the percentage of researchers for which the firm 
received wage-based tax credits.85 
Finally,86 given that authority over R&D subsidy policy accrues to the regional governments, 
we include dummies for the three Belgian regions – Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels Capital 
Region. As studies in other countries have also found (Santamaría, Barge-Gil, & Modrego, 
2010), the decentralization of policies leaves room for differentiation in terms of subsidy 
eligibility criteria, focus on specific industries, etc. 
Means and proportions of the variables used for matching and the behavioural outcome 
variables are shown in the first and second panels of Table III.1, respectively. 
                                                 
84 Using information from the Amadeus database, we define members of a group as firms which are either owned 
(with a share of over 50%) by another firm, or have themselves a stake of over 50% in another company. 
85 We also weigh the percentage of researchers supported by the measure by the percentage of the tax exemption, 
according to the ‘treatment’ year: 25% from 2006 to June 2008, 65% as of July 2008 and 75% as of 2009. 
86 We tried to be as complete as possible with respect to the inclusion of variables in the matching model given the 
available data sources i.e. the survey conducted by the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office combined with the 
Belfirst and Amadeus databases. Nevertheless, we could not add some controls that have been used in other studies 
on R&D support. For example, Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento (2013) use CIS, Belfirst and IWT data for Flemish firms 
and include variables for exports and patents. We were not able to include such information due to limited 
possibilities to link to external data sources and confidentiality reasons. However, compared to their study, we 
were able to use a set of extra variables regarding firms’ financial health (current ratio), their R&D intensity, a 
proxy of their knowledge of the R&D support system (tax leader, tax importance), as well as regional dummies 
that capture differences in public policies across the three administrative regions in Belgium (Flanders, Brussels 
and Wallonia). Among other possible characteristics that might play a role in firms’ selection into subsidy schemes 
might be the education of their researchers, the wage base, but also the quality of research projects. However, we 
do not have data on either of these variables. 
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Table III.1 Descriptive statistics, pre-matching  
Variable 
Tax credits only 
N=72 
Policy mix 
N=105 
 
p-valueb 
R&D intensity 24.42% 24.74% 0.94 
Log(employees) 3.85 3.00 0.00 
Age 22.59 19.69 0.30 
Current ratio 1.76 2.52 0.27 
YIC dummy 18.06% 16.19% 0.75 
Group dummy 55.56% 47.62% 0.30 
Tax leader dummy 26.39% 42.86% 0.03 
Tax importance 37.55% 37.06% 0.89 
High-tech manuf.a 19.44% 20.00% 0.93 
High-tech services 27.78% 41.90% 0.06 
Low-tech manuf. 34.72% 25.71% 0.20 
Low-tech services 12.50% 8.57% 0.40 
Brussels 9.72% 8.57% 0.79 
Flanders 65.28% 62.86% 0.74 
Wallonia 25.00% 28.57% 0.60 
Scale 51.39% 69.52% 0.02 
Speed 41.67% 65.71% 0.00 
R versus D 29.17% 57.14% 0.00 
Nr. of projects 50.00% 68.57% 0.01 
a) A small number of firms could not be classified in any of the four categories because their NACE 
codes are not on the Eurostat list used for the classification. This is why the percentages do not 
sum to 100%. In the regressions, these firms are included in the base category. 
b) Equality of means between the two groups was tested by t-tests (continuous variables) and 
Pearson’s chi2 (categorical variables). 
Users of tax credits only (second column) do not seem to differ very much in characteristics 
from users of the ‘policy mix’ (third column). This is not unexpected, as both groups are users 
of some form of public support. Indeed, in terms of R&D intensity, age, percentage of young 
innovative companies, financial health (measured by the current ratio), the importance of the 
tax credit, sector of activity, and regional distribution, the two groups are rather balanced. 
However, like Bérubé & Mohnen (2009), who also study the ‘policy mix’ for firms experienced 
in accessing public support, we find some significant differences. In particular, differences in 
firm size – policy mix users are on average smaller – and speed of adoption of tax credits – 
policy mix users are on average more likely to be early adopters – point towards the necessity 
of balancing the two groups. 
The second panel in Table III.1 shows that there are significant differences in outcomes for the 
treated and potential control firms. On average, users of the policy mix reckon that the tax credit 
has increased the scale, speed, relative orientation towards research, as well as the number of 
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concurrent projects than is the case for users of the tax credit only.87 Table III.2 shows the 
results of the probit estimation of the propensity to use both tax credits and R&D subsidies, 
with a dummy indicating the use of subsidies as the dependent variable. As expected, 
companies that have used the tax credit since 2006 (tax leader) have a higher probability of 
also using subsidies. This confirms the intuition that these firms are more prone to use different 
types of public support measures for R&D. Further, the matching results indicate that larger 
firms have lower probability of using subsidies alongside tax credits. This is in line with the 
particular attention in many regional R&D subsidy programs towards providing support to 
SMEs (Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2012). Bérubé & Mohnen (2009) find similar results for 
company size in their matching study, using an analogous treatment definition. Note however 
that these results should not be interpreted as general predictors of using R&D subsidies, but 
rather serve to identify differences in observable characteristics between treated and control 
firms. 
Although the other variables such as industry affiliation and region have no significant effect 
on the probability to use R&D subsidies, they contribute to the model fit and thus the overall 
balance between treated and control firms in the propensity score matching in the next step. 
  
                                                 
87 We remind that we are interested in the difference in the answers between the control group (tax credits only) and 
the treated firms (tax credits & R&D subsidies). The survey data, with all respondents using R&D tax credits, does 
not allow assessing the effects of R&D tax credits alone.  
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Table III.2 Probit estimation of the joint use of tax credits and subsidies 
 Coef. s.e. 
R&D intensity -0.62 (0.43) 
Log(employees) -0.29*** (0.08) 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 
Current Ratio 0.03 (0.04) 
YIC -0.63 (0.39) 
Group 0.14 (0.25) 
Tax leader 0.69*** (0.24) 
Tax importance 0.11 (0.54) 
High-tech manuf. 0.09 (0.30) 
High-tech services 0.37 (0.30) 
Low-tech services -0.34 (0.38) 
Flanders 0.26 (0.38) 
Wallonia 0.15 (0.40) 
Constant 0.76 (0.59) 
Observations  177 
LR chi2(9)  28.78*** 
Pseudo-R2  0.12 
Log-likelihood -105.20 
a) ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The tests presented in Table III.3 confirm that none of the matching variables show significant 
differences in the means between the treated and control firms after matching, while balance 
indicators also reveal a reduction in bias after having performed the matching procedure.  
  
120 
Table III.3 Descriptive statistics of matched sample 
Variable Unmatched 
vs. Matched 
Mean 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
%bias % 
reduction 
bias 
t p>t 
R&D intensity U 25% 24% 1  0.07 0.95 
 M 25% 21% 11.9 -1041.8 0.84 0.40 
Log(employees) U 3.00 3.85 -48.6  -3.19 0.00 
 M 3.22 3.53 -17.9 63.1 -1.25 0.21 
Age U 19.69 22.60 -15.8  -1.04 0.30 
 M 19.88 20.41 -2.9 81.9 -0.2 0.84 
Current ratio U 2.52 1.76 18.5  1.12 0.27 
 M 1.80 2.04 -5.8 68.7 -1.04 0.30 
YIC dummy U 16% 18% -4.9  -0.32 0.75 
 M 16% 11% 14.5 -194.6 1.07 0.28 
Group dummy U 48% 56% -15.8  -1.03 0.30 
 M 48% 45% 6.6 58.5 0.44 0.66 
Tax leader dummy U 43% 26% 34.9  2.26 0.03 
 M 40% 41% -2.3 93.3 -0.15 0.88 
Tax importance U 37% 38% -2.1  -0.14 0.89 
 M 37% 35% 10.2 -372.8 0.7 0.49 
High-tech manufacturinga U 20% 19% 1.4  0.09 0.93 
 M 22% 14% 19.2 -1284.6 1.35 0.18 
High-tech services U 42% 28% 29.8  1.93 0.06 
 M 35% 43% -16.2 45.5 -1.06 0.29 
Low-tech manufacturing U 26% 35% -19.6  -1.29 0.20 
 M 29% 27% 2.4 87.8 0.16 0.87 
Low-tech services U 9% 13% -12.7  -0.85 0.40 
 M 10% 10% 0 100 0 1.00 
Brussels U 9% 10% -4  -0.26 0.80 
 M 9% 4% 15.2 -282 1.19 0.23 
Flanders U 63% 65% -5  -0.33 0.74 
 M 63% 66% -6.8 -36.2 -0.46 0.65 
Wallonia U 28% 25% 8  0.52 0.60 
 M 28% 30% -2.5 69.2 -0.16 0.87 
a) A small number of firms could not be classified in any of the four categories because their NACE codes 
are not on the Eurostat list used for the classification. This is why the percentages do not sum to 100%. In the 
regressions, these firms are included in the base category. 
b) Equality of means between the two groups was tested by t-tests (continuous variables) and Pearson’s chi2 
(categorical variables). 
Table III.4 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for each outcome. The share 
of firms reporting that the tax credit has allowed them to speed up R&D projects and/or increase 
the relative orientation on research versus development is substantially and significantly higher 
for recipients of the policy mix relative to those firms that only benefit from tax credits. 
Although the ATTs are also positive for the scale and number of R&D projects undertaken by 
firms, these effects are not significant at the 1% level, but merely at 5%. These results support 
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our hypothesis that R&D subsidies strengthen the behavioural additionality of tax credits. 
Noteworthy is that the evidence on size-related R&D outcomes (scale, number of projects) is 
somewhat weaker than for the outcomes that bear a closer relation with the firm’s efforts to 
safeguard its competitive position, both in the short run (speed) and in the long run (more 
emphasis on research). 
Table III.4 ATT on behavioural variables 
Variable 
Treated - 
Control s.e. Z-score p-value 
Scale 19.78% (0.09) 2.10 0.04 
Speed 24.18% (0.08) 2.90 0.00 
R vs D 26.37% (0.08) 3.24 0.00 
Nr. of projects 20.88% (0.09) 2.39 0.02 
4.2 Regression analysis 
We further ascertain the robustness of our main results in a multivariate probit regression 
framework, which allows for a closer identification of the role of subsidies in moderating the 
behavioural additionality of R&D tax credits. We trim the sample to include only observations 
on common support in the matching exercise, amounting to 91 treated firms and 72 controls. 
While the impact on the sample is modest, this correction serves to assure that none of the 
subsequent results are driven by atypical firms. The regression results are shown in Table III.5. 
Correlations between the explanatory variables are presented in Table III.7 in Appendix. 
A first observation is that remaining imbalance is low, with only few of the matching variables 
showing significant effects. The indicator variables for the three regions reveal different effects 
on scale and speed of R&D, firms in the Brussels Capital Region being more responsive to tax 
credits. A possible reason is the strong presence in Brussels of small firms active in the IT sector 
(mainly software and consulting), for which R&D is arguably less science-based and more 
cantered on short lead-times, which may not be picked up by the aggregate industry dummies 
(Teirlinck & Spithoven, 2008). As explained in section 3, we supplement the variables used in 
the matching procedure with additional (post-treatment) controls. First, we add the number of 
years a firm benefits from the tax credit as a way to capture accumulated benefits from the 
measure, but this turns out to be insignificant. The importance of R&D tax credits is now 
included as the weighted average of the yearly percentage of researchers supported by the tax 
  
122 
credit over 2006 – 2010.88 It has a significant and positive effect on the number of R&D 
projects, but does not affect the other outcomes. We also add indicators for the role of demand-
pull and technology-push: firms were asked in the survey whether these respective factors had 
an influence on the decision to perform additional R&D.89 We do not find evidence that the 
commercial and technical environments have an impact on the R&D behaviour of firms in our 
sample, except for a positive and significant effect of technology push on the speed of R&D 
projects.  
                                                 
88 We define yearly weights as the percentage of the wage withholding tax exemption available to companies: 25% 
in 2006 - 2007, 45% in 2008 and 75% in 2009 - 2010. 
89 In the survey, the two items are not mutually exclusive, for which reason we included both in the estimation. 
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Table III.5 Multivariate probit estimation 
  Scale Speed R vs D Nr. of projects 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Subsidy 0.43* (0.23) 0.61*** (0.24) 0.87*** (0.23) 0.55** (0.23) 
R&D intensity 0.10 (0.48) 0.18 (0.48) -0.41 (0.46) 0.78* (0.47) 
Log(employees) -0.10 (0.10) 0.02 (0.10) 0.00 (0.10) 0.06 (0.10) 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Current ratio -0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) -0.14* (0.08) 0.00 (0.08) 
YIC dummy 0.02 (0.36) 0.39 (0.37) 0.44 (0.36) -0.22 (0.37) 
Group dummy -0.23 (0.26) -0.02 (0.27) -0.23 (0.25) 0.03 (0.29) 
Tax leader 0.35 (0.35) 0.17 (0.36) -0.01 (0.38) 0.19 (0.36) 
Years of tax credit use -0.12 (0.12) -0.02 (0.11) 0.04 (0.12) -0.09 (0.13) 
Average tax importance -0.12 (0.42) -0.19 (0.39) -0.30 (0.43) 0.91** (0.42) 
High-tech manuf. -0.27 (0.31) -0.36 (0.32) 0.37 (0.32) 0.41 (0.32) 
High-tech serv. -0.27 (0.30) 0.02 (0.30) -0.16 (0.31) -0.06 (0.29) 
Low-tech serv. 0.03 (0.40) -0.06 (0.37) 0.21 (0.40) 0.55 (0.41) 
Demand pull 0.32 (0.30) -0.11 (0.33) -0.15 (0.32) 0.18 (0.32) 
Tech. push 0.67 (0.42) 0.83** (0.39) 0.13 (0.55) 0.06 (0.44) 
Flanders -1.43*** (0.43) -1.08*** (0.42) 0.36 (0.38) -0.22 (0.39) 
Wallonia -1.17*** (0.45) -0.55 (0.44) 0.10 (0.40) 0.21 (0.42) 
rho21 0.86*** (0.05) 
rho31 0.65*** (0.10) 
rho41 0.71*** (0.08) 
rho32 0.51*** (0.11) 
rho42 0.75*** (0.07) 
rho43 0.64*** (0.09) 
Observations 163 
Log pseudo-likelihood -319.26 
Wald test (chi²) 125.19*** 
LR test of all rho=0 (chi²) 141.26*** 
a) ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
With respect to our central hypothesis, we find that firms benefiting from the policy mix are 
significantly more likely to increase the research orientation and speed of R&D projects than 
firms using only R&D tax credits, which is consistent with the average treatment effect on the 
treated estimated in section 4.1. While the design of the R&D tax credit as a reduction in the 
wage cost of R&D workers may be expected to encourage all tax credit users – i.e. also the 
ones not receiving R&D subsidies – to hire highly skilled workers who engage in research 
rather than development, the policy mix may create a more favourable context for this to 
effectively happen. Possible reasons are that firms with subsidized R&D projects – which 
typically require a clear risk/research component to be funded – are likely to stumble upon 
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tough scientific challenges when executing those projects. Furthermore, R&D grants often 
involve collaboration with external partners such as universities, which may put eligible 
researchers on the hiring radar of the firm.  Further, subsidized R&D projects may provide a 
‘map function’ for the financial resources made available through the R&D tax credit. More 
specifically, once a firm is awarded an R&D grant, the project may perform as a focal point to 
which additional R&D resources can be productively allocated. 
This map function of subsidized projects also offers an explanation for the observed effect of 
shorter R&D lead times by avoiding wasteful R&D efforts. In addition, an important underlying 
mechanism that would explain faster execution of R&D is the learning effect stemming from 
competing for R&D grants.  Specifically, there may be a ‘disciplining role’ performed by the 
subsidy application process. While firms may have their own structured approach to initiate 
R&D projects, in order to obtain an R&D grant, firms need to write a proposal that forces them 
to think through the entire project, anticipate external reviewer comments, establish connections 
with potential R&D partners, etc. This constitutes a rigorous learning experience, which the 
firm may not be able to reproduce entirely in internal processes and which creates a fertile basis 
for the use of tax credits by expediting R&D activities that would otherwise take longer to 
complete.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper addresses behavioural additionality effects of a policy mix of R&D subsidies and 
tax credits on companies’ R&D strategy. Within the policy mix, we investigated the treatment 
effect of R&D subsidies for companies that also benefit from tax credits. The key contribution 
of our analysis is that it considers behavioural additionality effects of tax credits and subsidies, 
complementing the literature on input and output additionality. We find that subsidies enforce 
behavioural effects that tax credits might have on specific dimensions of firm decision-making 
in R&D. Our results indicate that firms that obtain R&D subsidies are more likely to further 
adjust their approach to R&D using funds made available through tax credits than when they 
benefit from tax credits alone. In particular, the combination causes firms to speed up their 
research projects, but also orient their R&D proportionally more towards research (versus 
development) activities. To a lesser extent, we also find that firms supported by means of a mix 
of tax credits and subsidies use the tax-exempted amounts to increase the scale and/or number 
of R&D projects relative to their counterparts using solely tax credits. 
Altogether, these results indicate that subsidies reinforce firms’ response to indirect support 
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like tax credits, which raises questions with respect to ‘picking the winner’ strategies R&D 
funding agencies are (accused of) following. In particular, one might ask whether high 
selectivity in allocating R&D subsidies does not result in great untapped potential given the 
positive interaction effects between subsidies and tax credits. At the time of the survey – 2011 
– the average subsidy received by a Belgian firm stood at 259,000 Euros, compared to little 
under 200,000 Euros for the average tax credit.90 Put into context, our results imply that public 
authorities ‘receive’ an almost 20% increase in the scale of R&D, a 24% increase in speed of 
execution, a 26% shift in activity towards research, and a 21% increase in the number of R&D 
projects, all for the average price of 259,000 Euros. However, in the same period, the average 
amount of policy mix per firm was 788,000 Euros. The large difference implies that there is a 
‘big user’ profile of firms that receive high amounts of tax credits and subsidies simultaneously. 
For this reason, the ‘price’ payed by authorities for the additionality mentioned above may be 
higher at the tail end of the distribution of policy mix amounts. 
On the other hand, whether the positive effect of subsidies on behavioural additionality of tax 
credits would hold if one expanded the set of subsidy beneficiaries is far from certain. In 
particular, while the effect may be due to the subsidized R&D projects acting as focal points in 
firms’ resource allocation process, the subsidized firms may also be more oriented towards 
R&D in ways that our matching approach could not control for. In other words, because of 
selection issues, firms that are currently not being granted subsidies might not use tax credits 
as productively if they also received a grant. Prior research has indeed shown that ‘picking the 
winner’ strategies are not necessarily a bad choice since they may result in a ‘virtuous Matthew 
effect’ (Antonelli & Crespi, 2013). Another concern with respect to adopting a policy mix is 
that such a comprehensive R&D policy requires communication between the public authorities 
managing different measures. Especially in the case of multi-level policy-making, such as in 
our setting where federal and regional governments are responsible for different support 
frameworks, such alignment may not be trivial. 
Leaving aside feasibility issues of implementing and exploiting the policy mix, a key takeaway 
from our results is that firms seem to act purposefully if given more resources for R&D through 
a combination of different R&D support mechanisms. This insight mitigates concerns about the 
effectiveness of tax credits that have been raised in the literature, such as opportunistic 
                                                 
90 The figures have been calculated based on the database of tax credit and subsidy recipients obtained from the 
Belgian Federal Public Service Finance. 
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relabelling of expenses as research activities (Antonelli & Crespi, 2013). After all, initiating 
additional projects or tipping the R&D-balance more towards research are decisions that firms 
arguably do not take overnight and may be expected to have a lasting impact on the firm’s R&D 
processes. 
Naturally, the specific nature of our survey data presents clear limitations to the analysis. One 
caveat is that the survey relied on firms’ capacity to assess the additionality effects of tax credits 
relative to the counterfactual of not having benefited from them, an approach which may be 
prone to measurement errors. Further, we asked a very specific question and can only assess 
whether firms using the policy mix respond more strongly to wage-based tax credits, without 
allowing any judgment on the effectiveness of subsidies compared to tax credits or the 
effectiveness of any of these policies in isolation. Instead, the analysis is confined to assessing, 
conditional on an R&D tax policy being in place, whether its effects in terms of firms’ R&D 
approach can be augmented by means of a subsidy policy. Clearly, we cannot make any 
statement about whether subsidies outperform tax credits or the policy mix altogether. More 
complete data on the timing of subsidy use and on R&D active firms that do not use any form 
of support would be needed to answer such questions. 
While our results establish that subsidies affect the way tax credits are utilized, further research 
is called for to better understand the interaction effects between different policy measures. For 
example, complementary effects between policies may be related to firms’ access to external 
finance (Busom et al., 2014). Avenues for future research include the construction of larger 
datasets in order to more accurately estimate behavioural additionality effects. Such datasets 
could give us more empirical traction in estimating the optimal policy mix by using information 
on the amounts of subsidies and tax credits. This goal could be achieved by the introduction of 
additionality-related surveys in more OECD or EU countries, following the example of the 
Belgian Science Policy Office’s survey providing us with the data analysed in this paper. Such 
an international effort would also allow assessing the external validity of the results we 
presented, since the country-specific design of R&D subsidy and tax credit schemes may cause 
results not to hold across different settings. Finally, the consideration of longer time periods 
beyond the period of economic and financial turbulence that characterized our analysis would 
strengthen the generalizability of the results.  
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6 Appendix 
Table III.6 Overview of longitudinal variables 
Variable Source Year used  
R&D intensity Belspo survey Year before first tax credit use 
Employees Belfirst Year before first tax credit use 
Current ratio Belfirst Year before first tax credit use 
YIC Belfirst & Belspo survey Year before first tax credit use 
Tax leader Belspo survey Year of first tax credit use 
Tax importance Belspo survey Year of first tax credit use 
Age Belfirst Year of first tax credit use 
Group membership Amadeus Last available year 
Industry Belfirst Last available year 
Region Belfirst Last available year 
Subsidy dummies Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Years of tax credit use Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Average tax importance Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Demand pull Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Technology push Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Scale of R&D Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Speed of R&D Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
R vs D Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
Number of R&D projects Belspo survey Single value covering 2006-2010 
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Table III.7 Correlation between explanatory variables 
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R&D intensity 0.00                
Log(empl) -0.18 -0.51               
Age -0.07 -0.31 0.47              
Current ratio 0.01 0.21 -0.15 0.02             
YIC -0.02 0.52 -0.49 -0.41 0.03            
Group -0.07 -0.30 0.54 0.26 -0.15 -0.47           
Tax leader 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.03          
Tax years 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.03 0.77         
Avg tax importance -0.05 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.18        
High-tech manufacturing 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.02       
High-tech services 0.08 0.42 -0.34 -0.34 0.15 0.32 -0.28 -0.13 -0.11 0.06 -0.35      
Low-tech services -0.04 0.05 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.18 -0.24     
Demand pull -0.16 -0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.16 -0.06 0.16 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.03 -0.12 0.05    
Technology push 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.08 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 0.09 0.34   
Flanders -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.01 -0.25 -0.32 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.10  
Wallonia 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.20 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.81 
  
129 
Table III.8 Multivariate probit model (treated and matched control firms only) 
 Scale Speed R vs D Nr. of projects 
  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Subsidy dummy 0.52* (0.28) 0.48* (0.28) 0.72*** (0.27) 0.54** (0.27) 
R&D intensity 0.22 (0.51) 0.20 (0.52) -0.50 (0.49) 0.85* (0.52) 
Log(employees) -0.09 (0.11) 0.02 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11) 
Age 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Current ratio 0.02 (0.09) 0.14 (0.10) -0.15 (0.10) 0.07 (0.09) 
YIC dummy 0.00 (0.40) 0.27 (0.41) 0.59 (0.42) 0.05 (0.43) 
Group dummy -0.12 (0.29) 0.11 (0.30) -0.18 (0.28) 0.03 (0.32) 
Tax leader 0.37 (0.41) 0.12 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42) 0.52 (0.41) 
Years of tax credit use -0.09 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) -0.02 (0.14) -0.14 (0.14) 
Average tax importance -0.24 (0.51) -0.38 (0.47) -0.33 (0.51) 0.98** (0.50) 
High-tech manuf. -0.37 (0.36) -0.43 (0.36) 0.57 (0.37) 0.17 (0.36) 
High-tech serv. -0.24 (0.33) 0.04 (0.31) 0.07 (0.33) 0.06 (0.31) 
Low-tech serv. -0.28 (0.45) 0.16 (0.43) 0.23 (0.44) 0.45 (0.46) 
Demand pull 0.21 (0.35) -0.16 (0.36) -0.45 (0.39) 0.07 (0.37) 
Tech. push 0.92** (0.46) 1.26*** (0.45) 0.58 (0.66) 0.29 (0.52) 
Flanders -0.85 (0.57) -1.34* (0.77) 0.16 (0.48) -0.14 (0.53) 
Wallonia -0.59 (0.58) -0.83 (0.80) -0.20 (0.49) 0.44 (0.55) 
rho21 0.87 (0.05) 
rho31 0.62 (0.11) 
rho41 0.65 (0.11) 
rho32 0.54 (0.13) 
rho42 0.76 (0.08) 
rho43 0.55 (0.12) 
Observations 130 
Log pseudo-likelihood -252.58 
Wald test (chi²) 116.07*** 
LR test of all rho=0 (chi²) 105.92*** 
a) ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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IV. Drivers of scientists’ entry into new fields 
Abstract 
This paper analyses which individual and institutional factors encourage scientists to venture 
into research fields that are new to them. Using a ten-year panel of researchers in biomedical 
sciences and engineering from a large research university in Belgium, we find that higher 
scientific productivity and academic rank positively affect the probability of publishing in new 
fields and the degree of novelty of such change. Accounting for the endogeneity of funding, 
we also find that grants have a negative effect, driving research portfolios towards 
specialisation rather than diversification. Implications for university policy are discussed. 
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“Nature is not interested in our separations, and many 
of the interesting phenomena bridge the gaps between fields.” 
The Feynman Lectures on Physics, volume I, lecture 35, 1964 
 
“In this age of specialization, men who thoroughly know one field 
are often incompetent to discuss another.” 
Richard Feynman, Caltech lunch forum, 1956 
 
1 Introduction 
Science is known to be a risky endeavour, where payoffs in terms of scientific success are 
highly uncertain (Arrow, 1962). Given that prestige sits at the core of the scientific reward 
system and that ‘wrong turns’ in one research trajectory may have long-lasting consequences, 
scientists arguably don’t take the decision to enter a new field lightly. This paper aims to offer 
a better understanding of what motivates scientists to venture outside of familiar territory. To 
this end, we look at characteristics of the individual and her environment that influence the 
risk-reward trade-off and hence the decision to make ‘sticky entries’ into new fields, as shown 
by a scientist’s repeated publication activity in fields they were previously not active in. 
More specifically, we expect the response of a scientist to the risk-reward trade-off to depend 
on his research quality, his academic age and his track record in publications. We also study 
his past experience in entering new fields and the diversity of his research team as mechanisms 
to mitigate the risk of exploration. In addition, entry into new fields may be steered by 
institutional and policy-related factors, which establish a more or less favourable context for 
exploring new fields. Policy choices, in particular the award of grants, may be endogenous to 
new field entry as interdisciplinarity may be taken into account in funding decisions. While 
funding may grant the researchers the means to explore new territories, there is a concern that 
funding bodies are risk averse – shying away from grantees that venture outside their own 
research zone. We account for this by instrumenting the receipt of grants in our analysis. 
Our work makes the following contributions. First, we exploit unique data that matches 
scientists’ publication records with detailed administrative records from a large top research 
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university in Europe – the University of Leuven. We combine a fairly rich characterization of 
the individual scientist’s characteristics and career track with elements from her environment, 
most notably funding history to explain the scientist’s research orientation. The perspective on 
funding as a driver of research orientation departs from the usual attention in prior work on the 
impact of research funding, which is mostly concerned with analysing the effects on 
productivity and collaboration (Bozeman & Gaughan, 2007; Goldfarb, 2008; Defazio et al., 
2009; Auranen & Nieminen, 2010; Jacob & Lefgren, 2011; Grimpe, 2012; Hottenrott & 
Lawson, 2013; Kelchtermans & Veugelers, 2011, 2013; Whalley & Hicks, 2014). Conversely, 
this paper broadens the perspective by considering consequences of research grants on research 
orientation, furthering our understanding of funding mechanisms and their impact. In fact, little 
is known about what drives scientists to venture into new research areas. In one of the very few 
studies on the change in research direction due to grants, Azoulay et al. (2011) have shown that 
certain programs stimulate scientists to explore new lines of investigation within biomedical 
research, an effect strongly related to the specificity of the grant. Gush et al. (2015) find low 
impact of grants on research output in New Zealand, and argue that the low overall additionality 
effect may be due to a shift in focus of the grantees towards the subject area of the grant, in 
which a higher impact was observed. Ayoubi, Pezzoni, & Visentin (2016) study how 
researchers learn new areas from other members in their team. Learning occurs when a 
researcher cites journals that are new to her, but familiar to one of her team members. While 
they find more learning in bigger teams, they find no evidence for more learning in funded 
teams compared to non-funded ones. 
We seek to build on this emerging empirical literature by analysing to what extent and under 
what circumstances researchers explore scientific areas that are new to them and what role 
research funding plays in this decision. 
We analyse an unbalanced panel (1992-2001) of 757 researchers active in biomedical and exact 
sciences at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven) in Belgium to discover factors that are 
associated with scientists’ motivation to enter and remain active in fields that are new to them. 
While previous studies are mostly focused on a single discipline, often the life sciences 
(Azoulay et al., 2011; Li & Agha, 2015), our dataset covers a wide range of fields within the 
domains of biomedical sciences and engineering. 
We find that academics are less inclined to venture into new research fields if they obtain 
funding, and also that entry happens in fields more similar to the ones in which they have prior 
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experience. Moreover, we show that rank and productivity play a positive role in 
diversification, as do higher numbers of PhD graduates that a scientist supervises. On the other 
hand, seniority seems to lead to specialisation, which, combined with the opposite effect of 
academic rank, implies that the positive effect is mostly present when higher-ranked scholars 
start their employment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the basic reasons 
why there is a trade-off between risk and reward in science, and puts forward a number of 
individual and institutional features that are expected to impact that trade-off and influence the 
decision to venture into new fields. Section 3 discusses the data and operationalizes the 
variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Entry in new fields and the risk-reward trade-off 
Choosing a risky road in one’s own research direction involves trading off the lure of important 
breakthroughs for the cost of a higher risk of failing. The alternative of a beaten path avoids 
the higher risk of failure, but at the cost of lower chances for a breakthrough. 
A number of intrinsic scientific knowledge-related reasons explain why research trajectories 
that have more potential for ground-breaking work also carry a higher risk. Literature on 
creative thinking has as a central tenet the fact that creativity, which is arguably underlying any 
major breakthrough in science, requires one to break away from prior experience (Simonton, 
1999; Audia & Goncalo, 2007). A similar insight emerges from prior work that has looked at 
technological search as a process of recombination, such as the work of Fleming (2001) and 
Verhoeven, Bakker, & Veugelers (2016). They find that new combinations of knowledge 
components, while leading to less useful patented inventions on average, also come with 
increased variability in citation performance. Recent empirical evidence confirms the higher 
risks associated with novel research for the case of scientific output. For example, highly 
innovative scientific papers, making new combinations in cited knowledge sources, usually 
end up either in the high-end or low-end citation spectrum, and comparatively less often in the 
centre of the citation distribution (Azoulay et al., 2011; Stephan, Veugelers, & Wang, 2016). 
To the extent that making new combinations of knowledge components is associated with 
venturing outside one’s own field to be able to make such new combinations, broadening the 
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scope of research implies that a researcher will face a higher risk. Deciding on whether to enter 
new fields and how far away they should be from their past research involves a risk-reward 
trade-off. In other words, while there may be an exceptional payoff associated with boundary 
crossing, there is no certainty that one’s existing expertise will be applicable in the new field 
or whether any productive cross-fertilization will take place. This concern is particularly acute 
for ‘long jumps’ to more remote fields, given that the way science is done differs substantially 
across areas (Becher, 1994). 
The investment needed to become familiar with findings and techniques from fields outside 
one’s core expertise come with an opportunity cost, in the form of foregone further 
specialisation within one’s core fields. The ever-growing reservoir of knowledge, while 
acknowledged as a key foundation for economic growth, is a mixed blessing for scientists. In 
particular, it creates an accumulating educational burden to stay abreast of the findings in one’s 
domain and it has been argued that they may respond with increased specialization. Jones 
(2009) found evidence that specialization has increased over time for technology inventors that 
received patents from the USPTO between 1963 and 1999, measured by the probability of 
switching technological areas between consecutive patent applications.91 
There are other institutional reasons that may affect the risk-reward trade-off a researcher faces 
when contemplating charting into unknown territory. In particular, economics of science 
literature has argued that the competition that is an inherent feature of the scientific reward 
system induces scientists to pursue similar research strategies, that is, “researchers tend to be 
drawn into duplicative races” (Dasgupta & David, 1994, p. 507). The ‘all or nothing’ feature 
of scientific races may hold back a scientist from entering new fields in order to avoid the 
‘nothing’. But at the same time, it might prompt the researcher to enter new fields and vie for 
a breakthrough. Second, the governance model of academic institutions may interact with 
individual scientists’ research orientation decisions. It is well documented that research 
evaluation based on bibliometric measures has become institutionalized in many 
establishments. Geuna (2001) already observed that many European universities had adopted 
a contract-oriented approach to funding, which includes an emphasis on research output. This 
                                                 
91 Our data on scientists in biomedical sciences and engineering, using a similar measure of diversification, confirm 
to some extent this long-run trend for scientific output, as we see that the average number of publications in new 
(to the researcher) fields drops in our sample between 1992 and 2001 from 0.69 to 0.48. 
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evolution has provoked comments that the aim for scientific productivity may cause the science 
system to compromise other important values like diversity and novelty of research (Hicks, 
2012; Alberts et al., 2014). Recently, the debate seems to have intensified, several stakeholders 
of the science system pondering the implications of a metrics-based approach to research 
evaluation and funding. For example, Bruce Alberts, the former editor-in-chief of Science 
argued that the use of impact factors to assess researchers’ quality encourages ‘me-too science’ 
(Alberts, 2013). The argument is that the use of short term bibliometric indicators to evaluate 
individual scientists will drive them away from riskier trajectories. In other words, to the extent 
that classic bibliometric indicators bias against risky novel research (Stephan et al., 2016), the 
evolution towards metrics-based systems of research evaluation may not be helpful to 
encourage scientists to venture outside of their turf, but the contrary. Heavy reliance on 
bibliometric indicators may partially explain the perception that funding agencies and their 
expert panels are increasingly risk-averse. Selection procedures are accused of encouraging 
relatively safe projects which exploit existing knowledge at the expense of novel projects that 
explore untested approaches (Alberts, 2013; Walsh, 2013). Our paper ties into these concerns 
by considering the effect of grants on scientists’ choices to publish in fields that are new to 
them, rather than funding’s impact on scientific productivity in the classical sense. 
2.2 Factors affecting the decision to enter new fields 
Assessment of the risk-reward trade-off when considering to enter new scientific fields – that 
are also dissimilar from a researcher’s track record – will vary among individuals and research 
environments. In this section we take a look at which characteristics of the individual and of 
his environment will influence his choice to venture into a new scientific field. 
Taste for risk 
A first intuitive factor is an individual’s intrinsic risk aversion. Generally speaking, risk-averse 
scholars will mostly specialize in established areas (Jones, 2009), while those with a taste for 
risk will innovate more and possibly fail more in the process. The basic premise underlying our 
paper is that, while a scientist may have an idiosyncratic taste for risk, her attitude towards the 
risk-reward trade-off will be determined by her individual characteristics and the institutional 
context that shapes her research strategy. We consider taste for risk or experimentation to be 
ground zero in determining one’s portfolio diversification, as other characteristics will build 
upon it and establish the overall profile of scientist Lambda. 
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Seniority  
Whether a scientist chooses to engage in research that is dissimilar from what she has a proven 
track record in starts off with how comfortable she is with making such changes. But ‘comfort’ 
will arguably evolve during her tenure, as experience in a research environment plays an 
important part in professional choices. As such, senior scholars with a proven track record may 
have more appetite to explore new fields that may also be more different from what they are 
used to because they can afford to take more risk, ‘riding the wave’ of past career achievements. 
On the other hand, the ‘experience trap’ can lead them to continue the same research lines they 
are familiar with and that have proven efficient in the past. Junior scholars may behave in the 
opposite way: unburdened by an established reputation in a given field, they have more 
freedom to explore and stray farther away from their main research. Conversely, expectations 
to prove themselves in a relatively short time span may keep junior scientists within a well-
defined research area without much incentives for excursions into new fields. 
Life cycle effects may also be at play: the finite time horizon may not only induce more senior 
researchers to have less incentives to produce scientific output (Levin & Stephan, 1991), but 
may at the same time reduce the appetite to invest in mastering new fields, especially if the 
returns from these risky investments take a longer time to materialize and if the new fields are 
very different from their primary work. 
Academic rank 
Correlated with seniority, academic rank may affect the individual scientist’s diversification 
decision. Whereas experience and seniority flow (almost) unrestricted, career advancement 
through rankings involves more red tape, evaluations and proven track records. For junior 
researchers, the ‘carrot’ of promotion may be a driver to bet on the riskier road towards higher 
probabilities for breakthroughs and consequent promotion. Moreover, research flexibility may 
be well regarded in early career stages, when juniors tend to be hired based on potential rather 
than track record. On the other hand, researchers having reached higher ranks may be missing 
this taste for risk-taking and venturing into uncharted waters. 
Conversely, junior researchers may be more cautious and choose a less risky path, assuring 
performance, if the promotion process is not favourable to risk-taking and relies on bibliometric 
indicators focused on measuring short term success. Then, having reached the highest academic 
rank may result in a less risk-averse attitude and a greater appetite to enter new fields, being 
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freed from the constraints of assuring performance for promotion. The bucket list only gets 
bigger throughout one’s tenure, and, as they reach their career goals, time comes to cross off 
those eminent ‘paper ideas’ that have been put off because of constant pressure to perform. 
Quality and productivity 
No matter where they are or how they feel about taking risks in their careers, some scientists 
may simply be more productive in publishing their research. While publishing more, they may 
also create more novel ideas (Simonton, 2003). They may have the talent to recognize new 
approaches and navigate through the risks of combining their established skills in one field 
with learning new ones, avoiding the pitfalls and bringing them to breakthrough success 
(Stephan et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, talented researchers with a thick track record face a higher opportunity cost 
when venturing into new fields. Past success can lead to path-dependency, ‘riding the wave’ 
patterns guaranteeing constant streams of publications (Audia & Goncalo, 2007). They are like 
Olympic athletes facing the choice of focusing on defending their titles or going for more glory. 
They face the choice of being the Michael Phelps or the Clara Hughes of academia; they can 
choose to specialise and be the most decorated summer Olympians or diversify and be one of 
only a handful to win medals at both summer and winter Games. 
Past entry and scope of scientific fields covered 
Unlike sports, the academic choice of whether to specialise or diversify does not come once 
every four years. Throughout their careers, researchers’ portfolios will vary in depth and width 
– or productivity and diversity. Their history of venturing into new fields will influence their 
propensity to do so in the future. It is a testimony of their attitude towards risk and of the 
variation in intrinsic ability to spread across scientific fields. At the same time, experience from 
a larger scope of research allows them to exploit more synergies when venturing into new fields 
that are farther away from (scientific) home. On the other hand, because there is a limited 
number of research areas someone can publish in, past entry into new fields can also capture a 
saturation effect, where a scientist is less prone to enter new areas because she has already 
spanned the full spectrum of her individual portfolio. 
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Co-author network 
So far our discussion has focused on individual characteristics that play a role in research 
behaviour. Arguably, with few exceptions – economics being one of them – research is not a 
one-(wo)man show anymore. Science is being performed in ever larger teams due to, among 
others, the increasing burden of knowledge and easier long-distance communication (Wuchty, 
Jones, & Uzzi, 2007; Jones, Wuchty, & Uzzi, 2008; Agrawal, McHale, & Oettl, 2013). An 
extreme example of the increasing size of research teams was observed with the discovery of 
the Higgs Boson in 2012, which was made by two independent CERN92 teams, each 
comprising several hundred scientists. The implication of having a large network of co-authors 
for one’s own research agenda is that such collaborations may provide a stepping stone for the 
individual researcher to enter new fields. Team interaction should allow for learning from each 
other’s expertise (Ayoubi et al., 2016). Learning that comes from partnering with other 
researchers who are specialized in different fields may nudge the scientist to venture into new 
fields too (Lee, Walsh, & Wang, 2015). Moreover, diverse teams will be better catalysers for 
experimentation, while mono-disciplinary teams may trap scientists into continuing to do more 
of the same research. 
Funding 
The question to what extent funding encourages researchers to venture into previously 
uncharted territory is important because acquiring funding is central to performing research 
and can have a big impact on research agendas. Specifically, there are several mechanisms 
through which funding may incite researchers to go into – or avoid – new directions. 
First, funding allows scientists to allocate resources to research avenues they want to exploit. 
Particularly if a grant is substantial and with a long timeframe, and if it is funding the researcher 
rather than a specific project, it allows her to go into new directions. This is why, as argued and 
demonstrated by Azoulay et al. (2011), HHMI93 grants, in contrast to other type of funding, 
had positive effects on the novelty of the research produced ex post. 
Furthermore, funding may affect the direction of research ex ante. Being involved in the 
competition for grants may lead researchers to enter fields they were previously not active in. 
                                                 
92 The European Organization for Nuclear Research. 
93 The Howard Hughes Medical Institute. 
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The competitive nature of the funding process may push researchers to come up with novel 
elements to convince review panels that the proposed research is worthy of funding. A proposal 
that promises to bring together insights from different fields may have the cutting edge required 
to beat the competition. This stimulus effect from funding holds the more the funding selection 
criteria focus on high-risk / high-gain, as in the case of the HHMI grants or the more recent 
ERC94 grants. 
Conversely, one can think of reasons why funding may blunt scientists’ willingness to venture 
into new fields. One reason is that performance-based funding systems award grants by 
considering past research performance, typically measured using classic bibliometric indicators 
which focus on short term impact (Jonkers & Zacharewicz, 2016; Wang, Stephan and 
Veugelers, 2016). Funding agencies may therefore be inclined to fund those proposals where 
the researcher and her team have a proven capacity to deliver results. These are the low-risk 
modes where the researcher continues on his existing path. Boudreau et al. (2012) analyse the 
role of novelty in research projects’ evaluation by experts and find a penalty for novel proposals 
that deviate from existing research paradigms. Similarly, Banal-Estañol et al. (2016) show that 
more radical teams are less likely to be funded by the EPSRC95 in the UK, but they find no 
correlation between the likelihood of receiving a grant and the interdisciplinary profile of 
individual researchers. While we do not consider novelty at project level and we study the 
impact on the individual researcher rather than the funding decision itself, this result suggests 
that scientists concerned about a steady funding stream may become locked-in in a field. Such 
path-dependency may have long-term effects on researchers’ careers. Grants may impose 
expectations on the scientist in terms of delivering results, acting as an incentive to stay on 
familiar ground rather than experiment. 
The effect that funding may have on research direction has been mostly analysed in studies that 
considered the effects of industry grants on academic research. Florida & Cohen (1999) argue 
that collaboration with industry can have an impact on the choice of research topics, and as 
such may shift academic agendas from basic towards more applied science, which was 
confirmed by empirical studies in Norway (Gulbrandsen & Smeby, 2005) and the US (Glenna 
et al., 2011). More recently, Banal-Estañol et al. (2015) find evidence that grants received for 
                                                 
94 European Research Council. 
95 Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. 
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collaborating with industry increases academics’ output of applied research papers, while 
general external grants increase the number of basic research publications. Banal-Estañol et al. 
(2013) show that scientists with an affinity for more applied research are a better match to 
collaborate with firms, but also that firms can use incentives in order to collaborate with 
scientists with an affinity towards basic research. In our paper, we only observe two related 
funding schemes of the Research Fund of the University of Leuven. In terms of scope, these 
grants make up a quarter of research funding at the university and are overwhelmingly 
attributed for basic scientific research. Industry grants, which we do not observe, represent an 
almost equal amount and may well drive research towards applied areas. We thus acknowledge 
that there is a possibility of ‘hidden treatment’ effects due to the unobserved impact that other 
types of grants may have on research behaviour. Nevertheless, we develop our empirical 
strategy in order to mitigate to the best extent possible any bias due to this effect.  
Methodologically, taking into account selection effects when analysing the impact of funding 
on research direction is crucial if one wants to identify the true effects of funding on new field 
entry decisions. Given the aforementioned shift towards performance-based funding systems 
(Stephan, 2012), productivity and track record in entering new fields is one – but not the only, 
as discussed further below – factor to take into account when addressing the selection of who 
receives funding. 
3 Data 
Our data match scientists’ publication profiles with detailed administrative records from a large 
university in Europe. The University of Leuven is the largest university in Belgium. It is a 
research-intensive, internationally-oriented university, consistently within the top 100 
universities in world research rankings.96 
We observe a data set of 757 researchers active in biomedical and exact sciences between 1992 
and 2001 at the University of Leuven.97 The data comprises individual and career-related 
characteristics, such as gender, age, year of employment at the university, full-time 
employment status, career age, rank, teaching duties, and a type of research grants received 
                                                 
96 www.kuleuven.be/research. 
97 The data comprises the population of scientists in biomedical and exact sciences employed by KU Leuven 
between 1992-2001. We only observe scientists who publish at least once in that period, resulting in 5,009 
observations. For the 757 active scientists we constructed full publication records while they are affiliated to the 
University of Leuven, including publications before 1992, from the Thomson ISI Web of Science (WoS). 
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from the university.98 We complement this data with publication and citation numbers and 
scientific fields from Thomson ISI Web of Science (WoS).99 
3.1 Dependent variables: entry into new scientific fields 
We define entry into new research fields by first constructing, for each researcher, an indicator 
with the value one whenever a scientist publishes in a field in which she hasn’t published 
before,100 and follows-up with at least another publication in that field in subsequent years.101 
The latter means that we require a new field entry to achieve a minimum level of ‘stickiness’ 
and excludes a one-time only excursion into another field.102 
To do so, we use historical publication data from Thomson ISI dating back to 1971 in order to 
accurately depict the fields in which each scientist has published in every year. The taxonomy 
of scientific fields defined in WoS has 247 unique fields, shown in Table IV.4 in Appendix. 
The fields cover all domains of science – science, social sciences, arts & humanities – and are 
attributed to journals and other publications. The researchers in our sample publish in 216 of 
these fields throughout their careers at the University of Leuven.103 
Since some fields have many sub-classifications (e.g. chemistry is subdivided into analytical, 
applied, inorganic & nuclear) while others do not (e.g. microbiology is not further subdivided), 
usage of the complete taxonomy would imply that almost all entries in a subfield are classified 
as a ‘new field entry’. In order to deal with this and remaining imbalances in the WoS taxonomy 
that may affect our measure of field entry, i.e. some fields may be more narrow than others 
                                                 
98 The construction of the data set is described in Kelchtermans & Veugelers (2005). 
99 In order to retrieve each researcher’s publication history, we have performed searches by name and affiliation at 
the University of Leuven. For the latter, we used the Organization-Enhanced field provided by Thomson Reuters, 
which links all possible variations of an organisation’s name found in WoS publications. The search term ‘KU 
Leuven’ captures all the different names used in publications to refer to the university of Leuven; we also added 
the search term ‘University Hospital Leuven’ to retrieve all publications by scientists affiliated to the university’s 
medical departments. 
100 We take into account the following types of publications: ‘Article’, ‘Article; Book Chapter’, ‘Article; 
Proceedings Paper’, ‘Letter’, ‘Meeting Abstract’, ‘Note’, ‘Proceedings Paper’, ‘Review’. 
101 The first-ever publication while at KU Leuven is not counted as a new field entry.  
102 This restriction also partially addresses the concern that a field entry may be due to co-authorships. While this is 
not a problem per se, it exaggerates new field entry for the focal scientist if the co-author simply supplies own 
expertise without there being much interaction between co-authors.  
103 Researchers’ publication records were retrieved from WoS using name and, to avoid false matches due to 
homonyms, affiliation. While we took into account spelling variations in both names and affiliation, the retrieved 
publications are restricted to those where the scientist mentions her University of Leuven affiliation. Although 
this may imply incomplete coverage of publication records, mobility of researchers is known to be very limited, 
especially in the time period we consider and it is reasonable to assume that the publication records are generally 
accurate. 
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and/or may differ less from neighbouring fields, we construct an alternative dependent variable. 
For each scientist, we define in each year t the maximum dissimilarity or distance between her 
main field – in which she published most before year t – and all new fields that she enters in 
year t. 
We first calculate a yearly cosine similarity matrix between fields based on cross-citations 
between journals and their respective scientific fields attributed by Thomson Reuters.104 
Dissimilarity between each field pair is then defined as (1-similarity), and pairs of fields which 
are completely dissimilar have a distance value of one.105 We finally calculate our dependent 
variable as the maximum dissimilarity or distance between each researcher’s main field prior 
to year t and all fields that he publishes in for the first time in t (and at least once more 
afterwards). 
Overall, the yearly average number of fields a researcher publishes in is 4.44 in the 1992-2001 
period, while the average maximum number of fields per scientist and per year is 7.43. Three 
quarters of researchers enter new scientific fields at least once in the ten-year period, and the 
average maximum distance to new fields is 0.28, indicating that exploration happens mostly in 
closely related fields. However, the standard deviation of the maximum distance variable is 
0.42, indicating a fair amount of variation between scientists. 
Table IV.1 illustrates in its left panel the variation in entry percentages and overall number of 
new fields, and maximum distances and sum of distances to new fields in the right panel. The 
between-variation shows how much average behaviour differs from one scientist to another, 
while the within-variation illustrates individual behavioural differences across time. We 
observe that overall, both the entry indicators and the distances to new fields vary more across 
time than between scientists. 
                                                 
104 For example, the most similar scientific fields in 1992 were ‘Remote Sensing’ and ‘Imaging Science & Photo 
Technology’, with a cosine similarity value of 0.692. The least similar in the same year (with a non-zero cosine 
value) are ‘Astronomy & Astrophysics’ and ‘Biochemistry & Molecular Biology’. In 2002, ‘Cell Biology’ and 
‘Biochemistry & ‘Molecular Biology’ are most similar, while ‘Astronomy & Astrophysics’ and ‘Health Policy & 
Services’ are farthest apart. 
105 See Zhang et al. (2010) and Stephan, Veugelers, & Wang (2016) for a technical description of cosine calculation. 
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Table IV.1 Variation in field entry rates and distances from main fields 
  Mean s.d.   Mean s.d. 
Entry in new fields overall 0.30 0.46 Maximum distance overall 0.28 0.42 
 between  0.27  between  0.25 
 within  0.39  within  0.36 
Sum of new fields overall 0.55 1.07 Sum distances overall 0.64 1.71 
 between  0.60  between  0.86 
 within  0.91  within  1.50 
Looking closer at different entry patterns per main discipline in Table IV.6 in Appendix, we 
notice that Agriculture and Biology researchers are, on average, more prone to enter new fields 
in the observation period.106 Researchers in these disciplines publish in new fields 40.3% and 
37% of the time respectively, while, for example, the rate among mathematicians is 19%. 
Engineers and agriculture researchers have the highest averages of number of new fields 
entered per scientist and per year, at 0,76 and 0,79 respectively. Similarly, scientists with 
agriculture or biology as main disciplines stray farthest away from their fields when entering 
new ones, followed by engineers. 
As the large standard deviations in Table IV.1 already indicate, there is still substantial 
heterogeneity within disciplines. As an example, Figure IV.1 displays the cumulative number 
of field entries of four bioscientists which are, to improve comparability, part of the post-1992 
entry cohort. Different patterns occur: zero variation, modest and strong increase in the stock 
of field entries at low and high levels of output.107 
  
                                                 
106 The classification of disciplines was developed by the Centre for Research & Development Monitoring 
(ECOOM) from the University of Leuven, independently from the Web of Science field classification. It 
distinguishes among 13 main disciplines, shown in Table IV.5 in Appendix. A researcher’s main discipline is 
defined as the one in which she has the majority of her publications. Including it in the analysis allows controlling 
for both the fact that it may be ‘easier’ to enter new fields due to imbalances in the field taxonomy, as well as for 
different propensities between disciplines to enter new fields, e.g. due to scientific opportunities.  
107 Note that scientists enter the analysis from the moment they become professors at KU Leuven. Since we track 
their prior publications (as PhD & post-doc) the stock of field entries typically does not start at zero. 
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Figure IV.1 Cumulative number of new field entries for 4 bioscientists 
 
3.2 Covariates 
In this section we define the variables capturing the factors driving a researcher’s venture into 
new fields that were discussed in section 2.2. The numbers we refer to are present in Table IV.7 
in Appendix, unless stated otherwise. 
We control for seniority through the number of years each person has been employed at the 
University of Leuven at least as an assistant professor. The average seniority in the sample is 
8.91 years, with a standard deviation of 7.83. In Table IV.8 in Appendix we can observe that 
junior researchers – which have been employed at least at assistant professor level for at most 
seven years (the median value in our sample) – are on average more probable to enter new 
fields than senior scientists, and they also enter more new fields (0.63 versus 0.48 new fields 
entered per year). 
To capture the talent of the researchers, we include a pre-sample measure of quality of research 
by dividing the average number of citations per publication before 1992 for each researcher by 
the average number of citations per publication in her main field in the entire Web of Science 
in 1991. The quality of her average pre-1992 publications is benchmarked to the world average 
research quality. 
To capture researchers’ track record of publishing, we compute a yearly productivity measure 
based on the scientists’ comparative performance with colleagues who are active in the same 
main discipline using k-means clustering. We construct three mutually-exclusive binary 
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indicators capturing the productivity cluster a scientist is in at each time period – low, medium 
and high productivity – considering the best performance over all disciplines she is active in. 
In the third panel of Table IV.8 in Appendix we observe that scientists in the medium and high 
productivity clusters enter more often new fields than the low-productivity group, with high 
performers almost twice as likely to do so than low performers. Moreover, the former also enter 
fields that are less similar to their main field. 
To assess the impact of academic rank, we create binary indicators capturing whether a 
researcher is assistant professor, associate professor, professor or full professor in any given 
year. About one third of our researchers are assistant professors (30.4%). Panel 4 of Table IV.8 
in Appendix illustrates the differences in entry behaviour by rank. We observe the differences 
are small in terms of entry in new fields, the average entry rate varying between 29.2% and 
31.4% sequentially from lowest to highest rank. Similarly, the number of new fields entered 
during the sample period does not vary significantly. The difference is slightly larger in terms 
of maximum distance between new and main fields, more senior ranks adventuring farther than 
junior ones. 
We next include the stock of fields in which the researcher has published. This variable counts 
the number of scientific fields each person has published in over their entire observed history 
up to one year before the current period. To the extent this reveals past entry decisions, it 
reflects appetite and experience in venturing outside of one’s scientific comfort zone, which 
would have a more positive inclination to diversify into new areas. It may also reflect a larger 
scope for synergy effects. Conversely, as there is a limited number of feasible research areas 
someone can publish in, the stock effect may have diminishing effects. 
To measure the size of a scientist’s co-author network, we count the number of her co-authors 
in the previous year. The average scholar in our sample has 13.61 co-authors per year, with a 
standard deviation of 19.75. The relatively high numbers are mostly driven by a couple of 
disciplines – Biosciences and Clinical and Experimental Medicine. Researchers with more co-
authors than the median in our sample enter new fields more often than those under the median, 
and they also venture farther in terms of maximum distance from their main field, as can be 
seen in panel 6 of Table IV.8 in Appendix. 
We also look at the disciplinary composition of networks by adding a variable measuring the 
percentage of co-authors that are mostly active in the same main discipline as the academic. 
On average, 41% of co-authors register most of their publishing activity in the same discipline 
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as the focal researcher, with the highest values present among Clinical and Experimental 
Medicine authors. We also compute the percentage of co-authors with the same funding status 
as the focal scientist – that is, if the scientist has (not) received a grant, we calculate the 
percentage of her co-authors that have (not) received grants. Furthermore, we control for the 
number of PhD graduates each scholar coordinated during the year in order to capture whether 
having a larger pool of disciples increases one’s inclination of publishing in new fields: would 
PhDs be a bridge for incumbent senior advisors to be more adventurous or, on the contrary, are 
they a source of path dependency? If doctoral students are engaged in projects that the senior 
scientist has started prior to hiring PhDs, the propensity to enter new fields would be negatively 
affected by the variable. The average number of doctoral graduates per researcher and per year 
is 0.34 with a standard deviation of 0.52. 
A number of other control variables are included, such as teaching duties. Academics with 
more teaching hours may have less incentives, given their restricted research time, to enter new 
fields, and so they will publish more in their established areas in order to reach evaluation goals 
based on productivity. We control for the amount of teaching by the average number of 
teaching hours per week. This variable captures the actual teaching load, i.e. we do not count 
teaching hours that are outsourced. The average researcher teaches 3.87 hours per week. 
We also observe whether scholars are employed full-time at the university as a binary indicator. 
We observe that 90% of researchers are full-time employees. This can influence research 
portfolios in two ways. First, we expect a negative effect on entry in new fields for people that 
only work part-time at the university and the rest of their time is spent on other employment 
contracts unrelated to scientific research. Second, a positive impact would show up for 
researchers that are part-time at KU Leuven, but are also employed at other research 
institutions, giving them access to larger networks of peers and creative ideas. As we do not 
have detailed data on the amount of employment nor the activities external to the university, 
the effect captured by the binary indicator will depend on the average impact over all scientists 
in the sample. Next, we include a binary indicator signalling whether a scientist starts her 
contract with the university in or after 1992 to capture a hike in hiring that year and the fact 
that we do not observe full employment history for hirings prior to that date. This variable also 
corrects for new entrants in the sample for which we have less observations to calculate stocks. 
A major factor of interest in our analysis is the funding status of researchers. Does funding 
make researchers more or less likely to venture into new scientific fields? 
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The funding scheme we observe is the University of Leuven’s Research Fund (BOF), which 
represents a quarter of all research grants available at the university. The fund is financed by 
the Flemish government and its size is determined by the university’s share in the overall 
Flemish quantity and quality of scientific publications. The university decides autonomously 
on how to allocate these funds to its researchers. To this end, it has established a Research 
Council that organises a competitive, international peer review assessment of the projects and 
the track records of applicants. Of the pre-screened proposals that are allowed to enter the 
competition, less than half obtain funding. Grants vary between 475,000 Euros for individual 
research grants and 1,625,000 Euros for research teams. Grants can last either four or five years, 
depending on the grant’s type. In our sample, 314 researchers receive grants at least once, and 
the average number of funded researchers per year is 165. 
Table IV.2 shows that funded researchers have a significantly higher likelihood than non-
funded researchers to publish in new fields that are also less similar to their main fields. This 
positive correlation between funding and exploration may be driven by the selection process 
of the Research Council, as grant winners may also be ex ante more likely to be the types that 
venture into new fields, rather than funding leading them to venture into new fields ex post. 
Table IV.2 Publication patterns by funding status (t-tests) 
 Mean t-test 
 Funded Not Funded t p > t 
Entry in new fields 0.37 0.27 7.01 0.00 
Sum of new fields 0.70 0.49 6.37 0.00 
Maximum distance 0.34 0.25 6.90 0.00 
Sum of distances 0.77 0.59 3.32 0.00 
Sum of fields 6.69 3.67 24.87 0.00 
Stock of fields 17.91 12.09 21.99 0.00 
Table IV.9 in Appendix illustrates the different profiles of funded and non-funded researchers. 
The former are more likely to be in the medium (45% to 28%) and high (21% to 10%) 
productivity clusters. Their score is also significantly higher on the pre-1992 quality of 
research. These numbers confirm that funding is granted mostly based on research 
performance. Grant receivers have, on average, higher ranks (professor and full professor) than 
the control group, while also being more senior, on average, by 2 years. The network of 
researchers that receive grants contains, on average, 22.62 co-authors, compared to 10.57 for 
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non-funded scholars, although the difference is smaller in terms of percentage of co-authors 
with the same main discipline – 51% to 36%. 
Overall, these statistics confirm the importance of correcting for the selection process of the 
grant in order to assess the impact of funding on the likelihood of entry into new fields. Our 
empirical specification, detailed in the following section, will deal with this issue. 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Method 
Our empirical strategy needs to take into account a few specificities of the data. As there are a 
number of researchers having multiple entries in new fields in a year, we use a binary indicator 
on whether or not a researcher has entered a new field as our main dependent variable. Second, 
we test whether the effects are similar if we take into account the dissimilarity of newly-entered 
fields with a researcher’s main field via a continuous variable defined on the [0; 1] interval. 
Third, we instrument grant receipt in order to account for its endogeneity. 
In order to maintain comparability between different specifications, we estimate a linear 
probability model and we formally define the following equation (omitting researcher 
subscripts for ease of exposition): 
𝒀𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕(𝒕−𝟐) + ∑ 𝜷𝒌𝒙𝒌(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜺   ( 1 ) 
Yt indicates in a first instance whether a scientist enters new fields in year t, and in a second 
estimation denotes the maximum dissimilarity between the fields she enters in t and her main 
field prior to t. xk is the vector of k individual characteristics described in section 3.2.  
We lag all time-varying covariates by one year in order to mitigate endogeneity arising from 
simultaneity. For received funding we use a two-year lag because we expect that, once a grant 
is awarded, it takes time between the start of a research project and publishing its results. We 
subsequently test the robustness of our results when considering different lags of funding. 
Receiving a grant may be endogenous with respect to entering new fields – exploration may be 
evaluated positively by the funding panel. However, the opposite argument can also be made 
– funding tends to reward a proven track record in a field. Proposals that would typically 
continue the proven research trajectory will be more likely to be granted, due to risk averseness 
and/or a ‘winner picking’ attitude of the funding panel. Either way, funding may not only steer 
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scientists’ research orientation, but there may be reverse causality with the (intention to) move 
into new research directions affecting the probability to receive funding. In addition, un- or 
imperfectly controlled heterogeneity, like research talent, may be driving both the funding 
decision and the decision to enter new fields. Therefore, we instrument the funding status 
variable with the percentage of peers who share the same main discipline with the focal 
researcher and who obtained grants in the same period. The instrument is individual-specific 
and correlated with the probability to get funding – positively, to the extent that it signals 
available budget; or negatively, if it implies that successful peers reduce one’s own chances of 
securing the funding. 
4.2 Results 
Table IV.3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) through different procedures. 
Columns a and b report OLS estimates for the model with a binary dependent variable denoting 
entry in new fields, excluding and including a funding indicator, respectively; column c reports 
the coefficients estimated through two-stage least squares (2SLS), where in the first stage we 
instrument the funding indicator with the percentage of peers who are active in the same main 
discipline with the focal researcher and who obtained grants the same period.108 Similarly, the 
second panel (columns d to f) reports the determinants of the maximum distance (dissimilarity) 
between newly entered fields and a scientist’s main field. 
  
                                                 
108 The excluded instrument is relevant in the sense that its first-stage impact on grant receipt is significant at 1% 
level (coef. 0.350; s.e. 0.065), and the F-test has a value of 29.08 with p < 0.001. The validity of the instrument 
rests on our assumption that the average funding rate of a scholar’s peers (active in the same discipline) is 
correlated the scholar’s own probability of receiving a grant, but uncorrelated with her decision to publish in fields 
she hasn’t published in before. 
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Table IV.3 OLS and 2SLS estimations of determinants of entry in new fields 
 New field entry t (0/1) Maximum distance t 
 OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
 a b c d e f 
Grant t-2  0.035* -0.484**  0.031* -0.542*** 
  (0.021) (0.218)  (0.019) (0.210) 
Seniority t-1 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Quality pre-92 -0.001 -0.002 0.015 0.000 -0.001 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
High productivity cluster t-1 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) 
Medium productivity cluster t-1 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.103*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.096*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) 
Associate professor t-1 0.028 0.025 0.074** 0.024 0.021 0.075** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) 
Professor t-1 0.067** 0.062** 0.144*** 0.056** 0.051* 0.143*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.049) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Full professor t-1 0.116*** 0.108*** 0.231*** 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.233*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.068) (0.036) (0.036) (0.066) 
Co-authors t-1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Co-authors same disc. t-1 -0.043** -0.046** -0.004 -0.044** -0.046** 0.000 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) 
Co-authors same grant status t-1 0.036 0.038* 0.007 0.036* 0.038* 0.004 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) 
PhD graduates t-1 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.055*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.057*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) 
Stock of fields t-1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Start after 1992 0.025 0.026 0.011 0.017 0.018 0.001 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) 
Gender (m) 0.028 0.029 0.011 0.028 0.029 0.009 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) 
Full-time t-1 0.005 0.002 0.058 0.003 0.000 0.063 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.038) 
Teaching t-1 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 5009 
Researchers 757 
Anderson under-id   28.21***   28.21*** 
a) Intercept and discipline dummies estimated but not shown in table. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by researcher in parentheses. 
c) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
While we found a positive correlation between funding and entry in the descriptive statistics, 
this positive correlation seems to be driven by selection. When we do not control for selection 
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into funding, we find a positive effect (significant at 10% level) of funding on the probability 
to enter new fields (column b). When instrumented in the 2SLS estimation, the effect of funding 
is negative and significant at 5% level.109 The size of the estimated coefficient implies that 
researchers that receive grants from the university’s Research Council have a 48% lower 
probability of entering new fields two years after having received a grant compared to those 
that are not funded. Furthermore, columns e and f show that the same effects take place on how 
far away (from their main research) scientists venture when publishing in new fields. Receiving 
a grant is negatively (-0.542) and significantly (at 1% level) correlated with publishing in new 
fields that are less similar to the field where a scholar has published most in the past. These 
combined results support the hypothesis that this particular grant acts as a specialisation rather 
than a diversification tool. 
Concerning the other independent variables, we find that the probability to enter new fields and 
the distance between them and the main field decrease with academic seniority. However, once 
correcting for academic age, we find that higher-ranked academics are more probable to 
publish in new fields that are also more distant. This shows that climbing the academic ladder 
has a significantly positive effect, rendering researchers less risk-averse and seeking to 
diversify their portfolios, possibly due to less achievement pressure that marks an early career. 
The effect is a 7.4% increase in the (linear) probability to enter new fields for associated 
professors, 14.4% for professors and 23.1% for full professors. 
Productivity also drives experimentation, as shown by the positive and significant (at 1%) 
coefficients of the indicators for medium and high productivity clusters. This effect becomes 
stronger in the 2SLS results. Compared to academics in the low productivity group, those in 
the medium cluster have 10.3% higher chances of entering new fields, while those in the high 
productivity group 9.8% more. However, the pre-sample quality indicator is not significant at 
10% level, which implies that the positive link between productivity and risk-taking is stronger 
over short periods, rather than reflecting a more permanent talent effect. The results are similar 
concerning the distance from his main field that a researcher ‘travels’ to enter new fields. 
                                                 
109 The first-stage results in the first column of Table IV.10 in Appendix indicate that talent (Qualitypre-92) is an 
important determinant of receiving a grant. However, this is the full extent of conclusions we can reach regarding 
selection into funding, as the two-year funding lag precedes the one-year lag of all other covariates with the 
exception of talent. 
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Having more co-authors does not significantly increase entry in new fields but it does positively 
affect the distance of those entered from one’s main field, although the magnitude of the effect 
is small, around 0.1% for each extra co-author. Having more PhD graduates increases the 
probability by 5.5% but also the distance between fields. This result points towards an 
interesting avenue for increasing diversification of portfolios by raising the number of doctoral 
students. 
On the other hand, the percentage of co-authors that share the same main discipline as the focal 
scientist only has a significant (negative) effect in the OLS estimations; when we instrument 
the grant indicator, the effect from similar co-authors drops under the 10% significance level. 
This is rather surprising, as we would expect the variable to have a negative impact on entering 
new fields. One plausible explanation is that disciplines are defined too broadly to capture the 
impact of network similarity on the fine-grained field classification. Similarly, the percentage 
of co-authors with that have the same funding status – either receiving grants or not – as the 
focal researcher is not significant in our main 2SLS estimations. Again, more refined data 
regarding the percentage of co-authors that receive the same grant – i.e. on the same project – 
would be more suited to capture network effects. 
The stock of fields in which a scholar has previously published has a positive and significant 
(at 1% level) effect, each extra field that she has already published in raising the probability of 
entering a new one by 0.7%, with a similar effect on the distance between her main field and 
the newly-entered ones. Although not large, the effect signals a certain trend that past behaviour 
can predict future diversification conduct. 
We do not see any significant effect of gender, full-time employment status or the amount 
teaching hours. The former might be specially interesting for gender studies, as it shows that 
scientific exploration is not correlated with gender. Finally, academics that teach more classes 
have the same exploration behaviour as ‘pure researchers’, result which can be taken into 
account in internal evaluation policies that correlate research duties with productivity. 
In order to test the conditions under which our results remain robust, we performed a number 
of additional estimations. 
First, we test whether the choice of a 2-year lag for funding impacts our conclusions. We have 
re-estimated the 2SLS models by including different funding lags – from 1 to 5 years – and we 
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present a summary of the grant effect in Table IV.11 in Appendix.110 We see very similar 
patterns for 2 to 5 year lags, the negative effect of grants on entry in new fields and also on 
entry distance becoming even stronger over time. However, the 1-year lag of grants is not 
significantly different from zero at 10% level. We assert that this is due to the time required 
after receiving the grant to set up a team – including hiring doctoral students and postdocs – 
and performing research prior to publication. 
Lastly, we re-define our dependent variable to relax the definition of new entry and include 
any publications in a new (to the researcher) field, disregarding whether she publishes again in 
the same field afterwards. The results in Table IV.12 in Appendix show that the effects of most 
covariates are highly similar to our main specification, reinforcing the latter. The two 
differences come as a decrease in significance (from 5% to 10% level) of the grant indicator, 
corroborated with an increase in significance to 10% level of the full-time employment 
indicators. 
5 Conclusions 
We provide empirical evidence of the drivers behind entry in scientific fields that are new to 
the researcher, including an analysis of the role of research grants. Our results show that 
academics who receive competitive grants are less inclined to venture into new research fields, 
and they also venture into fields that are more similar to their past publication activity. This 
negative effect from grants on new field entry is only obtained when we correct for selection 
into funding. We also find that productivity and exploration are positively correlated, scholars 
with higher publication output being more likely to enter new and more diverse fields. 
Moreover, past track record of entering new fields is a positive predictor of similar future 
behaviour. Career effects suggest that higher-ranked professors tend to venture more in new 
and distant fields, but they do so later after receiving a promotion. Finally, we find little 
evidence that peer networks affect diversification, the only channel seemingly being through 
doctoral students supervised by the researcher, their number increasing both the probability to 
publish in new fields and the diversity of those fields. 
Our results suggest that grants lead researchers to stay within their established research fields 
rather than diversifying their portfolios by entering new and more diverse fields. Recent calls 
                                                 
110 We capture the entire life-span of grants, as a project can be funded for maximum five years. 
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from prominent scientists show that there is a pressing need to improve the design of funding 
mechanisms, which has highlighted that we still do not fully understand the amalgam of 
incentives provided through grants (Lane, 2009). Funding agencies advertise the success of 
their support for science, but many fail to provide empirical evidence of any causal effects 
(Gush et al., 2015). In the economics of science literature, the main focus with respect to the 
effects of science funding has been on productivity. Although undoubtedly very informative 
for policy makers, output is only one product of the scientific process (Lane, 2009). Our paper 
reveals how funding affects the diversity of output by (not) stimulating scientists to enter new 
areas of research. We do not take a normative view on the scope of funding. To the extent that 
policy makers desire to increase diversity of research, we show that some types of competitive 
grants that are focused on productivity can have the reverse effect – leading scientists to 
specialise in order to secure output based on their past research experience. On the other hand, 
this effect is helpful if the goal of policy is to produce more specialised research. 
Our study suggests a number of avenues for further analysis. First, the distribution of field 
taxonomy could be exploited further to distinguish whether entry in fields that are more 
different from one’s past expertise is affected by funding in a different way than entry in more 
similar fields. Related to this, our results suggest that exploration varies across disciplines that 
comprise related fields. It may also be the case that the effect of funding varies with discipline 
or at a higher level, which could be analysed by estimating the effects in split samples. 
Moreover, we only analyse one type of research funding, which is specifically designed for 
basic research. A useful addition to the data would provide information on other grants, such 
as European Research Council funds or grants offered by the private sector. The latter would 
primarily offer evidence whether exploratory behaviour is driven by a push towards applied 
research. 
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6 Appendix 
Table IV.4 List of Thomson Reuters ISI WoS scientific fields 
 Acoustics   Medical Ethics  Area Studies  
 Agricultural Economics & Policy   Medical Informatics  Business  
 Agricultural Engineering   Medical Laboratory Technology  Business, Finance  
 Agriculture  Medicine Communication  
 Agronomy   Metallurgy & Metallurgical Engineering  Criminology & Penology  
 Allergy   Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences  Demography  
 Anatomy & Morphology   Microbiology  Economics  
 Andrology   Microscopy  Education & Educational Research 
 Anaesthesiology   Mineralogy  Education 
 Astronomy & Astrophysics   Mining & Mineral Processing  Environmental Studies  
 Automation & Control Systems   Multidisciplinary Sciences  Ergonomics  
 Behavioural Sciences   Mycology  Ethics  
 Biochemical Research Methods   Nanoscience & Nanotechnology  Ethnic Studies  
 Biochemistry & Molecular Biology   Neuroimaging  Family Studies  
 Biodiversity Conservation   Neurosciences  Geography  
 Biology   Nuclear Science & Technology  Gerontology  
 Biophysics   Nursing  Health Policy & Services  
 Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology   Nutrition & Dietetics  History  
 Cardiac & Cardiovascular Systems   Obstetrics & Gynaecology  History & Philosophy of Science 
 Cell & Tissue Engineering   Oceanography  History of Social Sciences  
 Cell Biology   Oncology  Hospitality, Leisure, Sport & Tourism 
 Chemistry  Operations Research & Management Science  Industrial Relations & Labour 
 Clinical Neurology   Ophthalmology  Information Science & Library Science 
 Computer Science  Optics  International Relations  
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 Construction & Building Technology   Ornithology  Law  
 Critical Care Medicine   Orthopaedics  Linguistics  
 Crystallography   Otorhinolaryngology  Management  
 Dentistry, Oral Surgery & Medicine   Palaeontology  Nursing  
 Dermatology   Parasitology  Planning & Development  
 Developmental Biology   Pathology  Political Science  
 Ecology   Paediatrics  Psychiatry  
 Education  Peripheral Vascular Disease  Psychology 
 Electrochemistry   Pharmacology & Pharmacy  Public Administration  
 Emergency Medicine   Physics Public, Environmental & Occupational Health 
 Endocrinology & Metabolism   Physiology  Rehabilitation  
 Energy & Fuels   Plant Sciences  Social Issues  
 Engineering  Polymer Science  Social Sciences 
 Entomology   Psychiatry  Social Work  
 Environmental Sciences   Psychology  Sociology  
 Evolutionary Biology   Public, Environmental & Occupational Health  Substance Abuse  
 Fisheries   Radiology, Nuclear Medicine & Medical Imaging  Transportation  
 Food Science & Technology   Rehabilitation  Urban Studies  
 Forestry   Remote Sensing  Women's Studies  
 Gastroenterology & Hepatology   Reproductive Biology  Archaeology  
 Genetics & Heredity   Respiratory System  Architecture  
 Geochemistry & Geophysics   Rheumatology  Art  
 Geography, Physical   Robotics  Asian Studies  
 Geology   Soil Science  Classics  
 Geosciences, Multidisciplinary   Spectroscopy  Dance  
 Geriatrics & Gerontology   Sport Sciences  Film, Radio, Television  
 Health Care Sciences & Services   Statistics & Probability  Folklore  
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 Haematology   Substance Abuse  History  
 History & Philosophy of Science   Surgery  History & Philosophy of Science  
 Horticulture   Telecommunications  Humanities, Multidisciplinary  
 Imaging Science & Photographic Technology   Thermodynamics  Language & Linguistics  
 Immunology   Toxicology  Literary Reviews  
 Infectious Diseases   Transplantation  Literary Theory & Criticism  
 Instruments & Instrumentation   Transportation Science & Technology  Literature  
 Integrative & Complementary Medicine   Tropical Medicine  Medieval & Renaissance Studies  
 Limnology   Urology & Nephrology  Music  
 Marine & Freshwater Biology   Veterinary Sciences  Philosophy  
 Materials Science  Virology  Poetry  
 Mathematical & Computational Biology   Water Resources  Religion  
 Mathematics   Zoology  Theatre 
 Mechanics  Anthropology   
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Table IV.5 List of main scientific disciplines 
Agriculture & Environment 
Biosciences (General, Cellular & Subcellular Biology; Genetics) 
Chemistry 
Engineering 
Geosciences & Space Sciences 
Mathematics 
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I (General & Internal Medicine) 
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II (Non-Internal Medicine Specialized) 
Neuroscience & Behaviour 
Physics 
Biomedical Research 
Multidisciplinary Sciences 
Biology (Organismic & Supraorganismic Level) 
Table IV.6 Entry into and distance to new fields by main discipline  
  
Entry in 
new fieldb) 
Sum of 
new 
fieldsc) 
Maximum 
distanced) 
Sum of 
distancese) 
A Agriculture 0.40 0.79 0.38 0.96 
  (0.49) (1.24) (0.46) (1.86) 
B Biosciences 0.30 0.51 0.27 0.55 
  (0.46) (0.95) (0.41) (1.20) 
C Chemistry 0.29 0.53 0.26 0.56 
  (0.45) (1.08) (0.41) (1.32) 
E Engineering 0.33 0.76 0.31 1.04 
  (0.47) (1.40) (0.44) (2.65) 
G Geosciences 0.28 0.47 0.26 0.74 
  (0.45) (0.84) (0.41) (2.53) 
H Mathematics 0.19 0.34 0.18 0.42 
  (0.39) (0.86) (0.38) (1.11) 
I Medicine I (general) 0.34 0.61 0.30 0.58 
  (0.47) (1.08) (0.42) (1.07) 
M Medicine II (specialised) 0.27 0.49 0.25 0.64 
  (0.44) (1.02) (0.41) (2.13) 
N Neuroscience 0.20 0.34 0.17 0.53 
  (0.40) (0.87) (0.35) (2.12) 
P Physics 0.27 0.46 0.25 0.51 
  (0.44) (0.94) (0.41) (1.21) 
R Biomedical 0.19 0.36 0.17 0.43 
  (0.39) (0.88) (0.35) (1.32) 
Z Biology 0.37 0.69 0.33 0.78 
  (0.48) (1.16) (0.44) (1.60) 
a) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
b) Entry in new to the researcher fields market by binary indicator (0/1). 
c) Sum of new fields represents the average number of fields entered that were new to the researcher. 
d) Maximum distance between main field prior to year t and newly entered fields in t. 
e) Sum of distances between main field prior to year t and newly entered fields in t. 
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Table IV.7 Descriptive statistics at scholar level (yearly averages) 
Variable Mean s.d. 
Average entry in new fields 0.75 0.44 
Avg. maximum distance from main field 0.28 0.25 
Avg. sum of distances 0.63 0.86 
Average # of fields 4.44 3.39 
Maximum # of fields 7.43 4.77 
Stock of fields 13.24 8.27 
Co-authors (#) 13.61 19.75 
Co-authors in same discipline (%) 0.41 0.31 
Co-authors with same grant status (%) 0.37 0.26 
Low productivity 0.54 0.39 
Medium productivity 0.33 0.31 
High productivity 0.13 0.25 
PhDs 0.34 0.52 
Seniority 8.91 7.83 
Teaching load 3.87 3.75 
Assistant professor 0.30 0.40 
Associate professor 0.25 0.33 
Professor 0.21 0.33 
Full professor 0.24 0.40 
Male 0.89 0.32 
Full-time employment 0.90 0.28 
Quality pre-92 0.84 1.03 
Start after ‘92 0.47 0.50 
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Table IV.8 Average entry rates by covariate category 
  New entry Maximum distance 
  mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Seniority 
Junior 0.347 (0.476) 0.315 (0.436) 
Senior 0.263 (0.440) 0.242 (0.408) 
Talent 
Low 0.315 (0.464) 0.288 (0.428) 
High 0.291 (0.454) 0.266 (0.419) 
Productivity 
Low 0.233 (0.423) 0.214 (0.391) 
Medium 0.371 (0.483) 0.338 (0.444) 
High 0.414 (0.493) 0.379 (0.455) 
Academic rank 
Assistant 0.292 (0.455) 0.265 (0.415) 
Associate 0.301 (0.459) 0.274 (0.420) 
Professor 0.304 (0.460) 0.279 (0.425) 
Full Prof. 0.314 (0.464) 0.291 (0.433) 
Stock 
Low 0.257 (0.437) 0.234 (0.401) 
High 0.343 (0.475) 0.315 (0.439) 
Team size 
Low 0.236 (0.425) 0.218 (0.395) 
High 0.366 (0.482) 0.333 (0.442) 
Team similarity 
Low 0.270 (0.444) 0.249 (0.412) 
High 0.334 (0.472) 0.303 (0.432) 
a) Seniority, talent, stock, team size and similarity have been split at the median value in the 
sample. 
Table IV.9 t-tests for independent variables by funding status 
 Mean t-test 
 Funded Unfunded t p>t 
Co-authors (#) 22.62 10.57 14.95 0.00 
Co-authors same discipline (%) 0.51 0.36 11.62 0.00 
Co-authors same grant status (%) 0.43 0.34 7.26 0.00 
Low productivity 0.33 0.62 -19.61 0.00 
High productivity 0.21 0.10 10.77 0.00 
Medium productivity 0.45 0.28 12.53 0.00 
PhDs 0.70 0.30 14.95 0.00 
Seniority 11.41 9.34 8.79 0.00 
Teaching 4.64 4.31 2.65 0.01 
Assistant Professor 0.07 0.27 -16.48 0.00 
Associate Professor 0.23 0.28 -3.58 0.00 
Professor 0.27 0.22 3.41 0.00 
Full Professor 0.43 0.22 15.22 0.00 
Gender (m) 0.92 0.90 2.77 0.01 
Full-time contract 0.98 0.89 10.41 0.00 
Quality pre-92 1.20 0.80 12.24 0.00 
Start after ‘92 0.25 0.41 -11.03 0.00 
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Table IV.10 Selection into funding and funding effect on entry – 2SLS 
 
First-
stage 
Structural 
Grant t-2  -0.484** 
  (0.218) 
Grant instrument t-2 0.350***  
 (0.065)  
Seniority t-1 -0.003 -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Quality pre-92 0.033*** 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
High productivity cluster t-1 0.027 0.098*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
Medium productivity cluster t-1 0.058*** 0.103*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) 
Associate professor t-1 0.079*** 0.074** 
 (0.027) (0.034) 
Professor t-1 0.144*** 0.144*** 
 (0.036) (0.049) 
Full professor t-1 0.232*** 0.231*** 
 (0.049) (0.068) 
Co-authors t-1 0.001** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Co-authors same disc. t-1 0.080*** -0.004 
 (0.026) (0.031) 
Co-authors same grant status t-1 -0.058** 0.007 
 (0.025) (0.029) 
PhD graduates t-1 0.052*** 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) 
Stock of fields t-1 0.005** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Start after 1992 -0.05 0.011 
 (0.033) (0.031) 
Gender (m) -0.03 0.011 
 (0.037) (0.036) 
Full-time t-1 0.113*** 0.058 
 (0.025) (0.040) 
Teaching t-1 -0.008*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 5009 
Researchers 757 
Anderson under-id 28.21*** 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by researcher in parentheses. 
c) Discipline indicators and intercept estimated but not shown in table. 
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Table IV.11 Comparison of 2SLS coefficients for different lags of funding 
 New field entry Maximum distance 
1-year lag 0.007 -0.079 
 (0.236) (0.221) 
2-year lag -0.484** -0.542*** 
 (0.218) (0.210) 
3-year lag -0.441** -0.462** 
 (0.220) (0.208) 
4-year lag -0.883*** -0.883*** 
 (0.327) (0.315) 
5-year lag -0.714** -0.728** 
 (0.320) (0.308) 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by researcher in parentheses. 
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Table IV.12 OLS and 2SLS estimates of determinants of ‘non-sticky’ entry 
 Non sticky entry (0/1) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 
 a b c 
Grant t-2  0.028 -0.399* 
  (0.020) (0.224) 
Seniority t-1 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Quality pre-92 -0.001 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
High productivity cluster t-1 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) 
Medium productivity cluster t-1 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.101*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) 
Associate professor t-1 0.042* 0.039 0.079** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) 
Professor t-1 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.148*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.049) 
Full professor t-1 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.236*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.068) 
Co-authors t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Co-authors same disc. t-1 -0.017 -0.019 0.015 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.031) 
Co-authors same grant status t-1 0.058** 0.059** 0.034 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) 
PhD graduates t-1 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.054*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) 
Stock of fields t-1 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Start after 1992 0.035 0.036 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) 
Gender (m) 0.039 0.04 0.025 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) 
Full-time t-1 0.024 0.021 0.068* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.041) 
Teaching t-1 0.002 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 5009 
Researchers 757 
Anderson under-id   28.21*** 
a) ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
b) Robust standard errors clustered by researcher in parentheses. 
c) Discipline indicators and intercept estimated but not shown in table. 
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Conclusions 
My research sheds light on the behavioural changes both firms and individuals go through when 
faced with an intricate R&D policy environment. In a first instance, I show that complexity 
leads companies to rely on their peers’ decisions to adopt newly introduced tax exemptions. 
Then, responding to recent calls for a combined analysis of multiple policies, I analyse how 
separate policy measures and their mix affect the firms that adopt them. And finally, I focus on 
individual researchers and how they are changing their scientific behaviour when receiving 
competitive grants. By connecting these analyses, I adopt a systemic view of innovation policy 
at two different levels – scientific research and industrial R&D. Furthermore, I incorporate an 
often forgotten element of innovation environments – interaction between its users and between 
users and institutions (policy). 
The first chapter makes the following contributions. First, it complements literature on support 
for R&D by showing how peer effects influence firms’ usage of public support measures. An 
accurate understanding of the dynamics of firm choices is essential for reducing inefficiencies, 
such as the belated absorption of public support for R&D. My results suggest that firms develop 
strategies to cope with the complexity of the R&D support landscape by imitating firms who 
adopt earlier. The finding that imitation occurs in peer groups that follow industry and distance-
based lines suggests possible policy interventions for reducing inefficiencies in usage of R&D 
support. More specifically, adoption by eligible firms could be expedited by communicating 
the measure to sufficiently fine-grained sectors and in a geographically-distributed way. As 
opposed to broad policy communications, ‘narrowcasting’ would help to reach many localized 
firm clusters, allowing rapid peer-to-peer influence, once initial adoption has taken place. 
Second, the establishment of peer effects as a significant factor driving firms’ selection into 
support schemes informs the methodological literature on selection bias in program evaluation 
(Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). The existence of peer effects calls for looking beyond the 
individual firm to explain selection into support programs. 
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Using recent advances in identification strategy for peer effects (Bramoullé et al., 2009; De 
Giorgi et al., 2010), this chapter also contributes to the broader literature on peer effects. Given 
the high degree of clustering in many ‘small world’ firm networks (e.g. Fleming & Marx, 2006), 
exploiting intransitivity in firms’ networks is more generally applicable to identify peer effects 
in other settings. 
In the second and third chapters I analyse the additionality of subsidies and tax credits on firms’ 
R&D activity. I provide empirical evidence that firms that mix direct and indirect support 
respond better to treatment than those using a single policy. My results also reveal that tax 
credits and subsidies have different effects on budgetary decisions regarding basic and applied 
research and development. I find that subsidies seem to mostly increase spending on research, 
whereas tax credits also positively affect development activities. 
Furthermore, although I do not find any additionality of subsidies as a single treatment on R&D 
expenditure, my results do not indicate any substitution effects either. In other words, only 
receiving grants does not increase private expenses on R&D, nor does it decrease them. The 
central implication is that, should the goal of the government be to increase the overall volume 
of research and development in the economy, a subsidy-only policy might do the job. On the 
other hand, should the goal be to raise private funding of R&D, then using tax credits or a policy 
mix seems the more effective choice. 
This part of my research also provides evidence that regional and national policies in Belgium 
reinforce each other. I show in the third chapter that subsidies – a regional measure – strengthen 
the effects of federal tax credits by further increasing the speed and scale of R&D for users of 
the policy mix. I thus build on recent literature on the mix of multi-level policy, as advocated 
by Martin (2016) and following empirical results from the US produced by Lanahan and 
Feldman (2015), among others. 
Finally, I shift focus to the individual researcher to explore to what extent grants affect the 
diversity of scientific output. The competitive nature of funding leads researchers to stay within 
their established research fields rather than diversifying their portfolios by entering new and 
more diverse fields. Recent calls from prominent scientists show that there is a pressing need 
to improve the design of funding mechanisms, which has highlighted that we still do not fully 
understand the amalgam of incentives provided through grants (Lane, 2009). My research 
reveals how funding affects the diversity of output by (not) stimulating scientists to enter new 
areas of research. To the extent that policy makers desire to increase diversity of research, I 
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show that some types of competitive grants that are focused on productivity can have the reverse 
effect – leading scientists to specialise in order to secure output based on their past research 
experience. On the other hand, this effect is helpful if the goal of policy is to produce more 
specialised research. 
Combined, my findings have both policy and managerial implications. First, they provide much 
needed empirical evidence of the effects of funding on R&D. Second, they show that 
additionality goes beyond R&D inputs and outputs and touches research behaviour itself, both 
at firm and at individual level. And finally, they help understand what characteristics should be 
incorporated in funding schemes to avoid substitution and crowding-out, but also to reduce 
incremental research and encourage exploration. 
Far from answering all the policy-relevant questions, my work triggers several avenues for 
further research. First, while I do show that firms that do not use tax credits can be influenced 
to do so by their peers, it would be interesting to explore which types of companies are leaders 
and which are followers in the take-up of policy support. Second, relating the speed of adoption 
to additionality might reveal whether firms that are slower to use support also respond less to 
it. And third, better data on inter-firm interactions would allow a more robust identification of 
peer groups and of the flow of information within them. Although my analysis seems robust to 
possible mis-specification of groups, it would benefit from comparing its results to a setting 
comprising observed networks of firms. 
Regarding the multitude of policies available to companies performing R&D, more complete 
data sets are required in order to further mitigate hidden treatment effects stemming from 
unobserved support that firms may use simultaneously. Reinforcing recent evidence (Dumont, 
2013, 2015; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015), I have briefly shown that failing to account for this 
effect can lead to an over-estimation of the impact of single policies. Similarly, in my analysis 
I aggregate various types of subsidies and tax credits due to data constraints. Dumont (2015) 
and Hottenrott et al. (2014) have shown that there is variation in the effect of these policies 
when they are split into finer components. However, their ability to do so rests again on the 
availability of data. The former paper does so for federal tax credits, while the latter analyses 
regional subsidies in Flanders. Aggregated national data – which I use in this thesis – is not 
systematically collected by local authorities in the same form, which renders it hardly usable if 
one tries to analyse it at high resolution. This being said, I applaud recent efforts by authorities 
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at all levels of government to provide better access to more data for researchers, and I believe 
that they will be rewarded with more robust evidence for policy-making in the near future. 
Finally, my fourth chapter shows how scientific grants can change individuals’ research 
orientation by driving them towards specialisation. Although undoubtedly relevant, in my paper 
I only analyse one type of research funding, which is specifically designed for basic research. 
As such, its effect on exploration might be instrument-specific and, moreover, it may be 
simultaneously used with other types of grants and interact with them in ways not captured in 
my analysis. A useful addition to the data would provide information on other grants, such as 
European Research Council funds or grants offered by the private sector. The latter would 
primarily offer evidence whether exploratory behaviour is driven by a push towards applied 
research. Yet again, it comes down to more and better data.
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